Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, General, the British Commonwealth, Volume I

500.A15A5/94: Telegram

The Ambassador in Great Britain ( Bingham ) to the Secretary of State

London , June 18, 1934—10 p.m.
[Received June 18—8:20 p.m.]

332. From Norman Davis.⁶⁸ The first naval conversation took place this morning at 10 Downing Street. The Prime Minister,⁶⁹ the First Lord of the Admiralty,⁷⁰ Admiral Little⁷¹ and Craigie⁷² representing the British; Ambassador Bingham, myself, Admiral Leigh⁷³ and Atherton⁷⁴ representing the United States. Previous to this meeting we met in Ambassador Bingham’s office and decided that since the conversations were taking place on British initiative we should listen to what the British had to propose before presenting any American considerations and avoid getting into technical discussions until we at least are in agreement on the major issues. The Prime Minister’s opening approach to the question was far more penetrating, frank and sympathetic than we were. He referred to the developments in the Far East and in Europe since the London Naval Conference⁷⁵ which had made the situation more serious and raised problems which had to be taken into consideration now. He stated that although Italy had accepted to take part in these preliminary naval conversations, as yet no reply had been received from the French. Nevertheless, he continued, it was realized that now one or more nations were considering a denunciation of the Washington Treaties. After a somewhat considered exchange of views upon this point the conclusion was reached that the representatives there present would recommend to their respective Governments that it should be our joint policy to preserve the fundamentals of the Washington Treaty⁷⁶ and to discourage any denunciation of it.

2. The Prime Minister then referred to the reported demand of the Japanese for the revision of the 5–5–3 naval ratio. MacDonald said that Matsudaira⁷⁷ had informed the British Government that he had been informed by his Government that this was not an official demand. MacDonald stated in substance that the British Government saw no justification for any increase in the Japanese ratio and wished to know if that was our view. I told him that we not only saw no justification but that we could not consent to it and that I thought it was most important for us to know whether we both were opposed to such an increase. After some discussion it was agreed that we should each recommend to our respective Governments that, should the Japanese seek any modification of the existing ratio, we should as a matter of guide ask Japan to explain in writing the exact reasons for which they sought such a modification, but that our joint policy should be respectively to refuse to accept even a minor modification in the Japanese ratio without previous Anglo-American consultation.

3. The Prime Minister then said that this naval problem involved a discussion of the Eastern situation generally which was a matter of vital importance and would be covered at length in a later conversation. In the meantime he intimated very definitely that the measure on which the two countries could coordinate their policies in this respect would bear decisively on the outlook England would take in the forthcoming naval discussions.

It was agreed that the only statement to be made to the press was a report that the meeting took place at 10 Downing Street, who were present, also that the questions discussed were as to procedure.

The last part of the conversations were occupied with those Japanese comments set forth in Embassy’s telegram 292, May 31, 5 p.m. As regards (a) MacDonald pointed out the King’s 25th anniversary to the throne would occur April next year in London and that if the holding of the Conference were postponed very long after that date it would interfere with the naval estimates to be presented in the budget some time the end of April. Accordingly he was in favor of calling the Naval Conference in January 1935. We explained that this was coincident with the reconvening of Congress and tentatively suggested June 1st. We stated however that we thought it was premature to try to settle upon a place and time for the Conference until we had a clearer idea as to the possibilities of a successful meeting when the Conference was convened. We decided to adjourn this discussion for the present.

As regards (b) we reached no definite decision beyond making it clear that the United States was inclined to favor London.

As regards (c) we were in accord with the Japanese proposal. Mac-Donald suggested that before our next meeting which is fixed for Wednesday morning it would be advisable for the British to see Matsudaira and also for me likewise to see him. We agreed with Mac-Donald that we should both state that we had discussed procedural questions but take occasion to state to Matsudaira that we had not discussed political questions other than to ascertain that neither of us has any present intention of raising any political question. [Davis.]

Bingham

68. Chairman of the American delegation to the General Disarmament Conference, temporarily in London for naval conversations.
69. J. Ramsay MacDonald.
70. Sir Bolton Meredith Eyres-Monsell.
71. Charles James Colebrooke Little, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff.
72. Robert Leslie Craigie, Counselor in the British Foreign Office.
73. Richard H. Leigh, Chairman of General Board, U. S. Navy Department.
74. Ray Atherton, Counselor of Embassy in Great Britain.
75. For correspondence on the London Naval Conference, see Foreign Relations, 1930, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.
76. Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, signed at Washington, February 6, 1922; for text, see ibid., 1922, vol. i, p. 247.
77. Tsuneo Matsudaira, Japanese Ambassador in Great Britain.