Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, General, the British Commonwealth, Volume I

500.A15A5/287

Minutes of Meeting Between British and American Delegations in the Prime Minister’s Office at the House of Commons on November 14, 1934, 3 p.m.⁷⁸

London, November 14, 1934, 3 p.m.

Present:

For the United States:	For the United Kingdom:
Mr. Norman Davis	The Prime Minister
Admiral Standley	(For about an hour)
Mr. Atherton	Sir John Simon
Commander Schuirmann79	Admiral Chatfield
Mr. Reber80	Mr. Craigie
Mr. Field	Sir Warren Fisher81
	Commander Clarke82
	Commander Hodsoll83

The Prime Minister stated that as he was not feeling well as a result of just having a tooth pulled, he would ask Sir John Simon to take charge of the meeting.

Sir John Simon: We have not seen the American Delegation for a fortnight. I am sure you will understand the reasons. We have had a great deal of work on our hands. Of course we have had informal talks between individual members, and so there has been no real gap. We saw the Japanese Delegation on the 7th and you were told of the sort of inquiry we intended to make of them.⁸⁴ We made an inquiry in the sense indicated. We were very careful not to allow ourselves to be put in the position that we were making a concrete proposal. We merely asked them if they had thought of a definite form in which the treaty could be cast to meet their obligations; we were also careful not to imply that the new form would give Japan the right to do anything she liked without our being concerned. The position we submitted to them was that we, like the United States, could not see our way to approve the common upper limit, but we were anxious to see if there were no way by which to meet them on the question of prestige. It is, as far as the substance is concerned, possible to envisage unilateral declarations, setting out programs which would be negotiated and agreed to by the parties concerned and form a sort of annex to the arrangement. These programs would continue as far as possible the existing ratios. The only answer we got to our inquiry was that these matters would be considered and we presume they are being considered because we have had no answer.

Mr. Davis: I understand this would not involve a change in the existing relative strengths.

Sir John: Our understanding was that the present status should be maintained in substance.

Mr. MacDonald: You have not seen the Japanese any more?

Mr. Davis: No, not as a Delegation. I asked Wilson to see Matsudaira in connection with the traffic in arms. They did not discuss the naval matter except that Matsudaira said they had not yet had a reply from Tokyo, and he wanted to know whether I had formed any definite ideas as to a continuance of the conversations.

Sir John: In today’s conversations, we must make certain assumptions and try to determine what is likely to be our decision on these assumptions. The first assumption we must make is that Japan may carry out before the end of the year her intention to give notice to denounce the Washington Treaty, which, amongst other things, means that the prospect of continuing the London Treaty might also be vitally affected. Assuming therefore that the Washington Treaty is being denounced, let us also see how it would work out if we assumed that we could get an understanding by which Japan would continue to observe in practice the existing ratios, that is to say if she would be free theoretically to change them but did not in fact do so. In that case the United Kingdom Government would still feel that we should want it possible to have the good will of the United States for certain adjustments which we were telling you about in the summer.⁸⁵ What we would therefore appreciate is to have an indication from you of just what your position would be. In the summer you told us that the United States Government appreciated the reasons for the United Kingdom’s needs but that there would be great difficulties, especially in connection with that part of the American Constitution which calls into play the Senate. You have been home in the meantime. You had at an earlier interview said that you thought British needs might be met by getting some compensation elsewhere in the whole range. We should like to know a little more what you have in view. That is on the quantitative side.

The other thing we would very much like to have some information on is regarding the qualitative side. You appreciate how important it is for us to secure an agreement on the qualitative limit even if we should fail to get an agreement on the quantitative limit. What we would like to know is are you able to tell us now anything about the view of your Government on those two important points. It is always possible in this difficulty to state that we might be able to get an agreement on some qualitative matters even though Japan fails to come to an agreement with us both about the quantitative totals.

Mr. Davis: You are raising two very distinct questions. (1) An agreed naval program between Great Britain and the United States in case there is no agreement with Japan, and (2) the question of what we should do in case we do get an agreement with Japan.

