The German memorandum may be said to close the first chapter of the
proposed Eastern Pact. Whether there will be others remains to be seen.
The Foreign Office by no means rejects the idea of further negotiations
and indeed intimates as a general direction in which such might be
conducted either a series of bilateral agreements, or a collective
obligation of non-aggression together with consultation of the powers
interested.
The German note is a smooth and clever document, enabling this Government
to contrast itself favorably as a protagonist of peace in comparison
with France and Russia. As far as one can see here, the net result of
the Franco-Russian proposal sponsored by England is to establish a
common ground of agreement between Germany and Poland, to give the
Germans a pretext for making a more effective plea for equality of
armament than they have hitherto perhaps been able to do, and generally
to expose the unpractical side of the Franco-Russian scheme. Such a
result would seem to be equivalent to a diplomatic defeat for France and
the Soviets, and one is tempted to wonder how Barthou and Litvinoff came
to place themselves in a position which they might have foreseen would
have the result indicated.
Among my colleagues I have found two different points of view expressed;
one, that the project for an Eastern Pact was merely to prepare the
ground for a Franco-Russian alliance; and the other that the French
persuaded themselves that the main danger of war lies in the Far East.
The position of the British can be more readily understood. They are
only interested to a very secondary degree themselves
[Page 510]
in the Pact; their advocacy of it
presumably relieving them for the time being of the perennial French
pressure for guarantees of security. They would have been indirectly
benefited had the Pact turned out to be a success, and they are no worse
off by reason of its rejection.
[Enclosure—Translation]
German Memorandum Replying to the French and
Russian Proposal for an Eastern Pact of Mutual Assistance
In June of this year the French Government and the Government of the
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics verbally informed the German
Government of the broad outlines of the plan for a so-called Eastern
Pact of Mutual Assistance. In July the British Government
transmitted a written scheme of a Pact;40 according to this draft the first part of the
new Pact system has in view a treaty between Germany, Poland,
Russia, Czecho-Slowakia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; the
chief stipulations provided that in the case of a crisis these
States should proceed to joint consultations and in the case of an
attack by one of the Contracting Parties against another of the
Contracting Parties they should lend immediate military assistance
to the country attacked. This eight-Power treaty is to be
supplemented by an Additional Treaty between France and Russia in
which on the one hand Russia would undertake the same obligations
which England and Italy have undertaken as guarantors of the Rhine
Pact of Locarno and whereby, on the other hand, France would be
considered as a signatory of the eight-Power treaty so far as
Germany and Russia were concerned and would be entitled to
participate in consultations of these Powers.
On the basis of the informations hitherto received by the German
Government with regard to the plan many important points are still
left open. Nevertheless the German Government have carefully
examined the fundamental principles of such a Pact system. The
informations received call for certain observations which the German
Government would like to make at this stage to the Governments in
question. These remarks will, no doubt, help to clear the
situation.
There is an observation of a fundamental character which the German
Government must make at the outset. They have in the course of the
disarmament negotiations always held that by far the most effective
way of guaranteeing the security of all countries would be a general
disarmament or at least the establishment of a reasonable and
[Page 511]
just proportion of
armaments between the different States. At the same time they
expressed that they would be prepared to participate in other
agreements of a political character in so far as these agreements
complied with the demands for complete reciprocity and in so far as
they actually would serve as guarantees of peace. It was with this
idea in mind that the German Government have repeatedly offered to
conclude long-term non-aggression pacts with all neighbouring
countries, renouncing the use of force in any form. The German
Government stands by this attitude. They desire nothing more than
peace for Germany. They firmly reject the idea of aggression against
any other State or the use of any kind of force in international
relations. On the other hand it is only logical that they can not
participate in any kind of international system of security so long
as other Powers will contest German equality of rights with regard
to armaments. A self-respecting nation can not be expected to enter
into a special kind of political relationship with other Powers, if
they simultaneously treat it as a second-class nation and as a
nation of minor rights, where a question is concerned which is
inseparably bound up with what this relationship aims at. Moreover,
any system of security which is not firmly based upon equality of
military rights must in practice necessarily work out to the
disadvantage of the State differentiated. Considering the protracted
discussion concerning the relation between security and disarmament,
considering the Five-Power Declaration of December 1932,41 as
well as the facts which led up to Germany’s withdrawal from the
Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, and considering
more especially the disarmament negotiations between the Great
Powers in the course of the first months of this year, the German
Government did not expect to be called upon to participate in a Pact
system involving extensive new obligations, while her equality is
still being treated as an open question. According to the documents
transmitted by the British Government the latter obtained the
consent of the French Government to a declaration bringing the
conclusion of the proposed Pact into relationship with the
disarmament question. This declaration would seem to confirm the
apprehensions of the German Government with regard to what the
initiators of the plan are aiming at, rather than to dispel them.
