500.A15A/297: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 3—3:32 p.m.]
60. Your 37, November 26, 7 p.m.,28 with which we fully concur, is apparently based on the assumption or condition that the British will take with us the position that Japanese denunciation ends the present phase of the conversations and that the British will therefore agree to terminate them at that time, possibly by means of a joint statement with us. The British have not yet definitely stated whether or not they will be prepared to do this, but I still hope they will do so and I am strongly urging this upon them. It is, however, possible that the British, as hosts, may feel that they cannot dismiss the Japanese, even after denunciation so long as the Japanese wish to continue the conversations on the basis of the various British questions and suggestions. We must therefore decide what course to follow in this.
[Page 379]I agree with you that the first phase of the conversations should be terminated immediately upon denunciation. However, before finally deciding to do so by unilateral action—assuming that we cannot get the British to take the initiative—or to take joint action with us, we should, I think, carefully consider whether or not such a step on our part would lend itself to the appearance that the United States was running out not only on the Japanese but also on the British. The Japanese of course would utilize this situation by attempting to place the onus for breaking up the conversations on us, and those elements in Great Britain which are favorable to a compromise with Japan might be strengthened.
Another fact to be considered is that under both the Washington and London Treaties we are obliged to attend a naval conference next year, whether or not we assume the responsibility of calling it under article 23 of the Washington Treaty, unless the five naval powers agree in advance formally to abrogate these clauses in both treaties. Such an agreement, I fear may be difficult to obtain at the present.
If we cannot induce the British to terminate the conversations immediately upon denunciation, would you be in favor of our reaching, if possible, a compromise with the British to declare a recess for a certain period on the ground that Japan’s action had so radically changed the basis upon which the British and we had entered the present conversations that it was necessary for the two Governments to have time to reconsider when [what?] their position should be in the light of the new situation.
This procedure would leave the initiative for further conversations definitely with the British and, in case such conversations did not give promise for the successful holding of a conference under either naval treaty, would be a means of arriving at an agreement not to hold such a conference.
I should appreciate receiving your views with regard to (1) whether, failing agreement to terminate the conversations upon denunciation, we should attempt to seek an agreement for adjournment for a stated period and (2) whether, if the British insist on a continuance of the present conversations, we should withdraw unilaterally, at the same time possibly stating our willingness to return after a lapse of time or on the contrary, agree to remain here for the time being and if so, subject to what conditions.
Since we are meeting with the British tomorrow at 4 o’clock to discuss future procedure following denunciation, please send us your instructions at once.