Sir John: I did not really mean to raise the question of Anglo-American agreement on a program without Japan. What I mean is this: If we want to secure from Japan not the continuance of the Washington Treaty but in some other form assurances which satisfied both of us that Japan was not going beyond the existing proportions, would that be sufficient to enable you to help us to an agreement—a general agreement of course—for instance by meeting us on the number of cruisers that we need.

Mr. Davis: We had thought that if we could not get an agreement to continue the general principles of the existing treaty there would not be any treaty at all. In that case we thought that at least the United States and Great Britain could agree upon the maintenance of the principles of parity and upon a naval program that would meet their requirements, thus avoiding a naval race not only between themselves but, if possible, avoiding a naval race in general. But we have really not envisaged such a thing as an agreement with Japan just for qualitative limitation.

As I told you at the last meeting, we had gone over Mr. Craigie’s memorandum of last July⁸⁶ and were impressed by some of the arguments for an increase in your tonnage through replacements, which in the course of time would amount to 70,000 additional tons. We had thought it would be just to meet you in this respect provided we could come to a general agreement that did not increase the total treaty tonnage. Admiral Standley was of the opinion that when the time came to do so the two admiralties could sit down and work out a program that would carry this into effect, but the First Sea Lord agreed with us that until we knew just where we were going with the Japanese it would be futile and rather difficult to work out this idea.

Sir John: What you talked about then was on the assumption of the Washington Treaty remaining. What will you do if it does not remain?

Mr. Davis: If the Washington Treaty does not remain, I feel that as far as our mutual technical problems are concerned, it would be a purely academic question. We might have to act very differently than if we were going to renew the treaty. If we are in agreement that we are going to maintain parity between us, it would seem logical to agree upon naval programs.

Mr. MacDonald: Put parity out of your mind altogether. There is no quarrel about that.

Mr. Davis: Oh, I know that. I fully appreciate that.

Mr. MacDonald: But this is our position: We gave you a figure in June of I believe 70 cruisers and we told you we were quite willing to compose it in such a way that it would not mean all new ships.⁸⁷ But we want 70. Now our requirements consist of two types of needs: (1) a certain number to cover the surface of the seas and (2) a certain capacity to do those things that they must be able to do to carry out their job. Now if the individual item of the 70 had only to do a sort of police job and the minor work of communications each one of the 70 would only require to be of a certain small tonnage which multiplied by 70 would give a certain total which would enable both of us to say we had reduced the total tonnage. But suppose Japan and you had decided to put a fleet of cruisers with a certain tonnage and gun superiority on the seas, what is the use of our sending forth ships which would be blown out of the seas at once? For the double function we must give the 70 a certain tonnage corresponding to that of others. I don’t see that there is any trouble about your building; we are not interested in your building.

Mr. Davis: Oh, I know that.

Mr. MacDonald: We are interested in the political situation in the Pacific which imposes certain risks on us that we did not have at the time of the London Treaty and we had hoped would not occur; we hoped that our cooperation with you would prevent it. But it did not work out that way. What I want you to face is this, that we have got a minimum requirement, a minimum requirement of the number of ships and a minimum requirement of capacity to carry out their job. If we can get an agreement to permit us to carry out those requirements, we are in the game.

Mr. Davis: On the assumption that the two of us will want to do what we can to avoid a competition between us, and since we both accept the principle of parity, we ought to be able to get together on a program that meets our requirements. As far as Great Britain is concerned, the matter is simple. But what I am not so sure about is as to what we can do in the case of Japan if she refuses to come to an agreement. It is not just a naval question, that is mere camouflage. We have set up a collective system for cooperating in the Far East to maintain peace and now what Japan is trying to say is that she won’t have anything more to do with that collective system. We simply cannot agree with that.

Mr. MacDonald: I entirely concur. But I would like to get back to the point at which we left last summer. You never quite told us what you thought about our program. The Craigie memorandum was sent you so that you would know exactly where we stood. As long as I am here there has got to be no competition between us and when I am gone I am sure the same position will be taken. We want, if I may use this expression, to use our cooperation to terrorize the rest of the world into giving great moral answers to great moral issues, rather than to use guns. Your President in his message to me⁸⁸ proposed a reduction. That is all very well. I would like to go to half if my risks are reduced to half. We have a sliding scale based on our risks. It would not be much use discussing a limitation which is no good for our purposes. If we get to the real facts that face us in this case, we shall very soon come to an agreement.

