500.A15A5/42: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 2—12:16 p.m.]
219. Personal for Norman Davis. Your 168, April 28, 6 p.m. Craigie reports the Admiralty are studying their requirements and the whole question of preliminary [conversations?] is under consideration by British Cabinet Council who are expected any day to conclude their discussions when he will advise me further.
For your guidance I venture to point out that possibly since your departure an important section of British official opinion has crystallized very definite views in regard to the Japanese problem. As I understand these, I believe that until the menace of Japanese policy is more actually pressing than at present, when events in the Far East are overshadowed here by the threats inherent in the European situation, British would be against any appearance now of such Anglo-American cooperation and coercion vis-à-vis Japan as allegedly would [Page 233] strengthen the hands of the militarists in Japan and weaken the civilian element which is reportedly recovering political strength. With this background I believe British policy in regard to the recent Japanese statement can be best understood and I feel certain that in contemplating the forthcoming naval conversations there is an element here that would prefer to abandon the idea of a subsequent conference than to attempt by Anglo-American coercion to force Japan into a ratio agreement that would arouse national resentment there. There is also a naval group here that deplore by us naval discussions on the lines of the London naval agreement.
Craigie believes that German and Italian demands for parity have inspired Japanese naval officers to increase their demands, but that should Japan once realize the additional cost incumbent upon her if successful in her latest naval pretensions she would preferably accept any solution that did not destroy her amour propre rather than the burden of competitive cruiser building.