500.A15A4/2618
Memorandum by the American Delegate (Wilson)
At his request I dined with Litvinov alone last night. He opened the conversation by discussing the London naval conversations15 and said he did not see why the British were flirting with the Japanese by political discussipns of a non-aggression pact. I replied that as far as we knew no such action was taking place. (I remembered Sir John’s discussion with Mr. Davis on this point and believed I was within the bounds of truth in what I said.)16 Litvinov, however, was insistent that these discussions were going on and thought it was the height of folly to do anything which might lead Japan to think that a wedge could be driven between the United States and Great Britain. I replied that I thought there was less likelihood of a wedge between us than there had been some weeks ago and that even at that time the possibility was remote. He stated that for the moment the tension was reduced with Japan, scoffed at my idea that the tension was reduced because of the purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway17 and said it had been reduced solely and only because of intensive warlike preparation which the Soviet Government had made in Eastern Siberia. This had prevented the Japanese from thinking that they could make a parade across Siberia and made them count the cost.
Then he reached the purpose of pur interview. Indeed he frankly said that he had invited me so that we could talk of his idea of the permanent peace organization. He stated that there were several co-related ideas in his mind which led him to make his proposition: (1) The Kellogg Pact lacked all implementation and some form of implementation should be devised; (2) the League machinery was too cumbersome with its step by step procedure to sanctions which he recognized frightened not only the United States but many members of the League, including Great Britain; (3) the United States was not in the League and one of his principal thoughts was to devise something whereby the United States would consult with the rest of the world if there were a real threat to peace; (4) it seemed to him indispensable that unruly nations should realize that if they start anything there would be a united public opinion among the sober nations of the world which could take such measures as might be [Page 190] necessary to hold the unruly ones in check. In this particular conception he had been hoping that the United States would find it sympathetic since, when he was in Washington, President Roosevelt, he stated, had discussed with him the possibility of showing a united front on the part of the whole civilized world against the unruly ambitions of Germany and Japan.
I replied that I was very glad that he had given me this opportunity to discuss this matter frankly between us, since I felt that an intimate talk of this kind on this subject would be much more satisfactory than to have to argue such a matter on the floor of the Commission, and it was the very fact that he was concerned in our co-operation that made me happy at this stage to avoid a public discussion, because what I had to tell him was not at all encouraging to his project. I continued by stating that the American people were profoundly interested in the disarmament movement, but they divided in their minds disarmament from political problems and especially from European political problems, in which they firmly refused to concern themselves; that they felt that if the states of Europe were not even able to disarm among themselves, then it meant that any organization such as Litvinov proposed to set up would be purely political in character, predominantly concerned with European political problems, and therefore something in which we should not participate. I cited to him the experience of over a year ago when we had worked with France and Great Britain in the endeavor to find a basis of agreement which might be acceptable to Germany.18 The moment Germany walked out and accused us of trying to force her, public opinion in America indignantly repudiated the idea that we had mixed in an internal European squabble and it was necessary to clear the atmosphere at once by a public declaration to the contrary.
As to the Kellogg Pact, I had hoped myself at one time that further implementation could be made in it, but our thoughts had veered a long way in the past three or four years. Three or four years ago there was an atmosphere which at least gave hope of peaceful co-operation. Now there was an atmosphere of disillusionment and increasing distrust among the nations of Europe. Would the American people be willing to assume any fresh obligation even of a consultative nature in the face of a situation which seemed to be daily growing more bitter? I added that these were considerations in the minds of the American people and that I felt sure that if Mr. Litvinov pressed his project, we would have to bluntly say that if the Conference turned into such an organization, it would have to do so without the participation of the United States.
[Page 191]Litvinov made some further argument and then thought aloud as to possible modification that might be made in his plan which we could find acceptable, notably basing the conception squarely and directly on an implementation of the Kellogg Pact. At the end of the dinner he said, “Well, I am glad we have had this talk. It looks as if I would have to think of something else.”
Throughout the conversation Litvinov displayed the most complete distrust of Germany. To him, so long as there is a Hitler regime, just so long is Germany a mad dog that can’t be trusted, with whom no agreements can be made, and whose ambition can only be checked by a ring of determined neighbors.
- See pp. 217 ff.↩
- See telegrams Nos. 31 and 34, November 13 and 14, from the Chairman of the American delegation, pp. 328 and 331; telegram No. 20, November 14, to the Chairman of the American delegation, p. 333.↩
- See telegram No. 212, September 25, 1934, 5 p.m., from the Chargé in Japan, vol. iii, p. 283.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1933, vol. i, pp. 211–265 passim.↩