Mr. Davis: At the last meeting we all agreed that it was inadvisable to take up technical discussions because we did not know where we were going. When Mr. Craigie raised the point the other day I again said that we should not go into technical details because we did not know where we are standing with Japan. But if you want to explore what can be done on the assumption that we can get a general treaty which does not increase present totals (we do not think we can get such a treaty now but it is possible we might next year) we feel that our experts could sit down and study the problem. Instead of the First Sea Lord and Admiral Standley sitting down together which is a little too formal, we could have Commander Schuirmann and a corresponding British expert explore the matter. This suggestion was accepted and I understand that such talks began this morning.

Mr. MacDonald: What is in my mind is to make sure at this point that the necessities of Great Britain should be fully appreciated.

Mr. Davis: We appreciate them thoroughly and we want to do everything to meet you; but we do not want to come to an agreement if we have doubts of getting it adopted. There is a general feeling among the American people in favor of reduction and President Roosevelt thinks it most inadvisable to conclude an agreement for a treaty which would provide for total increases.

Sir John: Did I understand correctly that your view is that if the Washington Treaty were continued, nevertheless you felt there would be great difficulty in making such a change in its present terms as would increase the total treaty tonnage? I gather, first, that there is strong sentiment in favor of reducing naval armaments and, second, that you have your historical difficulty with the Senate.

Mr. Davis: Well, that is one and the same thing. Our whole theory is that there is a maximum tonnage laid down in the existing treaty and to increase that tonnage would change the whole basis.

Sir John: Now still on the assumption of the continuance of the present treaty, I do think that there should be some way of giving the British what they need within the treaty totals. Merely as a layman I should find it most useful to actually see how this could be worked out. Now on the other assumption of no treaty, I understand that you have not considered a middle position. You have considered what you would do if the treaty continued and if there were no treaty at all, in which latter case the two of us should do all in our power not to engage in a naval race. But is there not a middle ground, namely, that we might secure from Japan such assurances as to what her building program would be as not to involve a fundamental departure from the existing ratios. In that case we want to know what the two of us could agree upon.

Mr. Atherton: The first and third points raised by Sir John Simon we have answered. As to the second assumption in which Japan, after denouncing the treaty, may or may not agree to make a voluntary statement contractual or otherwise as to future building programs, in considering that contingency, we do not wish to make any engagement beforehand until Japan defines her position.

Mr. Davis: At our first meeting with the Prime Minister in the summer we all agreed that we were in favor of maintaining the specific treaty principles. Now you are taking the position that it is all over and that Japan is unwilling to continue the treaty principles. A mere discussion of programs to avoid competition is such a tremendous comedown that it requires considerable thought. If both treaties are gone and there is no new treaty to take their place with Japan, is it advisable to seek an agreement with Japan just so as not to compete? I don’t think that is the problem. That is not a realistic approach. It ignores that we are faced with more than a technical issue. It ignores the fundamental question of naval bases. If the Washington Treaty goes, the whole system goes, and I think that is more important than the question of avoiding competition in certain types.

Sir John: But might it not be one of the proposals of the middle course that there should be renewal of the non-fortification question? I quite agree that it would be a comedown. But what we have to consider is what the best thing is that we can do if a renewal of the treaty is impossible. Is the next best thing to have nothing at all?

Mr. Davis: No; let me make myself a little clearer. We had not envisaged a possibility of a middle course. Instead we desired to find out just what Japan wanted; we have been doing that patiently, hoping Japan might be willing to agree to some basis that would solve the situation. We are still waiting. I have never put up to my Government the question of a very limited program. I have felt this question premature. I don’t know what my Government’s reactions would be because it raises, as I have said, very fundamental questions. For instance, besides the matter of fortifications, it brings up the whole question of naval predominance in the Pacific. We accepted the Washington Treaty, in return for an agreement by Japan to respect our interests, to observe the open door and to follow a policy of peace. After all this has gone by the board, I gravely question the advisability of going along on such a limited basis.

