500.A15A5/130: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 3—2:30 p.m.]
378. From Norman Davis. In the light of our refusal to continue the discussions on the basis of the British proposals, which has caused them considerable concern, and of their unwillingness at least for the time being to recede from their present position, it is evident that they want to avoid a collision with us and hence would like to discontinue temporarily the conversations between us in the hope that we may in time become more inclined to make concessions or that subsequent developments may justify them in receding. They accordingly argue that it would be advisable to drop the Anglo-American conversations until they have carried on bilateral talks with the French and the Japanese and have determined more definitely what positions the other naval powers will put forward. I feel there is danger in accepting this procedure unless we can previously agree upon a common objective, since otherwise we would not be prepared for useful discussions with the Japanese and it would open the way to playing off one power against another.
In compliance with your instruction15 I shall endeavor to clear up definitely with Baldwin, whom I am seeing at 4 o’clock tomorrow [Page 286] afternoon, first whether they are in favor of a renewal of the London Treaty, with only such modifications downward as can be agreed upon, or second whether they will only agree to a renewal conditional upon important modifications upward. If they agree to the first alternative then I feel that we are justified either in postponing for the time being, if they so desire, an effort to reconcile our differences as to figures or in proceeding with technical discussions. If we could in either event agree with the British upon the issuance of a statement of common objectives it would stop propaganda and injurious publicity and at the same time prepare the way for conversations with the Japanese and French. The kind of statement we have in mind would be along the following lines:
- 1.
- The two Governments are in complete accord that the principle of naval parity as between themselves shall be maintained;
- 2.
- They agree that the object of a new naval agreement should be to bring about the greatest possible reduction in naval armaments;
- 3.
- To be in favor of the maintenance of the Washington Treaties of 1922, which established the bases and principles for the promotion of security and the limitation of naval armaments, together with the complementary London Naval Treaty of 1930, which they are in favor of renewing with only such modifications in detail as circumstances may require.
If the British should not be willing to go this far then it raises a grave question as to whether we should not definitely end the conversations.
Please advise immediately if you have any objections to this procedure. [Davis.]