500.A14/693a
The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt
My Dear Mr. President: In advising and consenting on June 15 to the ratification of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925 the Senate adopted the following reservation: [Page 477]
“Resolved that such adherence to this Treaty shall not be construed to deny any right or sovereignty which the Kingdom of Persia may have in or to the Persian Gulf or the waters thereof.”
This action was taken at the instance of the Persian Minister in Washington who, despite the fact that he had been fully advised on several occasions that such a reservation was unacceptable, conferred with one or more members of the Senate and induced the passage of the reservation over the objections of the Department.
When the American Delegation at the Arms Conference at Geneva was informed of the adoption of the reservation, Mr. Wilson immediately telegraphed40 that in his opinion the reservation raised so many difficulties, both in respect to the negotiations at Geneva and in respect to international law, that he hoped you would consider whether the convention should be ratified. Upon being requested to submit his further views, Mr. Wilson reported41 that authorities whom he had consulted in Geneva had expressed the opinion that the reservation would make the Persians even more difficult to deal with than they were at present. He also suggested the desirability of consulting the French and British Governments with respect to their attitude toward the reservation.
After consultation with the Foreign Office, the Embassy at London telegraphed42 that although the British authorities felt that the reservation had no substantial significance they feared it would encourage the Persian Government in its allegedly preposterous claim to certain islands in the Persian Gulf and would render more difficult the proper policing of the Gulf waters. Subsequently the British Chargé d’Affaires in Washington, acting under instructions from London, called twice at the Department to inquire into the reasons for the reservation. Although he was assured43 that neither the President nor the Senate had any intention of interfering with the status quo in the Persian Gulf or of taking any part in disputes with respect to territorial questions in that area, he stated that his Government continued to be concerned and feared that the Persians would stir up trouble unless this Government issued a clear statement that it did not support the Persian claim to sovereignty over the Gulf.
The French Government in expressing its attitude toward the reservation stated that on legal grounds it would be necessary for France, as the depositary of the Convention, to obtain the consent of all the signatory Powers.44 Fear was expressed that the consideration of [Page 478] this reservation by the signatory Powers would lead to further reservations which would indefinitely delay, if not actually prevent, the coming into force of the Convention.
From the point of view of our own interests mention should be made of the official Persian protest made to us with respect to a concession obtained by an American company for the development of petroleum resources in the Bahrein Islands.45 The Persians assert sovereignty over these Islands although they have not been in actual possession since 1783. The situation with respect to the ownership of these Islands has been thoroughly aired before the League of Nations and from our study of the relevant documents we see little if any basis for the Persian claim. We are fearful, however, that the Persians, encouraged by the Senate reservation, may use their naval forces to seize the tankers of the American company, or otherwise to hamper the company’s legitimate activities. In this connection, it should be mentioned that a bill has recently been introduced in the Persian Mejliss authorizing the Persian naval forces to exercise control within a distance of twelve nautical miles of the Persian shore.
For convenient reference I enclose a memorandum46 setting forth the foregoing considerations in detail.
The situation is therefore that despite our earnest efforts at Geneva, London and Paris to obtain a favorable reaction to the Senate reservation, we have met with no success whatever, and it has become abundantly clear that it will be impossible to bring the Convention into force in the near future, if ever, as long as the reservation stands. In view of these circumstances, and bearing in mind the possible adverse effect which the reservation may have upon our interests in the Persian Gulf, I venture to recommend the desirability of returning the Convention in question to the Senate for its further advice and reconsideration of the reservation with reference to the Persian Gulf.
In making the foregoing recommendation I believe I should also advise you of the objectionable behavior of the Persian Minister in Washington, as exemplified not only by his negotiations with members of the Senate over the head of the Executive but also by the tone of his oral statements and notes, a copy of the latest of which is enclosed.47 With your approval, I contemplate replying to the Minister in the sense of the attached draft.48
Faithfully yours,
- Telegram No. 910, June 21, 1 p.m., p. 462.↩
- Telegram No. 912, June 23, 2 p.m., p. 463.↩
- Telegram No. 391, July 7, 1 p.m., p. 467.↩
- See memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, p. 467.↩
- See telegram No. 539, July 20, 10 a.m., from The Chargé in France, p. 469.↩
- See vol. ii, pp. 890 ff.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Dated August 11, p. 471.↩
- Not printed; for note as sent to the Persian Minister, August 24, see p. 481.↩