Sir John: Have you considered on your side whether you would wish to continue the fortification provision in the Washington Treaty? Is it to your interest to let it go?

Mr. Davis: My position is that if Japan does not make a move that way, we should not. I am all in favor of salvaging what we can out of this, but I just don’t feel like making any commitment as to this middle course. It is something that must be explored very carefully.

Sir John: You see, we consider the middle course consists of more than merely qualitative limitation. In my thought it includes three things: (1) Non-fortification; (2) qualitative limitation; (3) programs as to future construction. I think this would be very much better than nothing.

Mr. Davis: Would you favor such a compromise even if there is no agreement as to the open door in China and as to what is going to happen out there, which means that you might have to use your navy?

Sir John: Well, what would be the position if there is no agreement?

Mr. Davis: I realize that, but it is not an easy question. We are in a ridiculous position. Japan has told us both that she is going to denounce the Washington Treaty. That impending denunciation imposes on us the necessity of dealing with a hypothetical question. I personally am beginning to feel that once it is denounced we will be in a much better position. Now we are in the situation that Japan will denounce the Treaty whatever we may do or not do. To negotiate under these circumstances is an inducement for Japan to put up her price; after all we have two years time following denunciation. During that time we may have to negotiate.

Mr. MacDonald: My personal view is that we all together ought to consider what the denunciation really means. It is not a denunciation of the 5.5.3 only, there are a lot of other things.

Mr. Davis: I quite agree, and that is why we have followed the present course, namely, to be patient and make every effort to try to find a solution; only by continuing in this manner could we really find out what Japan’s ultimate position is, and crystallize our own views.

Mr. MacDonald: I doubt if Japan really knows her ultimate position, but we ought to try to get her to determine it and not to wait. Won’t it in that case be necessary for us to have, not an agreement, but a kind of understanding as to how our minds are working. If there is going to be any trouble in the Pacific, it is going to involve both of us, that is certain.

Mr. Davis: No doubt.

Mr. MacDonald: Our eyes are primarily on the Pacific. What we want primarily is that we should both understand what is in our minds, that we are not in for aggression, but for defense, and then quietly continue to bring pressure on Japan as to what she purposes to do, making it plain to them that both of us regard this as a very serious thing. This pressure should be separate, of course, and not give the impression of concerted action. But let us understand each other’s minds. You have questions to ask us, for instance, about our seventy cruisers; and we have questions to ask you. I am not in favor of waiting a fortnight and forgetting each other, with Craigie coming around and asking, “Well, what shall we do about the American Delegation”. That is no way to proceed. We should get down to seeing each other on a definite basis.

(At this point Mr. MacDonald had to leave for the floor of the House. The formal meeting was suspended for about fifteen minutes while tea was served. During this period, the members of each delegation consulted among each other. Following the tea, Sir John resumed as follows:)

Sir John: I wish I knew what is the proper strategic view as to whether the non-fortification clause is valuable to preserve in both our interests.

Mr. Davis: I honestly don’t know. We have not discussed that in detail at home. It might be a good thing for our navies to talk it over.

Sir John: As long as it lasts, none of us, including Japan, can fortify. If it ends, who would fortify? I am not sure but that the Japanese might not be the first.

Admiral Chatfield: There is no doubt that this clause was supposed to be to the advantage of Japan; it was an inducement to the ratio. At that time we were just going to put up some fortifications near their country. Whether that still remains the same is a big question.

Sir John: I don’t know. It is a purely strategic conundrum.

Mr. Davis: I think Japan is proceeding on the theory that if she gets rid of that provision, neither one of us would fortify—neither Hongkong nor the Philippines.

Sir Warren: The Japanese the other day on this precise point did not at all exclude the possibility of an arrangement to continue the fortifications provision.

Sir John: They rather indicated that this was one of the things that could be saved out of the wreckage.

Mr. Davis: But that agreement was to make Japan feel secure; the other provisions were to make us feel secure and to assure us that we would not have to use our navies in the Far East.

I have been trying to find out just exactly what you have in mind as to your “middle course” proposal. This is something we have not considered. I have no authority whatever to negotiate on that basis, and don’t know what the attitude of the Government might be.

