500.A15A4/2465: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 6—3:20 p.m.]
155. From Norman Davis. In my talk with Simon this morning at which Eden was present Simon first read their reply96 to the last French note which in substance asked France to inform them categorically if the French would agree to the measures of disarmament indicated in the British memorandum conditional upon no rearmament whatever for Germany or if France would agree to reasonable German defensive rearmament conditional upon guarantees for the [Page 43] execution of the disarmament convention and if so specifically what were the guarantees France has in mind. He then told me they had just received word from Paris that the French reply had been completed and would be delivered today.97 He said that they had no idea what the reply would be or what the results will be of their present negotiations with the French, but that if they did reach an agreement it would be along the lines of a European agreement for collective action in case of violation of the Disarmament Convention to be determined by a two-thirds vote of the Disarmament Commission; that they were considering only financial and economic measures but that naturally Great Britain’s commitment to join any such collective action would necessarily have to be conditional upon the position which the United States would take. I told him that this was developing along somewhat different lines from what we had been contemplating and that I could not tell him what our position would be, but that as soon as there is something definite to pass judgment upon we will be glad to consult Washington. He then asked if we still stood by the position we took last May and I told him we did but that our proposal last May was conditional upon and in consideration of the adoption of a very comprehensive program for progressive disarmament and the discouragement of aggression, but obviously that proposal might not be applicable to a different kind of regime from that then envisaged, and that we would be apt to look differently upon a serious violation of the peace pact accompanied by invasion than upon a technical violation of any disarmament convention. He said that he himself looked upon a serious violation of a disarmament convention as a more serious matter; he understood of course that we would be unwilling to commit ourselves in advance in an unknown contingency; but what he had in mind was in effect some formula or understanding whereby the United States would retain its complete independence of judgment but that in case of a violation of the disarmament convention England and the United States would talk the matter over and then if we should feel that the circumstances are such as to warrant taking further steps to deal with certain collective measures we would then agree not to interfere, and England would proceed, otherwise not. In substance, he said that they did not expect the United States to join in any measures but that England’s commitment to do so would be conditional upon reaching at the time an understanding with the United States as to the position it would take. I told him I was afraid this would be construed as putting indirectly considerable responsibility on us but that in any event the Administration could not form [Page 44] any definite opinion until it is known more clearly what there was to decide about. I told him that the United States Government was naturally interested in disarmament as a world problem and not as a European problem.
We then discussed the forthcoming meeting of the Bureau. He and Eden said that while it would have been better for the Bureau to meet a week later, there seemed to be nothing to do now but to proceed with it and for Henderson to make a report and then for the British to make a report on the present status of negotiations but that no date for the calling of the General Commission should be fixed until something more definite is known. Their information as to the two schools of thought in the French Government is substantially the same as mine, as indicated in the Embassy’s 154, April 6, 11 a.m. It was suggested that it might be psychologically helpful to get Barthou to go to Geneva. Simon said he did not know Barthou. I told Simon that if he himself should go to Geneva no doubt Barthou would feel that he must go and that it might be helpful for him to get acquainted with him in Geneva. Eden agreed with this and Simon then indicated that if the French reply today is favorable, he might decide to do that but that he would like me to come to the country to lunch with him tomorrow and we would then talk the matter over further. [Davis.]