500.A15A4/2515
The Chairman of the American Delegation to the
General Disarmament Conference (
Davis
) to
President Roosevelt
10
My Dear Mr. President: I am enclosing a
memorandum of my conversation with Mr. MacDonald with regard to the
naval question. The British are unquestionably disturbed as to the
far-reaching effect which the present Japanese activities may have,
and they are most desirous of reaching an agreement with us, if
possible, because of the salutary effect which it might have on
Japan. I am informed that they are pushing the work at Singapore as
rapidly as possible but that this will not be completed until 1937.
In the meantime their policy will, in my judgment, be to iron out
their differences with us [Page 223]
with regard to the maintenance of naval parity, to reach a common
understanding as to the Japanese demands for an increased ratio and
even to go further, if we are disposed to do so, for the maintenance
of peace and the protection of our respective rights and
interests.
I understand that, while they all want an agreement with us,
Baldwin11 and some of them are fearful
that the Senate might upset any agreement that might be made. For
that reason they want to be very careful in doing nothing to arouse
Japan’s susceptibilities until they know definitely where they
stand. That, I think, is MacDonald’s chief reason for insisting that
any preliminary negotiations should be most secret. Preliminary
conversations such as we have had can, of course, be kept
confidential but when it reaches the stage of actual agreement on
technical and political questions relating to the navy I doubt if it
can be kept secret and I do not quite see the necessity for it.
Since the British have taken the initiative in inviting us to have
an exchange of views, I think it is wise for us to see that they
maintain this position in the negotiations preliminary to the Naval
Conference in 1935. Once these are prepared, we could well take the
initiative of having the Conference, in case there is to be one,
held in Washington.
As to procedure, I would suggest for your consideration, two or three
alternatives. First, to accept MacDonald’s invitation to have a
naval representative and someone representing the Department of
State, confer with two corresponding British representatives. To
maintain the present strategic position I think it would be wise for
us to send someone here. Otherwise, if they send someone to
Washington, our strategic position changes. We might designate as
naval attaché here the Admiral to be chosen for the Navy and
Atherton might serve as the opposite to Craigie. In this respect,
however, we would be at a disadvantage unless there were someone to
agree with MacDonald on the agenda for the preliminary discussions
and to keep a hand on the situation and prevent its getting in a
jam. I do not see how this could very well be done without causing a
lot of speculation unless the principal representative has a reason
for being here.
After thinking this over and talking with Bingham and Atherton, I am
inclined to favor a second alternative method as follows: Once we
have reason to believe that, as a result of a further exchange of
views with Mr. MacDonald during the next few weeks, we can get
together, it would be better to let it be known that the British,
with a view of preparing for the forthcoming naval conference, are
first inviting the Americans to have an exchange of views, after
which the discussions will be broadened to include the Japanese and
then the French and the Italians. The British may be somewhat
reluctant [Page 224] to do this for
fear it may strain their relations with Japan, which they wish by
all means to avoid unless practically assured of a naval agreement
with us, but I think that if they believe our negotiations can be
concluded quickly (which I believe would be possible), they will
fall into line.
If, however, there should be a meeting within the next month of eight
or ten Powers, in a last effort to reach a disarmament
agreement,12 our negotiations with
the British could be carried on under this umbrella without any
difficulty or embarrassment. The possibility of such a meeting will
depend largely upon the attitude of France which at present is not
favorable.
Eden,13 who has told me
of his visits to Berlin, Rome and Paris, is satisfied that
Hitler14 now is most desirous of reaching a
disarmament agreement and of mollifying France, and from other good
sources I am informed that Hitler now feels the need of tranquillity
in foreign politics, which is becoming more and more necessary for
the organization of his plans for internal reconstruction.
On the other hand, Eden feels that Barthou,15 Tardieu,16 and even Herriot17 and Léger18 (who is rather a key man at the
Quai D’Orsay) do not want a disarmament agreement now and that
Beneš,19 for some reason, is
becoming less inclined to favor an agreement.
Just now Eden called me by telephone and told me that they had had a
meeting of the Committee of the Cabinet on disarmament today and
that they had decided to send to Tyrrell20 to be delivered to the French, some further
arguments urging them as a matter of self-interest to accept at
once, as a basis of negotiation, the British memorandum.21 This they hope will
have some effect but at present they are expecting a temporizing
reply. After that they will decide upon the advisability of trying
to get a meeting on disarmament, including Germany and all the
principal powers.
While the situation does not look promising as to an agreement, the
British still feel that when the French have to decide whether,
through a disarmament agreement and supervision, to stop German
rearmament at about where it is now, or to face the inevitable
continued rearmament of Germany in the absence of any control, they
will be wise [Page 225] enough to
choose the former. The chief source of trouble will be on the part
of the manufacturers of armaments and particularly the Comité des
Forges and the Germans, who have a financial interest in fomenting
international strife. That is the most insidious and powerful
influence against which we have to struggle and there is a growing
realization here of this.