“The conclusion of such a Pact and Germany’s participation in the
system of reciprocal guarantees now contemplated”—so the British
draft says—”would afford the best ground for the resumption of
negotiations for the conclusion of a convention such as would
provide for a reasonable application of the principle of German
equality of rights in a regime of security for all nations.”42 The interpretation
[Page 512]
given to the declaration
by the initiators of the plan appears clearly from a public speech
made by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs when he stated that
there could be no question of disarmament being negotiated parallel
to the Eastern Pact; it could only be said that the conclusion of
the Eastern Pact might perhaps create a new atmosphere which would
permit to examine what effect this Pact might have on disarmament.
The German Government must emphasize that they can not be a party to
such a policy. Without justification Germany is called upon to make
prestations by anticipation which she would have to reject, even if
the construction of the Pact did justice to the German point of
view. The negotiations with regard to the realization of German
equality of rights in the beginning of this year led to an almost
complete agreement between the British, Italian and the German
Governments;43 on the basis accepted
by the three Powers they might rapidly and without difficulty have
been brought to a conclusion, if all Powers concerned had been
willing. If now the realization of the new demands for security is
to be given preference to an international settlement of
disarmaments, thus leaving the latter in a state of complete
uncertainty, the German Government can not agree to this; more
especially as all the highly-armed States have since last spring
proceeded to a further increase of armaments, thereby more and more
reducing the chances of a general limitation of armaments, to say
nothing of a general disarmament.
There is another point in connection with the previous question.
Under the present scheme the entry into force of the new Pact system
is subject to the entry of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
to the League of Nations. No mention is made in the scheme of
Germany’s future relations to the League of Nations. If this
omission is to indicate that the initiators of the plan are taking
it for granted that Germany will return to the League of Nations as
a matter of course, the German Government must refer to their
declaration repeatedly made that Germany’s future relationship to
the League of Nations can not be discussed so long as her equality
of rights is in any way questioned from certain quarters.
This decisive point having been made clear, the German Government
would make the following observations with regard to the proposed
Pact system.
It is evident that the essential point of the system is the
obligation of the Contracting Parties to lend immediate assistance
in case of war. Thus the idea of joint assistance of States to
another State in case of attack is once more put into discussion, an
idea repeatedly brought forward in varying forms in certain quarters
ever since the foundation of the League of Nations. All
international negotiations
[Page 513]
conducted in connection with the sanction clauses of the Covenant
have shown with increasing evidence the extraordinary difficulties
met by any attempt to introduce a collective Pact system providing
for the obligation of an automatic military assistance, a system
which in a crisis would function justly and on an equal basis for
all. These difficulties hardly diminish if a system of sanctions and
guarantees comprising all States or a large number of States is
replaced by regional Pacts of certain groups of States. Except under
circumstances and in the case of problems of quite a special kind as
they exist, for example, in the case of the Rhine Pact of Locarno, a
regional Pact system of this kind will in practice, as a general
rule, either fail completely or it will merely operate along the
lines indicated by other political engagements and interests of
different Powers and corresponding in no way to the aims of the
Pact. Even on the supposition that at the critical moment, the
contracting parties will give preference to considerations of
loyalty to the Pact over other engagements and interests, it is
difficult to imagine how such a Pact could afford adequate
protection to partners of military inferiority against partners of
strong military power. Moreover the tendency to secure as far as
possible the automatic functioning of assistance would involve the
danger of the Pact being put into operation more easily in an
arbitrary way and by political machinations.
If the proposed Pact system is examined from the points of view
indicated above, serious doubts must arise as to whether, under the
existing circumstances, this system can really be considered as an
effective instrument of peace, working indiscriminately under all
circumstances. The question arises as to what considerations have
led to the selection of the eight Powers named as partners of the
Eastern Pact. In this connection it must further be asked for what
reason France is called upon to act as a guarantor of the Eastern
Pact, and for what reasons this guarantee is to be so stipulated in
a special treaty, that it only applies to Germany and the Soviet
Union and not to the other Contracting Parties to the Eastern Pact.
The serious complications which might arise from this or a similar
grouping of Powers can easily be gathered, if you consider the
geographical situation of the Powers concerned, their individual
political interests and furthermore the fact that several of these
countries are already bound by other political engagements. Far from
putting into doubt the loyalty of the Governments concerned, yet the
German Government does not feel convinced that the engagements
stipulated by the new Pact system would in every case prove
sufficiently strong and that they would not come into conflict with
given realities. The assistance provided for in the Pact is, in the
case of war, to be given “immediately” i. e. at once and
unconditionally, no time being given to wait for the result of the
consultation between the Governments or the decision of
[Page 514]
any other Institution and
no allowance being made for the agreement of the States obliged to
offer assistance. Is it not likely that, under such a system, the
Powers obliged to lend assistance will have different views as to
which of the States drawn into the conflict has been attacked? Is it
not likely that in case of such a divergence arising it would easily
happen that either the attitude of the strongest Power or Powers
would decide and compel the other partners to follow suit, or that
the question at issue would lead to the formation of opposing groups
among the partners, resulting in a war of all against all? But,
putting aside the possibility of such differences of opinion, would
it not lead to extraordinary difficulties in many cases, if the
Contracting Parties are bound not only to military assistance but
also to permit the troops of any other partner to march through
their own territory? Finally it should not be left out of
consideration that the formation of such groups, in so far as it
actually increases the security of Contracting Parties, might, for
this very reason, under certain circumstances cause reactions on
States not being partners which would be out of harmony with the
general interest in the preservation of the peace of the world.
