Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, General, the British Commonwealth, Volume I

500.A15A4/2600⅔

The Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Moffat) to the Under Secretary of State (Phillips)⁸⁵

[Washington,] October 23, 1934.

Memorandum

Dear Mr. Phillips: I have endeavored to give a critical study to the effects of the Pact proposed in the attached memorandum^85a and venture to list a number of objections which materially detract from its practical value.

(1) A pact of this nature, which makes the crossing of a frontier an absolute test of aggression, would give every nation a free hand to pursue a policy of treaty violation without fear of outside interference. For instance, Germany would feel safe in rearming to a point where she could actively threaten her neighbors in spite of her treaty obligations.

(2) Instead of assisting us to remain out of a further European war, this Pact would bid fair to involve us in a future conflict, as there is little doubt that “declining to trade in any manner, shape, or form with an aggressor” as a means of sanction, comes pretty close to a casus belli, and would in any event be inconsistent with the duties of neutrality.

(3) This Pact would go considerably beyond the offer contingently made by Mr. Davis in 1933⁸⁶ that in certain circumstances where States in conference had determined that a State was guilty of a breach of the peace in violation of its international obligations and had taken measures against the violator, then if we concurred in the judgment rendered as to the responsible and guilty party, we would refrain from any action tending to defeat such collective effort which these States might thus make to restore peace. The Davis offer was made contingent upon a real measure of disarmament, which the Pact does not provide for; further, its purpose was a negative one, namely, to refrain from action, while the Pact is cast in positive form and implies action.

(4) The proposed Pact goes considerably further than the Covenant of the League of Nations which even recognizes certain types of “legitimate war”. Great Britain and certain of the other members of the League have consistently attempted by interpretation to tone down the League Covenant, and have objected to assuming any additional international obligations.

(5) As a practical measure the test of the crossing of frontiers as an act of aggression is not altogether a sound one. There are many disputed frontiers; in such a case the signatories would speedily become involved in the merits of the dispute over the frontier. (As an example, take the Saar territory in the event that Germany had won the plebiscite but the Council had not yet made the final allocation of the territory.)

(6) There are cases such as protecting citizens abroad in case of disorder or threat to life, particularly in backward parts of the world, in China, et cetera, where it might be necessary for a nation to allow its armed forces to cross foreign frontiers or to land on foreign soil, without subjecting themselves to the penalties provided for.

(7) If the proposed Pact were not universalized, I reach the reluctant conclusion that it would in effect constitute an alliance in fact if not in form between the signatory Powers.

Pierrepont Moffat

85. A note by the Under Secretary to Mr. Moffat attached to this memorandum reads: “The President says we can let this matter rest.”
86. Supra.
86. See telegrams No. 644, May 19, 1933, and No. 646, May 20, 1933, from the Chairman of the American delegation, Foreign Relations, 1933, vol. i, pp. 154 and 158.