I am leaving for Sweden tomorrow. I had planned to go today but Mr.
Kindersley, who is the British member of the International Committee
and is going with me, could not leave until tomorrow. I was unable
to arrange to take a boat directly to Sweden, as I had hoped to do,
because at this time of year there is only one boat a week, leaving
Saturday night. We therefore have to go by train through Hamburg but
I will not go through any of the capitals or see anybody on the
Continent.
By the time I get back here in two or three weeks I presume we will
know much more about the possibilities of disarmament and whether or
not I shall get into that or return home. If, by then, you have any
instructions or suggestions with regard to the naval question I hope
you will send me word through the Embassy here.
It was gratifying that there should be such a favorable impression
everywhere with regard to the end of the first year of your
Administration. Even Wilmot Lewis22 sent a very excellent dispatch, more
friendly than those he has been sending heretofore.
With warm regards, I am as ever,
Sincerely yours,
P. S. I may say that Bingham and I, who have discussed these
various questions, have reached the same conclusions and our
views are identical.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Chairman
of the American Delegation to the General
Disarmament Conference (
Davis
)
The Prime Minister, Mr. MacDonald, who went to Ambassador
Bingham’s for luncheon, came at noon so that we could have a
talk beforehand.
I told him Mr. Atherton had reported to Washington23 his conversation with him several weeks ago
with regard to the naval question; that the President and
Secretary of State were interested in and sympathetic with the
suggestions he had made for a confidential exchange [Page 226] of views with regard to a
renewal of the London Naval Treaty and the possible
eventualities in case of Japan’s refusal to renew the treaty
without an increase in her ratio (to which, it was understood,
neither the British nor American governments were disposed to
agree); and that Mr. Atherton had accordingly been advised24 to inform him of the receptive
attitude of the United States and to inquire when, where and how
he thought such an exchange of views should take place.
I then told him that, as nothing more had been heard from him and
as I am now on leave of absence and was going through London on
my way to Sweden in connection with the Kreuger matter, the
President had suggested that I might have a private talk with
him in case his ideas had crystallized sufficiently to report
them confidentially to the President. He said that since he had
received, through Mr. Atherton, the reply from Washington, he
had been so occupied with pressing and perplexing questions he
had not had time to think the naval question through and to
discuss it with the necessary persons here. My impression was
that, while he was most eager to talk, he had rather hoped that
we might have some definite proposals to make to him. I
accordingly took the position that, since he had made the
advance, we were waiting to ascertain more definitely what he
has in mind.
He then said that Great Britain would not agree to parity with
Japan. He had thought the first step would be to so inform the
Japanese Ambassador25 and to tell him that Great Britain was
disturbed by the Japanese talk about an increase in their naval
ratio, which was unjustifiable because Great Britain is entitled
to a larger ratio than Japan since her fleet has to cover two
oceans, whereas Japan has only a limited area to cover. He said
he would like to feel that the United States felt the same way
about it. Furthermore, he thought he ought to advise the
Japanese Ambassador that Great Britain is quite disturbed by
their fortifying the mandate islands, which they had no right to
do. He said that before having such a talk he thought it well
for us to be in accord in refusing to accede parity to Japan, to
iron out any differences as regards the future makeup of our
respective navies and also to decide what we would do with
regard to a naval agreement as between ourselves in case Japan
refused to renew the present Treaty.
I told him that the United States was also definitely opposed to
parity for Japan but that, as regards the proposed talk with the
Japanese Ambassador, I thought it would be wiser and more
effective for the United States and England each to speak
separately to the Japanese, rather than for the one to speak for
the other.
[Page 227]
I then asked him if he could tell me definitely that Great
Britain would not even consent to an increase in the ratio for
Japan. He said he was not yet prepared to state categorically
that they would not consent to any modification at all in the
ratio, since he had not yet had an opportunity to discuss it
with all the proper authorities in the British Government, but
that the most that had been suggested by anyone here was that,
as a compromise, they might possibly agree on a 10–10–7 ratio
provided certain other questions could be settled
satisfactorily. I told him that, in my own personal opinion, the
present ratio was fixed after considerable thought and
negotiation and that the only basis for a modification would be
that the present ratio is unfair, and that I did not think such
a contention could be upheld because of the relative differences
in the functions which the British and American navies have to
perform in relation to that of Japan. I told him, furthermore,
that as a matter of fact the present ratio is not actually 5–5–3
except as to battleships and battle cruisers, because there is
parity as to destroyers and submarines and that, if the question
were ever opened up again there would be no limit to where it
might go. He said he was inclined to agree entirely with this
point of view and that his feeling is that, if England and the
United States agree to oppose any increase in the Japanese
ratio, the chances are that Japan would be more amenable to
reason.
