500.A15A5/269: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
44. I feel as you do that Anglo-American cooperation in dealing with the present and future situation that confronts us is of primary importance and holds greater promise of eventual success than searching for a formula to salvage portions of the existing treaties. The situation we faced here, however, was such as to make it difficult and inadvisable to try to force the British to make a quick decision on all the questions involved.
As indicated in my 32, November 13, 10 p.m., I felt, for the same reasons as advanced by you it would be advisable to terminate the conversations now on the basis of Japan’s announced determination to denounce the Washington Treaty. In conversations with Simon, as well as in the meeting with the British on Wednesday, I in considerable detail substantially [stated?] the views set forth in your 25, November 17, 3 p.m. I interpreted your 22, November 15, however, as an expression of your desire that we avoid taking any definite initiative as to termination, but rather go along with the British as long as they wish the conversations to continue, without, of course, committing ourselves as to substance, endeavoring to secure at the same time a formula which would modify the existing obligation to hold a conference regardless of circumstances. In view of your 22, and as a result of our meeting with the British on the 14th,97 I come to similar conclusions.
In the first place, I am inclined to think the British strongly advocated further exploration now with Japan, in order to test Japan’s real position and intentions, and thus to determine our own course. In the second place, there were increasing indications that Japan would ultimately turn down the British suggestions and thus assume the onus for ending that particular phase of the conversations. In the third place, I felt that following the Japanese rejection, the British would more clearly recognize the impossibility of coming to satisfactory terms with Japan in her present frame of mind, and would thus more readily be prepared to take a common stand with us and to assume the initiative in terminating the talks. Since we cannot entirely dictate the terms of Anglo-American cooperation but must work them out in cooperation with the British, and since there are increasing evidences that the British are becoming more suspicious [Page 357] of and irritated by the Japanese, I thought it unwise to precipitate the issue and thus play into the hands of the group here that has favored concessions to Japan. Finally, there was the possibility that Japan might in the meantime formally denounce the Washington Treaty, which would force the issue and make it easier to place the responsibility for termination where it belongs. The opinion expressed in my 41, November 16, 9 p.m., was therefore with a view of acquiescing in further efforts in the hope that the British and we would ultimately reach the same conclusion as to the necessity of taking a common and more determined stand.
The British say there is still considerable friendly sentiment here for Japan on account of the former alliance and that therefore public opinion would more strongly favor a definite stand against Japan after the failure of every reasonable effort to reach agreement had proved Japan’s unwillingness to cooperate on an acceptable basis. Furthermore, the Cabinet must satisfy those members who are most apprehensive of an alignment between Germany and Japan that every effort consistent with the safety of the Empire has been made to retain Japanese good will. As an indication that the British Government is inclining to our point of view and preparing public opinion for it the trend of the British press has been towards building up a case against Japan and the tone of the entire press today is distinctly anti-Japanese.
Another argument advanced by the British for continuing the conversations beyond the date of denunciation is that Japan at the moment of taking such a drastic step will be in an apologetic frame of mind and find it difficult to be intransigent on other issues.
I do not believe the British have any intention of playing the role of mediator or of making any separate agreement whatever with Japan. In fact the British and ourselves seem to be in agreement now as to principles and objectives. Our chief remaining difference is over the time and method of approach. Whereas we favor discontinuing the conversations, sending the Japanese home free but empty handed and avoiding any impression of a surrender to Japan, the British wish to keep the talks alive hoping either to tie the British up even in a limited way but without giving Japan any increase in ratio, or failing that, to convince the British public that every reasonable effort towards agreement has been tried and has failed owing to Japanese intransigence.
Moreover in the British concept the exploration of the “middle course” does not mean that we accept the Japanese contention that the present ratios and principles embodied in existing treaties should be scrapped. The Japanese denunciation which must be taken for granted and as the starting point for discussions of the “middle course” itself scraps ratios as a treaty principle, and the British believe that the only practical way left to safeguard present ratios in fact, after [Page 358] the treaties are scrapped by Japan, is for us to be free to build in any ratio we desire, keeping Japan bound at least by qualitative restriction.
Since receipt of your telegrams numbers 25, November 16 [17], 3 p.m., 26, November 16 [17], 4 p.m., 27, November 16 [17], 8 p.m.98 the British have I understand received the reply of the Japanese to the British suggestions. The information obtained from press circles but which has not been officially confirmed is that the Japanese have answered the British inquiries in the negative, and will refuse qualitative limitation unless we agree to quantitative equality. Therefore, unless I receive from you specific direction to the contrary I shall refrain from stressing those features of our position which have not yet been accepted by the British until we are informed of the character of the Japanese reply and of the British reaction thereto.
In an informal frank talk with Baldwin yesterday afternoon he told me that while he was unable to commit himself without conferring with his colleagues with whom he had not talked for several days on this subject, he was strongly impressed by the point of view advanced by me as to the advisability of taking a common definite stand now against the Japanese and letting them go home and think it over. As he expressed it, when your cook gives notice of quitting the best thing is to let her quit.
To sum up, while I cannot predict what turn events may take, there is every evidence that the trend now is distinctly favorable to our thesis and that, if we are patient and careful for a short while longer the situation may definitely crystallize to our satisfaction.99
- Telegram in three sections.↩
- For minutes by the American delegation of this meeting, see p. 334.↩
- Telegram No. 27 not printed↩
- Telegram No. 31, November 21, 6 p.m., to the Chairman of the American delegation stated: “Our first reaction to your No. 44, November 21, 1 p.m. is one of distinct encouragement.” (500.A15A5/269)↩