As far as the Embassy can remember, this is the first time that a
Prime Minister, who was not at the same time holding the portfolio
[Page 579]
of Foreign Affairs,
has called, and his action was made more striking by the fact that I
had already made an appointment to see him at his office at the Quai
d’Orsay today, November 22nd. It would seem that the French
Government is disturbed by the lack of sympathy for France in
foreign countries and is endeavoring to correct it by increasing the
personal contact between members of the Government and the
diplomatic missions in Paris. It has been noticeable, likewise, that
more of the cabinet colleagues of M. Flandin have called in person
on me than has been the case in any government since I have been
here.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in
France (Marriner)
Paris, November 21,
1934.
The President of the Council, M. Flandin, called on the
Ambassador this afternoon, apparently as part of a policy I
presume he has recommended to the cabinet, as more of the
members of the present cabinet have called on the Ambassador
than of any previous cabinet in my recollection.
M. Flandin began by asking what news the Ambassador had from
America, and agreed with Mr. Straus’ reply that things were
evidently going better and that the President had received a
remarkable testimony of support and was now in a stronger
position than ever before with a tremendous majority in both
Houses of Congress, including over two-thirds in the Senate. The
Ambassador said that M. Flandin had the advantage of him as he
had seen President Roosevelt more recently than he had.49 The President of
the Council said that, on his return to France, he had surprised
a good many of his colleagues by his general optimism with
respect to the United States and his belief that the President’s
efforts were working out, contrary to the views generally
expressed in the press here and on the Bourse.
The President of the Council then asked what the Ambassador heard
in these days from London with reference to the naval
negotiation.
Mr. Straus said that he was not currently informed, but that we
were apparently playing a game of patience with the Japanese, in
which the English were aiding us, particularly as the Dominions
were not in favor of the Japanese contentions. Should the
Washington Treaty be denounced,50 it would still remain uncertain as to whether
[Page 580]
something more like it
might not be put back in its place, the Japanese saving their
face by the fact that they could say that they had rid
themselves of that incubus.
M. Flandin then asked what news we had from Germany.
The Ambassador said that our direct information from there was
very slight, and asked what basis there was in the statements of
M. Archimbaud, Reporter on the war budget of the Chamber Finance
Committee, concerning German armaments.
M. Flandin said that in general his information was that these
armament figures were quite exact, although he could not say
just how the total of four million mobilizable men was arrived
at. There could, however, be no question in the great increase
of the Reichswehr on which, since June 30th, Hitler found
himself dependent, and to whom he was giving a large measure of
independence. He said that he felt it was the German scheme to
have sufficient arms and equipment to prevent any invasion or
attack on German territory, and to develop at the same time the
strongest sudden striking force possible, namely, air attacks
with bombs and gases. He said that this scheme naturally
endangered London as much as Paris and that up to the present
there had been no demonstration that there was any adequate
defence for sudden and unpremeditated attack of this character.
He said that, while talk in Germany centered on Paris as a point
of attack, he felt that their projects were equally fixed on
London.
M. Flandin did not reply to the question as to whether or not the
whole northern coasts of Germany were open to return attack from
airplane carriers.
The Ambassador then inquired how Germany would be able to sustain
itself from the point of view of food in case of war, as
certainly it would have the whole world against it.
M. Flandin said that Germany naturally hoped that any such war
would be brief and that they were developing to the highest
degree every form of substitute for food and matériel and had
thus far made great progress with regard to synthetic petrol. He
did say, however, that this problem of food supply was the one
which made him less worried about any immediate attack as the
problem was certainly not solved as yet to Germany’s
satisfaction. He then said that these problems of security were
not the only ones troubling the world, but that of monetary
stabilization equally hung heavy over all international affairs.
He asked if we had any news or indications of our country’s
intentions, as of late he had noticed we seemed less disinclined
to stabilize than Great Britain.
[Page 581]
Mr. Straus said that M. Flandin’s contact was more recent than
his own; he had no knowledge, but it was his belief that we were
opposed to any further devaluation of our monetary unit.