Sir John: The matter we were talking about during tea and which we want to put before you is this: We all want to be very plain with one another, and I am not sure that I, at any rate, have ever conveyed to you the reasons why, in the view of ourselves and our advisers, qualitative limitations have such extreme importance. I will state it very briefly, as though acting as lawyer before a court and then call my principal witness, (turning to Chatfield) and you can cross-examine him. Historically, unrestricted naval races begin because of the complete want of limitation as to sizes. The increased expenditures in our own history arose in that way. The dreadnought, for instance, started an entirely new level which went around the world. Another example is the eight inch cruiser; I can mention that now, since it is past history. It is evident that the eight inch cruiser has led to increased competition all around. A third example is the Deutschland type, which has thrown the French program into confusion. Once somebody chooses to bring out a new type, he is extremely likely either to make the complete program of the other cockeyed or to set a new standard which everybody must follow.

Therefore, if you were to assume that in the Pacific we don’t get all the agreements we like, it is going to be very serious for us if there is going to be complete freedom of new types. It may be that Japan would proceed to a new type of vessel which would make us feel that the money we had spent in the past was wasted. That is why we cannot treat the qualitative side as a small matter or as unworthy of bothering about, if we can’t get the whole thing. I now ask Admiral Chatfield to supplement my views.

Admiral Chatfield: What we feel is that really when you Americans started the Washington Conference, it was not because of a race in numbers, but because of a race in sizes. You had the six inch gun ship which the Japanese were applying to a certain type. Then later came the eight inch ship, etc. At Geneva, one of your delegates, I believe it was Gibson, sponsored the idea of the importance of qualitative limitation.

Suppose we are in for a new race. It is not so much a question of numbers. It is very difficult to upset the fellow ahead of you numerically. Japan would have a hard time increasing her battleship numbers compared to yours. Her ships are old, she has got to start replacing them; she cannot keep up. But suppose she starts to build a very different type of battleship from anything we have, such as a rapid battle cruiser, light in armament, but with a speed of, say, forty knots. It would have repercussions for all of us, perhaps even on the continent. Suppose she does the same thing with cruisers. It would at once start an extremely serious qualitative race.

Therefore, we feel that if we cannot have a complete limitation, it is extremely important to have, at least, a qualitative limitation. It is very easy for a fellow to come out and design a new ship about which others know nothing. There was the French battleship Dunkerque. Italy is answering with new 35,000 ton ships.

Sir John: I want you to understand we are not saying all this because we want to get an additional lever for reducing the tonnage of a particular unit. All we want is some kind of limit.

Admiral Chatfield: We feel it is better to have any kind of limit than none at all.

Mr. Davis: What bothers me is that we were only able to get the agreements we did because we were able to obtain a general settlement of political questions. What I am trying to clear up is whether you think it advisable to have qualitative limitation without any political agreements; because that is what it really gets down to.

Sir John: The more we can have in the way of agreement, the more we will like it. We feel bound to envisage the situation when the choice is between nothing and something, and if that choice were put up to us, we would feel that qualitative limits would be worth something.

Mr. Davis: Well, I don’t say that we cannot consider that at all; but, as I said, it raises very serious questions of a political nature. After all, the navy is an arm of a nation’s foreign policy, and we cannot disregard that aspect.

Admiral Standley: There is no disagreement between us as to the seriousness of qualitative competition.

Mr. Davis: We are ready to go to the limit of our ability to get a comprehensive limitation agreement, but that possibility seems to be disappearing. Don’t you see how much easier it is, psychologically, politically and otherwise, to proceed with this question, once denunciation is out of the way; it is too hypothetical now. We did not come here to negotiate an entirely new arrangement. It was in neither of our minds. We wanted to find means of continuing the existing treaties and principles.

Sir John: I should like, if I may be permitted, to go back to a remark of yours, namely, to the effect that the fundamental fact is political. That of course is true, and is the reason why the Foreign Office wants to have a certain Say in this naval matter. But don’t let us be under any delusion; the Nine-Power Treaty⁸⁹ is not coming to an end.

Mr. Davis: What there is left of it.

