500.A15A4/2481: Telegram
The American Delegate (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 12—9:45 a.m.]
830. 1. After conversation with Eden I am supplementing Davis’ 155 April 6, 4 p.m. from London with further details.
[Page 47]2. Eden assured me with vigor and decision that any formal commitment that Great Britain made along the lines of guarantees of execution would only be against a quid pro quo from France in the matter of reduction with especial reference to aviation. He is fully alive to the fact that through the whole course of disarmament discussion lasting over 8 years numerous advances have been made, not only by his country but by the United States, to meet the French point of view and that as a result we had nothing tangible in the way of promises of disarmament from France. He, therefore, thought it essential that this big card should not be played except for appreciable results.
3. What the British Government is contemplating is a possible acquiescence with some modification in the proposal made by Paul-Boncour to Henderson last December2 (I left a copy of this proposal with Moffat on December 28th when after consultation with him and Davis I wrote to Henderson regarding it). Eden added that what they hoped for from us in this connection was a reaffirmation of Davis’ declaration of May 22 but so phrased as to apply not only to the Pact of Paris but also to the Disarmament Convention. I made no observation on this point (I only received today, April 12, your 130, April 2, 7 p.m. to London).
4. Eden then went on to say that Simon was turning over further details in his mind. Eden made clear to us that these ideas existed as yet in Simon’s mind only. Simon contemplates a European subcommittee of the Permanent Disarmament Commission. In the event of a breach of the convention by a European state this subcommittee would establish the fact and notify the violator giving time for the breach to be remedied. If at the end of this period the breach still existed the European subcommittee would establish by a note that a breach had occurred within the meaning of the convention and that the pertinent penalties were applicable. Simon contemplates further that the convention or a unilateral declaration would make it plain that when the situation had developed to the point sketched above Great Britain would not act until it had consulted with the United States and until the United States had declared that it would act affirmatively under Davis’ declaration of May 22.3
5. At this point in the conversation I said that of course I could only speak personally but that I felt strongly that any arrangement which specified that the action of the United States was essential and that threw the burden of decision for sanctions on the United States would be distinctly unpalatable and not practical politics with us.
[Page 48]6. (I feel even more strongly on this point than I felt it advisable to state to Eden without instructions. Simon’s scheme would seem to me a means of making a so-called concession to France at our expense. In other words the British would agree to “automatic” action in the event of a violation and on a vote of a committee but at the same time leave to the United States a final veto or approbation of such action before they themselves became engaged. This would mean nothing less than an ultimate decision by the United States when punitive action was to be taken that should be most advantageous on the Continent of Europe.)
7. Eden also touched on the question of Germany’s participation in the negotiation of a disarmament treaty. He felt strongly that Germany must be brought into the picture shortly and before any real drafting of a convention. I gained the impression from Eden that the French now have the same idea having abandoned their previous thought that a convention could be drafted without Germany. There seems no doubt that the British are keeping in very close touch with the German Government with regard to present diplomatic negotiations and presumably they will choose the proper time to try to have German demands satisfied sufficiently to bring them back to Geneva.
8. The most dispiriting thing that Eden encountered with regard to his trip was the complete unreadiness of either Germany or France to accept the other’s word. This led him to speak of other difficulties. He found Hitler really disposed to draw up a convention and ready to make undertakings which Eden felt convinced Hitler would carry out. When Eden reported his conviction to his own Foreign Office however he found profound skepticism there against which he has had to struggle. He added that François-Poncet was unable to report his real convictions to his Government because he would be completely disbelieved. The atmosphere of distrust renders the negotiations infinitely more difficult.
9. I feel sure that the Department will appreciate the extremely confidential character of this message.
Cipher text to London for Davis.