M. Flandin expressed the opinion that Great Britain was at
present the center of the problem and in actual fact, until she
was willing to stabilize, the general financial and commercial
relations could not be smoothed out or the world set running
again on predictable bases.
The Ambassador then said that, as M. Flandin knew, he had an
appointment with him for to-morrow, but that if M. Flandin had
time he would like to raise two questions he had planned to
discuss then. The first one concerned the Double Taxation
Treaty, which was signed over 2½ years ago, ratified by the
American Senate in May 1932, and still unratified by the French
Parliament. The Ambassador reviewed the history up to the
moment, including the failure to ratify last July, despite the
efforts of M. Germain-Martin. The Ambassador pointed out that
the failure of this ratification caused continuous irritation
among American business men in France, and added that
ratification would no doubt be a useful gesture in eliminating
one of the causes of friction between the two countries. M.
Flandin promised to talk with M. Germain-Martin on the
subject.
The second question was one concerning which the Ambassador had
already talked to M. Barthou twice, the second time on the
evening before he left for Marseille, and with M. Laval, namely:
the French debt to the United States. Mr. Straus said that his
ideas were altogether informal, entirely his own, and
constituted no governmental step, but merely an idea for
appropriate exploration. He then proceeded to set forth his
ideas, as reported in his despatch to the Department, No. 1183
of September 4, 1934, giving the substance of his conversation
with M. Barthou on August 31, 1934.
M. Flandin then said that he would ask a question or two, his
first being, whether the total of the sum involved in such a
discussion would be that of the Mellon–Bérenger Agreement, plus
interest.
The Ambassador replied that we had no other sum to go on and that
it had been worked out considering various elements of the debt
up to the moment of that agreement.
M. Flandin’s second question was whether the amounts involved in
American expenditure in a given year might not overrun the
amount of exchange available in France for the purpose,
considering that France would likewise in any year have to spend
money in the United States for the purchase of raw materials,
such as oil, cotton, etc., and whether the Ambassador’s proposal
was to utilize for the purposes he suggested merely the
difference in trade balances.
[Page 582]
Mr. Straus replied he had not thought this phase of the matter
out, but that he did not feel that, if the term of the
obligations to be used for these international payments was long
enough, the increment in any year would be large enough
adversely to affect the situation M. Flandin described. That is
to say: should the agreement be made to run for 150 years, it
would be stipulated that not more than l/150th in any given year
would be available for use by Americans purchasing commodities
or services in France.
The Ambassador then proceeded to emphasize the fact that the
initiation of such an idea, which would involve admission of
indebtedness, naturally would have to come from the French side,
as it would be a form of refinancing and it was naturally up to
the debtor to make a proposal: that he could not guarantee of
course whether or not such an offer would be acceptable as it
was personal to him.
M. Flandin said that, on the other hand, it would be impossible
for France to make such an offer publicly only to be refused,
and that the matter would have to be gone into by mutual
explorations before it could be brought to public light. The
Ambassador agreed thoroughly with this, while still maintaining
the interest for the first move to come from France in such
definite though confidential form that it could not subsequently
be altered or appear like a “fishing expedition”.
M. Flandin took his leave, expressing his gratitude to the
Ambassador for this opportunity to talk over material troubling
the relations of the two countries and for the Ambassador’s
goodwill for the settlement of these problems.
The Ambassador recalled a conversation at Rambouillet in which M.
Flandin had mentioned the exaggerated stories appearing in the
American press with reference to the recent change in
government. Mr. Straus said that the American press certainly
had no intention of distorting or misrepresenting, but that he
had found on inquiry that many of them felt that they were not
adequately informed and did not have access to the most
authentic news sources. The Ambassador said that both the
President and Secretary of State in the United States received
the press at stated intervals and answered, or refused to
answer, questions put to them on those occasions, but that the
contact gave the press confidence and a feeling that they had
the ultimate word. M. Flandin said that he realized this and
that he would be glad to receive the American press on Monday
next at the Quai d’Orsay and indicated that, if this were found
useful, he might be available every Monday at the same time for
this purpose.
On leaving, M. Flandin expressed his admiration of the chancery
building which completed the original plan of the Place de la
Concorde.
