500.A15A5/100: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:35 p.m.]
336. For the Secretary and the President from Norman Davis. From what I have been able to learn since my arrival, and particularly as a result of yesterday’s conversation with British, I feel encouraged as does Ambassador Bingham in the possibility of reaching an understanding with the British on the basis of certain common basic objectives, namely, the avoidance of a naval race among the principal naval powers by multilateral agreement if possible, without, however, consenting to an increase in the Japanese ratio, and an understanding, if agreement with Japan on this basis proves impossible, that a race between the British and ourselves should at least be avoided.
While I believe it is as yet too early to enter upon a serious discussion of technical details, I nevertheless desire to make certain at this time that I fully understand your views on the technical problems between the British and ourselves, in order that we may deal with them satisfactorily when they arise.
My understanding of the President’s instructions, as outlined in conversations with me before my departure and subsequently with Admiral Leigh, is that we should try to pave the way for the conclusion, at the 1935 Conference, of an agreement among the principal naval powers for a percentage reduction if possible up to 20 per cent, in the total treaty tonnages of all categories (except we should keep the present tonnage in aircraft carriers) without modification of the treaty ratios, or failing such reduction, a prolongation of the Washington and London Treaty limitations for as long a period as possible, say from 10 to 15 years.80 Should agreement with the Japanese on such a basis prove impossible we should strive for an understanding with the British for parity on a sliding scale depending on Japanese building on the one hand, and on Continental European building on the other.
[Page 263]I am restating my understanding of our basic position in view of the written technical program brought over by Admiral Leigh which he informs me was prepared by the Navy and approved in substance by the President (General Board memorandum of June 481). Certain of the points of this program seem to be at variance with the objectives I have outlined above, notably the suggestion looking toward the abolition of cruiser sub-categories since they would involve a serious modification in the present treaty. From what Admiral Leigh tells me, however, I take it that this latter is not a mandatory instruction designed to apply to the present treaty tonnages but only to such additional cruiser tonnage as might be agreed to in the event of a British demand for a larger cruiser allowance. On the basis of this interpretation, I foresee no difficulties, since this proposition would arise only in the event that the British take the initiative in asking for an increased cruiser allowance. I understand that the Navy would prefer a sooner or later abolition of the sub-categories but I believe that such a position would be too great a change from the London Treaty82 provisions to warrant any hope of successful advocacy thereof.
A similar doubt arises in my mind with respect to the question of the unit tonnage of capital ships. In my talk with Admiral Leigh and Commander Wilkinson83 prior to the confidential preliminary conversations which we had here last spring at MacDonald’s suggestion, they stated that, while they had not quite completed their studies, they had reached the conclusion that the Navy would be opposed to reducing the caliber of guns on battleships to 12 inches, but would probably be willing to reduce maximum permitted guns on capital ships to 14 inches, and to accomplish some reduction in maximum displacement. In my subsequent talks with the British, I did not indicate what Admiral Leigh had told me other than to say that I was satisfied our Navy would not favor reducing guns below 14 inches. The British, as indicated in my memorandum84 already referred to, intimated that they would be willing, in order to reach an understanding with us, to agree to battleships of a maximum tonnage of 30,000 and a maximum caliber of 14 inches. Admiral Leigh tells me that recent studies warrant acceptance if it should prove necessary in negotiations of a 32,300–ton size, which would permit a fully protected ship and would allow 13 vessels within a total tonnage of 420,000, a 20 per cent reduction. While I am opposed to granting of any concessions which would be prejudicial to our interests, I think [Page 264] it would be a strategic mistake for us to attempt, particularly at the beginning of the conversations, to initiate any suggestions which might have the result of widening rather than narrowing the relatively unimportant gap still existing between ourselves and the British on technical questions. If I am correct in my assumption that the main problem facing us is the question of the Japanese ratio, and if our most fruitful path toward meeting this problem is to search for a common ground with the British, then it would seem that we should avoid as far as possible bringing up new technical problems at least until we have explored the broader issues at stake. Once we have come to an understanding on these latter the possibilities of a mutual give-and-take on technical questions become greatly increased and we will find it easier to obtain concessions from the British on matters of particular concern to us.
I have little doubt but that the foregoing considerations are shared by all of us, both here and in Washington, but for the sake of enabling me to proceed with complete assurance of our common point of view, I should appreciate receiving your confirmation or approval of the delegation’s understanding as above outlined. [Davis.]
- For message from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister MacDonald along these same lines, see telegram No. 270, June 26, 9 p.m., to the Ambassador in Great Britain, p. 277.↩
- Not found in Department files.↩
- Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, signed at London, April 22, 1930, Foreign Relations, 1930, vol. i, p. 107.↩
- Theodore S. Wilkinson, Secretary of General Board, Navy Department.↩
- For memorandum of conversation between Prime Minister MacDonald and Mr. Davis, see p. 225.↩