The example of the Rhine Pact of Locarno, providing under certain
circumstances, for the automatic assistance of the Guarantor Powers,
can not be cited as against these possibilities. The Rhine Pact
deals with a very concrete and clearly defined political problem.
Its application was from the outset sufficiently clear to the
limited group of Powers concerned to enable them to form an accurate
opinion on the extension of their obligations. Complications as
indicated above are, as matters stand, practically out of the
question. There is no need to prove that matters would be quite
different in the case of the new Pact.
The Governments now supporting the plan of an Eastern Pact must
appreciate that the German Government can not take into
consideration such an extensive project but with the utmost caution
and after weighing carefully all possibilities. The central
situation of Germany in the midst of heavily armed states makes this
imperative. How can Germany undertake the obligation to intervene in
indefinite conflicts of other States which do not concern her or in
which she is not interested? She would thereby make herself the
battleground for all possible conflagrations in Europe and draw upon
herself dangers which no serious adherent of such a Pact can
possibly expect her to face. These apprehensions can not simply be
dispelled by stating that the object of the Pact is precisely to
prevent the outbreak of war and that therefore this eventuality need
not be seriously considered. That is a petitio
principii; for by so reasoning you are taking for granted
what, in the opinion of the German Government, must be a matter of
doubt, i. e. whether such a Pact would actually have the effect of
guaranteeing the maintenance of peace between the Contracting
Parties under all circumstances.
[Page 515]
There is therefore no ground whatever for the
argument that any apprehensions with regard to the consequences of
the proposed Pact provisions may be dispelled by expressing the mere
hope that these provisions will never receive practical
application.
Furthermore Germany can hardly expect any real advantages from the
Pact which would outweigh the dangers referred to. The German
Government can not refrain from speaking quite openly about certain
delicate points raised by the problem presented to them, the other
Governments having opened the plan of the Eastern Pact to public
discussion although they could have no doubt as to the German point
of view. The German Government is under the impression that the
Additional Treaty referring to the mutual obligations of France and
Soviet Russia is a construction which is neither called for nor
suggested by the natural requirements of the situation in Eastern
Europe nor by any need for a greater stability of the Locarno
system. Whatever may be the ideas of the other Powers interested in
eastern questions or partners to the Locarno system with regard to
the part now to be played by the two countries France and Russia,
Germany can not see how she might gain thereby. Even if the
Additional Treaty were so drawn up that the guarantee given by
France and Russia were to act equally in favor of Germany, this
would, as a matter of fact, only constitute a formal equality. The
German Government can not consider it a practical reality that
Germany, one day, should be defended in her own territory by
Soviet-Russian troops against an attack from the west or by French
troops against an attack from the east.
In expressing the aforesaid doubts and apprehensions, the German
Government does not wish to evade a joint examination of the
question as to whether and what new guarantees for security can be
created for Europe or for certain parts of Europe in addition to the
settlement of the armament question. They are inclined to believe
that, in general, the best results will be achieved by the method of
bilateral agreements, because such agreements can always be adapted
to the concrete circumstances and therefore do not run the risk of
either remaining pure theories or of leading to complications. They
do now, however, wish altogether to reject the idea of multilateral
pacts. In case the other Governments would wish to pursue the idea
of multilateral pacts, the German Government would, however,
earnestly suggest that stress should not be laid on the agreement to
immediate military assistance in case of war, but rather upon other
methods of securing peace. The idea of a collective obligation of
non-aggression and the idea of consultation between the Powers
interested, in a political crisis, would present themselves in the
first instance. It is known that both ideas have already been
discussed in the course of the disarmament negotiations at Geneva
and have at the time generally been accepted as part of the
Disarmament Convention. They might, however,
[Page 516]
be developed along various lines so that
thereby real guarantees of peace would be created. Without entering
into details the German Government would merely like to indicate the
general direction in which, in their opinion, further considerations
might well be carried on. Other possibilities need thereby not be
excluded. They would only have to be considered from the point of
view that the best guarantee of peace will ever be not to prepare
for war against war, but to extend and strengthen the means apt to
prevent any possibility of an outbreak of war.
Berlin, 8 September,
1934.