Sir John: Well, I agree it has been weakened, but it is not terminable. The Four-Power Treaty⁹⁰ is terminable by some notice. We have always assumed that if ever we could get anything agreed with the Japanese, we would include in it a stipulation that, during the period agreed, the parties to the Four-Power Treaty would not give any notice of denunciation; it would amount to renewing the Four-Power Treaty for the period of the naval agreement. The political agreements would thus not be altered. We may not like the political developments, but the relation of the political side to the naval side is that the latter can be terminated and the former cannot.

Mr. Davis: All right, but assuming that we want to save what we can, the question arises as to the best method. The two of us don’t want any competition, we don’t want new types, and we could easily agree on types for the future. But it might be better—I am just thinking aloud—for us to say to the Japanese “This is what the two of us would be willing to do ourselves” rather than to attempt a binding agreement with anybody else. Japan is upsetting the present system because she does not wish to be bound by the restrictions that were imposed. It is a question in my mind whether we might not more effectively get Japan to agree to a limitation as to types by going ahead as between our two countries, and then inviting Japan to come in if she cares to.

Sir John: May I also think aloud? We both feel that very shortly, perhaps within a few days, we may get the notice terminating the treaty. What we ought to consider is how we can best use that situation. Japan will be a little apologetic about the whole thing. After all, we have been very patient. We have made inquiries and had no answer. It strikes me that this would be the moment when we could say to Japan “If that is what you are going to do, may we not ask whether you are not at least willing to sit down and see what we can do in a qualitative way?” People cannot always expect to continue to be asked and to say no, and it will be very difficult for the Japanese to say no again. Of course we do not want to do that, except on the basis of agreement with the United States. You say you have no instructions. Would it not be worthwhile for you to report⁹¹ to your Government that both sides of the table feel that Japan is really going to give us notice; that we feel Japan will be a little apologetic about it; and that it might be a good moment to tackle the Japanese with the general question as to whether they were planning to abandon everything, including qualitative limitation. Then if you get instructions⁹² from your government to do that, we can proceed on that basis. If you don’t, we will, I fear, have very much less chance of saving something later.

Admiral Chatfield: I should like to bring up another point which has not been mentioned, namely, that each country must notify the other about its plans in accordance with the Washington Treaty. This is a very important provision, since it avoids the necessity of each country having to learn about the other’s plans through the press, and having to wonder what kind of ship is in prospect. Don’t you feel we ought to keep that provision?

Admiral Standley: I believe it would be a good thing if you could get Japan to accept that.

Sir Warren: I trust you appreciate, from our point of view, that if we can get a qualitative agreement, it is most important for us that it be general, that we get it in Europe, too.

Mr. Davis: Of course, that is most important. What I want you to think over is whether it is better to try this idea out now, or to adjourn the conversations until later. At that time the ghost will have been laid that is prancing up and down in front of us all the time. We may have to have a conference in any case within a year of denunciation. I have had intimations from the Japanese that once they are rid of the treaty, it would have a very calming effect on their people. My idea is that we should not show so much concern about this, but all part in a very friendly way, with the understanding that we will think it over and take this matter up again in a few months. I feel that our very eagerness to get Japan into an agreement now will give her the impression that we are unduly anxious, and thus induce her to stiffen her attitude.

Sir John: Of course it is a question of opinion. I appreciate the considerations you have advanced, but I think there are two arguments on the other side. In the first place, once people have had a treaty relation of some kind and get away from it, it is very hard to get them back again. They will say “The other fellow wants me back, and I will increase my price”. In the second place, the treaty does not say exactly when the conference is to be called. It will need some preparation. We cannot just say goodby, and not deal with the problem until the actual conference. Would it not be worthwhile, therefore, for us to begin to prepare for the conference while we are here?

Mr. Davis: I quite agree as far as our two countries are concerned, but I have grave doubts as to the wisdom of going quite that far with Japan. The primary purpose of Japan now is to pave the way for denunciation in such manner as not to leave any feeling of ill will and suspicion.

I don’t know how my government feels, but my personal reaction is that we might face the fact that Japan is definitely going to denounce; that this raises questions for us which we want some time to consider; and that we will meet again, say within ninety days, to prepare for the meeting which must be held within twelve months from the date of denunciation. I have reason to rather believe that the Japanese will find it easier in two, three, or four months from now to meet minds with us than today. They feel very restricted at present, and have no freedom whatsoever under their instructions.