He then said that he would like our two governments to reach an
agreement not only as to a continuation of parity between them
but also as to the particular categories of vessels. He said
that, as a result of his talks with the Admiralty, he felt the
only serious difficulty would be with regard to the size of new
battleships and that the younger officers in the British navy
believe that it would be desirable in the future to build
smaller and less expensive battleships. I told him that this was
a matter, of course, which had been argued backwards and
forwards and that the difference in view was due to the
difference in the problems that faced the respective navies due
to the differences in bases, but that if some arrangement could
be made whereby certain ports in the Pacific could be
neutralized, or used by the American navy, it would probably
facilitate an agreement as to the future tonnage of battleships.
He said that this raised difficult questions but that it might
well be explored.
I then told him that, as a result of the talks between Admiral
Hepburn and Admiral Bellairs, over a year ago,26 we
both got the impression that it was not impossible for us to
reach a mutually satisfactory naval agreement, contingent upon
what Japan, France and Italy may [Page 228] do. But, assuming now that we can agree as
between ourselves on a maximum and minimum for battleships, such
for instance as 15 of 25,000 tons for Great Britain and 14 of
30,000 tons for the United States, this would become purely
academic in case Japan refuses to renew the Treaty because, in
such event, neither of us would be willing to reduce the size of
our present battleships, or the calibre of guns. I expressed the
view that we might agree upon a continuance of parity as between
ourselves and provide for going up or down, depending upon what
other naval powers do. He said this was in line with his ideas
and that we would both have to have some provision, in respect
of Japan, such as the present escalator clause with respect to
France and Italy.
The question was then raised as to the advisability of holding a
Conference in 1935 in case Japan definitely informs us
beforehand that she will not agree to a renewal of the Treaty
without an increase in her ratio. He said he was concerned about
this because,-under the Treaty, Great Britain is the Power to
issue invitations and she would not want to put Japan in a
position to claim afterwards that she was not invited to the
Conference. I suggested that if our two countries should agree
beforehand as to the future makeup of our navies, and it should
then be found impossible to reach an agreement with Japan, a
naval treaty could be entered into by us without the necessity
of a Conference with other Powers, unless it were found that
France and Italy could be brought into the frame-work of a new
treaty.
He said another thing which concerned him was that, in case of a
general naval Conference as contemplated, in 1935, Great Britain
would have to invite Germany and that this would open the doors,
necessitating invitations to Yugoslavia, Spain, Turkey, and
perhaps Russia and other countries, which would greatly
complicate the problem.
Mr. MacDonald thought it essential that the preliminary
discussions be most secret in order to avoid arousing prejudices
and misunderstandings; and that, in order that such
conversations may be carried on freely and without embarrassment
to either government, it would be well to proceed as was done
year before last, i. e. to have a representative from each of
the navies, in conjunction with a representative of the Foreign
Office and a corresponding representative of the United States,
thresh out the details. He himself, and the principal
representative of the United States should not at first take
part in the conversations, although they should decide upon the
scope of the work and keep in touch with what is going on, but
in the background. He said his idea was to designate Admiral
Bellairs and Mr. Craigie of the Foreign [Office] for these
preliminary negotiations. [Page 229] I asked if it was his idea for these to be
held in Washington or London and he said he would like to think
this over and talk about it further later on.
There was some discussion of the possible appointment as naval
attaché, in London or Washington as the case may be, of the
person designated to deal with the naval aspects of the work
proposed, but no definite view was expressed.
Mr. MacDonald manifested considerable anxiety and concern about
the attitude and activities of Japan and said, in effect, that
he not only considered it of the greatest importance that the
United States and England reconcile any differences in the point
of view as to their respective navies but that, for the
promotion of world peace and stability, it was vitally important
that they cooperate most closely. I told him I had always
favored the most friendly cooperation between our two countries
and was satisfied that President Roosevelt feels the same
way.
I also said that I had been most hopeful about our ability to
reach a mutually satisfactory agreement on the naval question
but that I had been perplexed by the note his government sent to
the United States last September,27 with
regard to our naval program, because there seemed to be no
ground whatever for raising any objections about this. He
insisted that they recognized we were acting Within our treaty
rights and that there was no resentment whatever on their part
over our program, but said that they had hoped to avoid the
expense involved in building new types of vessels and that their
note to us was prompted by friendship but that our reply28 had
somewhat disturbed them. I told him I did not see how we could
possibly have taken any other position and that the fact that
someone from the Admiralty tipped off a Hearst representative
about the ending of the note, had made the situation more
difficult. Furthermore, if we had taken any other position it
would, under the circumstances, have been construed as a
surrender to the dictation of Great Britain. He said he had
understood that the leak came from Washington but I assured him
that it had not. He then said he was going to look into that
further but indicated that this was now a closed incident. He
repeated that he was now satisfied from his talks with the
Admiralty that the only difficult question between us would be
with regard to the size of battleships for which we must find a
solution.
In conclusion I told him that I would be back here on my way from
Sweden within two or three weeks and would then return home
unless [Page 230] developments in
disarmament require my presence. He said that during that time
he would go into the matter discussed more fully with the
different ones here with whom he must consult, and would be glad
to have a further discussion with me upon my return.
