Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, General, the British Commonwealth, Volume I

500.A15A5/284

Record of Teletype Conversation⁷

November 22, 1934, 2:10 p.m. to 2:55 p.m.

Davis: As I am seeing the Prime Minister and Simon tomorrow morning I would like to know if you are cabling me any further views or instructions on the basis of my 44, and if not do you approve of my proceeding on the line indicated therein?

Secretary: Yes, we feel you are on the right track, particularly if developments lead you to feel that matters are working out as you indicated you anticipated.

Davis: The conversation will probably take the following turn; the British will inform us of the reply of the Japanese yesterday, which I understand was inconclusive, but keeps the door open for further conversations. They will then no doubt wish to know if we are willing to have the British explore the possibilities of agreement on the middle course. My idea would be to inform them of your attitude and instructions as outlined in your 26 of November 17, and then give as my personal views the general line of thought in your 25 of November 17. If after this the British are still insistent on continuing the conversations what position shall I take?

Davis: I may say that Admiral Standley and I feel that with the Washington and London Treaties terminated, a multi-lateral qualitative agreement including Japan would have a greater tendency towards preserving the principle of disarmament than would be the case were there no agreement whatever. At the same time, our power to preserve the present ratios by necessary building would not be in the least jeopardized. Our guess is that Japan will probably refuse qualitative limitation alone, on the ground that it would be more advantageous to Great Britain and the United States than to herself. If, however, it becomes necessary for us to take a definite position, my judgment would be that we should consent to a further exploration of the “middle course” only on two essential conditions: first, an assurance that my interpretation of the British policy, as set forth in my 44, is essentially correct, and that they will not agree to any alteration of ratio or make any agreement with Japan not acceptable to us. Second, that if we are to pursue the conversations further, the first phase should be definitely closed on the basis of the expressed determination on the part of Japan to denounce the Washington Treaty and to refuse to continue bound by the present ratios. In this case, a public statement should be issued, in order to avoid the erroneous impression that we are in any way making concessions in principle to Japan. I do not know whether the British would agree to such a statement but shall I raise the issue with them tomorrow morning? If they refuse, you should consider making a unilateral statement. While the British may come to see as we do the advisability of our making no agreement with Japan until after denunciation, I fear they will not be willing to take the responsibility of closing the conversations as long as Japan wishes to continue. At any rate, bear in mind that Matsudaira will remain here. I foresee that in order to work for such an outcome of the present conversations as indicated in the Department’s most recent instructions, I may have to remain here until well into the New Year. If at any time you wish to avoid such a possibility, the only feasible reason to withdraw—without an agreement and without the appearance of a break—would be to return home for Christmas Holidays, over which period the British have already intimated they wish to have a break. The Krock article⁸ attacking Simon has had a very unfortunate reaction here. Unless some effective way can be found to show that it does not represent official views, and in fact that it is regretted in official quarters that any attack should be made on the Foreign Minister of a friendly power with whom we are in most important negotiations, it will have a very harmful effect on these negotiations. It is reported that Matsudaira called on the French Ambassador⁹ this morning and after an hour and a half conversation with him he went immediately to the Foreign Office and talked with Craigie for two hours. French Ambassador sent me word just now Matsudaira had called on him this morning evidently personally perturbed over Japan being the sole nation to denounce the Washington Treaty and asking the French Ambassador in a rather round about fashion what he believed was the attitude of the French and Italian Governments on this question—Matsudaira further went on to inquire what reply might be expected if the Japanese raised the question in Paris.¹⁰ French Ambassador gave little comfort and said in his viewpoint the French Government could not disassociate this question from the General Disarmament question and gave Matsudaira to understand in his personal opinion the French Government would not lend an ear to any such démarche from Japan. Japanese press are trying to give publicity to Matsudaira’s activities with the French today especially I understand with the American and French agencies.

Secretary: Norman, we can’t think through so many considerations in these surroundings. Send through all your message and we shall telegraph you an answer that you will have in the morning. My first impression is two-fold: One, that you don’t need to commit yourself tomorrow morning and two, that to commence negotiating a qualitative treaty with the Japanese immediately after her denunciation of Washington Treaty would be in essence a concession both in principle and in fact.

I have already sent you a telegram on the Krock incident. Phillips and I both spoke to Lindsay¹¹ this morning expressing regret and explaining that it did not represent my views. I asked him to cable his Government accordingly.

Davis: To further clarify your enquiry I would say—if at any time the situation does not develop whereby Japan calls off negotiations and the British want to continue and you wish to pull out but avoid a break—the only feasible reason et cetera.

Secretary: Yes, many thanks and good luck.

Davis: I am still inclined to believe the situation is most likely to work out as indicated in my 44, but it may take time. Best wishes to you, Cordell and to all.

7. Between the Secretary of State in Washington and Norman H. Davis in London, November 22, 1934, 2:10 p.m.–2:55 p.m. (via direct London circuit).
8. Arthur Krock, Washington correspondent for the New York Times; New York Times, November 21, 1934, p. 18.
9. André Charles Corbin.
10. See telegram No. 267, December 3, 1 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 406; and memorandum of December 3 by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, p. 406.
11. Sir Ronald Lindsay, British Ambassador to the United States.