Sir Warren: At an earlier stage today I gathered that you had in mind that the United States and Great Britain should have talks after the Japanese have left. I should think that would be very risky, by leaving the impression in the Japanese mind that there is concerted action.

Mr. Davis: That is a misunderstanding. I quite agree that it would be a very dangerous thing to do that. What I did have in mind was our two navies discussing our respective programs; that even if we should decide to take this “middle course”, the best approach would be for our two navies to have a meeting of minds together.

Sir John: I understand your idea to be that there would simply be a pause in which none of us would have a meeting.

Mr. Davis: Yes. The Japanese and we would go home.

Sir John: But what would Japan do after they go home? They will receive an enthusiastic reception. All the patriots will be saying that now at last they have shown the rest of the world what Japan is after. I doubt whether they will come back again in three months time in a better state of mind.

Mr. Davis: My experience in business is that the hardest thing on earth is to make a trade with somebody who is not in a mood to trade, and that the best procedure is to drop the discussion for the time being, until he is in a better frame of mind.

Sir Warren: Are you so certain that the Japanese are not ready to make a trade now?

Mr. Davis: I should think that we are pretty well agreed on that.

Sir Warren: But we have not tried the “middle course” yet.

Mr. Davis: That means scrapping the entire basis of the Washington Treaties.

Sir Warren: Sir John’s idea is that of trying to see whether we can’t get them to come along more or less on the same program, which would in effect maintain the ratios, the non-fortification agreement and qualitative limitation.

Admiral Chatfield: If we allow an interval to elapse, they will fill the time with propaganda and may be in a more difficult frame of mind later on.

Mr. Davis: Might we not submit to the Japanese the question of whether they would prefer to discuss now the preparations for the conference under the Washington Treaty, or whether they would rather defer it until a time to be agreed upon?

Admiral Chatfield: Supposing the Japanese choose the former?

Mr. Davis: Well, suppose we do go on, is the Admiralty and the Government ready to proceed with those discussions and really get down to serious negotiations on the subject?

(Admiral Chatfield indicated that the Admiralty is ready. Sir John was not so definite about the Foreign Office.)

Sir John: There are two questions we would like to know:

1. How much importance does the American Government attach to obtaining a qualitative agreement if the bigger object fails?

Mr. Davis: We really do not think it so important for us as you do.

Sir John: Second, if qualitative limitation is worthwhile, when is the moment to obtain it? This second point is a question of tactics, and there are arguments on both sides.

Mr. Davis: The situation is so different from anything we envisaged when we left that I simply cannot give a definite answer at present.

To clear up an earlier point, I should like to say that if we are to renew the present treaties, we cannot agree to an increase in total tonnage. Do you think it would be possible to arrange that and meet your needs?

Admiral Chatfield: I do not think it is impossible, but whether our different interests can be reconciled, I don’t know.

Mr. Davis: I think there is no real conflict of interests. We both want to see the other strong.

Now, if both Washington and London Treaties are overboard, I don’t know how the President would feel about a new agreement for an actual increase.

Sir John: May I try to sum up as briefly as possible the points that have been brought out this afternoon? It is my impression that, assuming the Washington Treaty is to be continued, there would be difficulties in getting an increased total allowance because it would involve difficulties in your Senate—

Mr. Davis: Not that alone. The President has a very definite conviction that it would be unwise and most unfortunate to increase tonnage totals in view of general sentiment at home and the effect throughout the world.

Sir John: You point out in contrast to this that if the treaties go, your powers in that particular might be affected. I am very much encouraged by what you have said about the possibility of exploring the idea of compensations to take care of our needs, and I would like these explorations to proceed.

