500.A15A/118: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 28—3 p.m.]
367. For the President and Secretary from Norman Davis. As a result of the meeting with the British yesterday I got the distinct impression, which Ambassador Bingham shares, that they are not prepared [Page 283] now to agree upon a renewal of the London Treaty without important modifications. While insisting that the program submitted to us was not a proposal, and that Anglo-American cooperation was more important than anything else, they did not recede from their position but did urge us to have patience and continue our efforts in a friendly and accommodating spirit to reach a treaty agreement ultimately. My personal opinion is that their strategy is directed in the last analysis towards either having a navy that will enable them independently to take care of themselves in the various eventualities they envisage or to say at a given time that if we can agree upon a common policy in contractual form in the Far East which would give them advance assurance that they would not have to deal with Japan single handed, then they would not need so large a navy.
While the British feel that the possibility of a conflict with us is too remote to be taken into their calculations and while the Admiralty is, I am persuaded, in favor of the closest possible friendship with our Navy and opposed to making concessions to Japan, they are nevertheless concerned over our superiority in large cruisers and likewise over those of the Japanese.
They are also concerned over the fact that the increase in the French naval tonnage has been, since the Washington Treaty only 10,000 tons less than the British.
The preoccupation of the Admiralty is primarily a technical naval one but the preoccupation of the Cabinet over the political situation has won them around to a large extent to the Admiralty point of view. They admitted yesterday, however, that if they could reach an agreement with France it would help them to make some modifications in their program. But Baldwin even then expressed more concern about Japan.
What the British would apparently like very much to do is to see just how close we could get together, primarily in the way of reducing battleship tonnage and caliber of guns and how much of an increase in cruiser tonnage would be allowed. If we are then not too far apart to make ultimate agreement seem impossible they would like to let the situation stand until they can see what they can do with France and then what we can both do with Japan, and failing in that what we could agree upon as between us.
Since the British want a larger naval program they would be embarrassed to have it publicly known that we are proposing a reduction. I am hoping Baldwin will realize that if the United States and England should both propose to Japan a renewal of the London Treaty with such modifications as will result in a net total tonnage reduction, we would be on better ground to refuse a change in ratio, [and?] adopt whatever course may be deemed desirable in case Japan refuses to sign.
[Page 284]As MacDonald is now out of it and Baldwin is taking over my judgment is that before taking any further steps I should have a frank and full private talk with Baldwin which he has told me he would like to have. [Davis.]