500.A15A5/24
The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 10.]
Sir: The Embassy has reported frequently on the Japanese attitude toward the coming naval conference in 1935*. Certain recent events bearing on this subject justify further discussion of Japanese naval aims, and bear out conclusions previously set forth by the Embassy.
There is broad evidence that the Japanese Navy is straining every sinew to place itself in the strongest possible position by the time the next conference meets. Present building programs will bring the Navy to full Treaty strength by 1936. This fact alone is not particularly significant, but other activities of the Navy point plainly to the aims of its leaders.
The London Treaty1 is intensely unpopular among Japanese naval officers high and low, particularly among the present group which heads the Navy. All officers who supported the civilian government in the bitter fight over ratification of the London Treaty in 1930 have been forced to resign or have been placed in unimportant posts. Admiral Takarabe, Japanese delegate to the London Conference, was the first to resign. Admiral Okada was placed on the retired list, supposedly for having sided with the Hamaguchi Government against the Naval General Staff. Admiral Taniguchi was denounced for “unfaithful service to the Navy” during the recent trials of naval officers who participated in the notorious “May 15th Affair”,2 and was shamed into resigning. The next to resign was Admiral Yamanashi, who was Vice-Minister of the Navy at the time the Treaty was concluded [Page 218] and who supported Admiral Takarabe in opposition to the anti-Treaty faction.
The latest to retire is Admiral Abo, third ranking naval officer and adviser to the Japanese delegation at London, who resigned on January 15th. His retirement has been predicted by the press since the other three pro-Treaty admirals were forced out.
These resignations leave at the head of the Japanese Navy, Admiral Kanji Kato, senior officer of the Supreme Military Council and notorious for his fight against the Treaty; Vice-Admiral Suetsugu, an intense nationalist and a bitter opponent of the Treaty; Admirals Kobayashi, Nomura, and Vice-Admiral Matsuyama. Admirals Nomura and Osumi, the present Navy Minister, have less weight in high navy councils, and are regarded as “finished”.
The ousting of these liberal pro-Treaty officers and their replacement by fire-eating nationalists is one significant indication of the Japanese Navy’s attitude toward past and future arms limitation. Another indication is the recent change in the Navy General Staff regulations† making the Chief of the General Staff solely responsible for determining the size of the fleet, thereby further removing the Navy from civilian control.
Still another indication is the formation of a group of Navy, Army and civilian officials to prepare policies in preparation for the so-called “crisis of 1935–36” in Japan’s international relations, of which so much has been heard lately.‡ In view of Japan’s proposals at Geneva in December 1932,3 and with recent statements by Japanese Navy leaders in mind, it is safe to assume that Japan, or at least the Japanese Navy, is determined to have her own way at the 1935 conference. Failing in this the Japanese Navy is prepared to reject all limitation on naval construction.
Supporting this assumption are statements by the two most powerful navy leaders in active service, as well as those of two other prominent admirals:
Admiral Kanji Kato in Keizai Oral:
“In view of the changes that have taken place in international relations, Japan at the next Naval conference must secure at all costs a revision of the existing naval treaties for the purpose of perfecting her national defence. Such an opportunity may never come again if we miss it in 1935. Precisely speaking, we must insist on equality of armaments which is the prerogative of every independent nation”.
Admiral Suetsugu in King Magazine:
“In my opinion no disarmament (limitation) is the best policy. Then [all] countries can make the proper defence preparation with knowledge of the defensive strength of others”§
Admiral Osumi, Minister of Marine in an interview with the Tokyo correspondent of the United Press:
“We are not satisfied with the present arrangement, and we will demand the change of ratios at the next conference”.
Vice-Admiral Takahashi in conversation with my Assistant Naval Attaché:
“We are going to the 1935 conference with a demand for parity. If our demand is rejected, we shall return home.”
These views, expressed by the highest authorities of the Japanese Navy who will have the final decision at the next Naval conference and who speak with authority for a Navy which has recently made itself supreme in decisions affecting the size of the Navy, are of utmost significance. The feeling they indicate dominates the entire Japanese Navy, and must be reckoned with in any plans made by our Government for the 1935 naval conference.
If newspaper accounts may be relied on, the suggestion, advanced in some quarters, that the validity of the Naval treaties be extended for two or three years, is equally displeasing to the Japanese Navy. The reason is, according to press resumes of the Navy’s attitude, that the reservations made by Japan at the London Conference would become meaningless, and that the present inferior quota would tend to be regarded as permanent. Moreover the Japanese Navy, which is designed to be at full Treaty strength in 1936, will become increasingly inferior thereafter as other nations approach Treaty strength.
That there exists a more liberal and conciliatory view in this country as regards Navy limitation is indisputable.¶ The point is that the Navy itself is bitterly intransigent and that it has the authority to enforce its will on the nation. The situation is entirely different from that in 1930, when the armed forces were unpopular, when a liberal government was in power, and when final decision as to the size of the Navy lay in the competence of the civilian government. Under present conditions the Navy alone will have the final say at the conference in 1935.
[Page 220]The efforts of the Navy and Army to maintain their present popularity and to keep the public aroused to a sense of national emergency are obvious to the observer and are largely successful. I may state with confidence that in the present spirit of the Japanese people they will follow their military leaders without hesitation into any commitment or crisis. Whether this spirit may be maintained until the 1935 conference meets, in the face of restlessness over the tremendous expenditures of the armed forces and the consequent tax burden, is the problem which causes most worry to the Army and Navy leaders at present.
Incidentally, the statement by the Army’s spokesman last year condemning “certain influences at work to alienate the people from the Army and Navy”, seems to have become since then somewhat of a political issue. The possibility exists that the political parties, incensed by the budget which gives to the military the lion’s share at the expense of projects sponsored by the parties, will attack the military for attempting to gag their critics. The Government, as well as the military, would deplore any airing of this controversy in the Diet, as this would tend to exacerbate the jealousy between parties and military, and more important, reveal to the world the resentment existing against domination by the military. The press reports that Premier Saito is beseeching the political parties not to make provocative interpellations regarding the Army and Navy in the coming Diet session.
Respectfully yours,
- Embassy’s despatches No. 480 of July 26, 1933, No. 520 of September 15, 1933, No. 559 of October 20, 1933. [Footnote in the original. Despatches Nos. 480 and 559 not printed; for text of despatch No. 520, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, p. 249.]↩
- Signed April 22, 1930, Foreign Relations, 1930, vol. i, p. 107.↩
- The assassination of the Japanese Prime Minister, Ki Inukai, May 15, 1932.↩
- Reported in despatch No. 559 of October 20, 1933. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]↩
- Embassy’s despatch No. 546 of October 6, 1933—refer to for a discussion of naval limitation in relation to political problems. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]↩
- For text of Japanese naval proposal submitted to Bureau of General Disarmament Conference, see Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. i, p. 410.↩
- Note: An article by Admiral Suetsugu appearing in the Genzai Magazine, which according to cabled reports caused some sensation in the United States, is appended to this despatch, translated by the Japan Advertiser. Also hereto appended is a part of the article from King Magazine of which the above quotation is an excerpt. [Footnote in the original; enclosures not reprinted.]↩
- Embassy’s despatch No. 559 of October 20, 1933. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]↩