Now, as to the “middle course”, let it be understood that we are not advocating it in preference to the treaties. We are merely facing the probability that the treaties will not continue, and we think we ought to consider what to do in that case. We think, under such circumstances, the “middle course” would be far better than nothing at all. This “middle course” I think might perhaps be formulated as follows:

If unfortunately we cannot get agreement to the extent which we would like, is it not still possible to try to get agreement which would include some or perhaps all of these points:

1. An agreement on programs, if possible;

2. An agreement which would preserve out of the wreck non-fortification of bases;

3. An agreement which would preserve qualitative limitation;

4. An agreement which would preserve the provision for notification to be given of the laying down of new ships.

We have explained to you why we think this is worth while pursuing. There remain the questions:

1. How important to you the “middle course” would be; and

2. If we both agree as to its desirability, when is the best time to try to get it.

Admiral Chatfield: The French and Italians are waiting to hear what we are doing. When they learn of the denunciation, they will ask us what we are going to do about it. We shall have to have conversations with them. If we don’t continue our talks, we shall be in a difficult situation with them.

Mr. Davis: The two real questions which we have to decide are:

1. Shall we give primary importance to even a restricted naval agreement dealing primarily with categories; or

2. Shall we make a still more determined effort to preserve, in so far as possible, the real fundamentals on which everything has been built.

In other words, do you give primary importance to reaching an agreement with Japan on any terms you can get, or to cooperating with a view to preserving the principles and policies on which naval limitation has been based up to now, including an agreement with France and Italy and everybody else, and thus try to continue in effect the naval treaties.

Sir John: I think that the feeling of my colleagues and myself is that we want to use every method that is open to us and to you to secure that there will not be unrestricted competition by Japan. It is very important to us that at all costs this competition shall not happen—it is more important for us than for you; it is our great concern. Therefore we must do everything we can to prevent this competition. We must first do all we can to preserve the treaties; if we can’t do that—subject of course to the maintenance of friendly relations with the United States, which remains our primary object—to keep Japan within limits which will hold her to the closest possible bounds.

Mr. Davis: Suppose England and the United States should say “We don’t want to forego the benefits of these treaties, and we shall continue under them, whether you do or not;” it might make it easier for Japan. That could not be construed as anything against Japan, because we would merely be agreeing to maintain the status quo except as a counter move against a withdrawal by Japan, which would of course be implied. It seems rather important to me that you should try to keep France and Italy tied under the Washington Treaty.

Sir Warren: Of course we are also concerned about France and Italy. But might it not make Japan feel that she was being formally ostracized?

Mr. Davis: It is the feeling of some people who know Japan better than I that if we could avoid doing anything that would arouse Japan’s suspicion, she might in time come around.

(At this point Sir John indicated that the Prime Minister desired the office for another purpose, and the meeting broke up.)

N[oel] H. F[ield]

78. Transmitted to the Department by Noel H. Field, secretary of the American delegation, in his despatch of November 21; received November 28. In his despatch Mr. Field stressed the fact “that no formal record agreed to by the Delegations has been made, but that each Delegation took its own notes. The enclosures were prepared on the basis of the American Delegation’s notes and have not been submitted to or approved by the British Delegation.”
79. Commander Roscoe E. Schuirmann, member of the General Board, U. S. Navy Department.
80. Samuel Reber, secretary to the American delegation.
81. Sir Warren Fisher, Secretary of the British Treasury.
82. Commander A. W. Clarke, secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence.
83. Commander Eric John Hodsoll, acting secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence.
84. See telegrams Nos. 26 and 31, November 9 and 13, from the Chairman of the American delegation, pp. 326 and 328.
85. See telegrams Nos. 343, 344, 364, 367, and 385, June 21, 22, 27, 28, July 5, and despatch No. 859, July 27, from the Ambassador in Great Britain, pp. 266, 267, 281, 282, 287, and 299.
86. Ante, p. 299.
87. See telegrams Nos, 344 and 352, June 22 and 25, from the Ambassador in Great Britain, pp. 267 and 272.
88. See telegram No. 270, June 26, 9 p.m., to the Ambassador in Great Britain, p. 277.
89. Treaty between the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal, signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 276.
90. Treaty between the United States, the British Empire, France, and Japan, signed at Washington, December 13, 1921, ibid., p. 33.
91. Telegram No. 37, November 15, 8 a.m., from the Chairman of the American delegation; not printed.
92. See telegram No. 25, November 17, 3 p.m., to the Chairman of the American delegation, p. 353.