500.A15A4/2594: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 22—4:34 p.m.]
5. Your 170, October 15, 2 p.m. to Wilson at Geneva. After a full discussion with Wilson of the dossier with regard to a separate convention on Manufacture and Traffic in Arms, and also with regard to the status and fate of the Disarmament Conference, our joint views and observations may be summarized as follows:
1. A disarmament convention in the near future is impossible. Mussolini has publicly declared his position, and France and Russia privately, to the effect that they would not disarm at all under present conditions; also the British feel that it is futile to make any further effort at present. A striking fact, however, is that while they are not willing to disarm now, they are not willing to destroy machinery for effecting a disarmament agreement in the future or to publicly abandon all effort to reach an agreement. The indications therefore are that the consensus of opinion will either favor keeping the Conference alive or setting up a Permanent Disarmament Commission for continuing the work of disarmament and specifically for the supervision of the substantive articles of a treaty relating to the manufacture and trade in arms. (For more extended analysis refer despatch No. 104 from Geneva.)83
2. My impression is the American public opinion would favor a vigorous effort on our part to secure an agreement going as far as possible in dealing with the arms traffic problem.
As to how we might initiate action, I am inclined to favor a blunt statement to the effect that the temper of many of the European states was such that no early success on disarmament negotiations could be expected; that we deplore this and believe that success could be achieved were the states thoroughly imbued with the necessity and importance for a disarmament agreement. That, nevertheless, recognizing the existing situation there was one phase of the problem of the highest importance and urgency, namely, manufacture and traffic in arms which offers promise of immediate achievement and on which a complete and autonomous treaty might be immediately negotiated and signed. Success in the treatment of this problem would of itself ease the solution of disarmament and eliminate some of the most sinister influences now acting against it.
3. As indicated by the draft text presented to you it is not possible to go very far beyond publicity, even in regard to manufacture and [Page 169] traffic in arms because until there is a limitation on the possession of arms obviously there can be no limitation on manufacture. Wilson tells me repeated effort has been made to find means of controlling profits in manufacture of arms by international agreement but without success. In fact the committee itself discussed this matter extensively over a year ago and were unable to reach any positive conclusion even when they were contemplating doing so in connection with a disarmament convention. At any rate the important thing is to attempt to get some measure of international agreement on at least a first step in the treatment of the problem of manufacture and trade in arms, publicity alone will go far to eliminate many of the evils of the trade and will reduce the fear of the unknown between states. It would also establish a concrete basis upon which to build more radical control in the future in the light of practical experience.
4. While we were reluctant to assume the moral responsibility of bringing real pressure on any nation to limit its armaments, because of the implications that this might involve, I feel that there is not the same responsibility in actively advocating a convention such as contemplated. We could, in fact afford to enter into such a discussion with a vigorous determination to prosecute it to a finish. Indeed, the states represented in the Disarmament Conference look to us as leaders in this particular objective. We should not, however, prosecute the matter further unless we are willing to throw the whole weight of our influence continuously and vigorously behind it.
5. We are satisfied that we can count upon the active support of the neutral states as to the position of the great powers. This is fully covered in Wilson’s despatch 101.84
6. If our initiative is to have the greatest possibility of success it will need careful preparation particularly with England and France because if they are unwilling to go along they can very well block it. If therefore you concur in the above views we can take it up with the British and Henderson and then, at such interval as his presence here may not be required in connection with the naval conversations Wilson could go to Paris to take the matter up with the French Government.
7. I have just received a copy of Mayer’s 938, October 20, 2 p.m. from Geneva to you and see no reason therein to modify the foregoing. Aghnides project would appear to be drafted to give a measure of satisfaction to Litvinoff by instituting at once the Permanent Disarmament Commission which would have nothing to supervise, the only purpose of which would be consultation and other political questions. It is open to the same objections which Wilson raised with Aubert (see his 936, October 4, 10 p.m.).
[Page 170]Since the disarmament appropriations will soon be exhausted and since it may be found difficult, if not inadvisable, to secure additional appropriations from Congress in order to continue participation in disarmament discussions when there is such a definite opposition to disarmament by some of the principal European powers, I feel inclined to tell Henderson that under the circumstances I am skeptical about our continuing to fan the air much longer without a specific objective with a possibility of realization. Cipher text to Geneva.