500.A15A4 General Committee (Arms)/35
The American Delegate ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 23.]
Sir: I have the honor to supplement my despatch No. 103, October 3, 1934,77 by the transmission herewith of Chapter IV accompanied by Annex I of the Draft of a Treaty on the Manufacture of and Traffic in Arms and Implements of War. Chapter IV envisages the setting up, competence and functions of the Permanent Disarmament Commission.
As we progressed in the study of this question, we became increasingly impressed with the fact that the limited scope of the convention now under consideration alters materially the nature and ends of supervision and especially of inspection within the territory. In the limited convention the inspection would appear to be for the purpose of establishing the accuracy of information submitted and would not, as in any general convention, occupy itself with any form of qualitative and quantitative limitation. This robs inspection somewhat of its dangerous character, since any adverse findings would be of a less serious nature as applying only to provisions of publicity rather than in contravention to limitations or restrictions on manufacture or possession. [Page 156] The scope now is more clearly limited by the convention itself, whereas in a general disarmament convention the scope of an investigating committee might conceivably have been applied to almost any form of national or local activity.
It is true, as the Department has no doubt realized, that the inspection provisions of Chapter IV of this Draft Convention seem overbalanced and out of focus, having regard to the limited character of the agreement under consideration. As we see it here, however, the supervisory or inspection features of a limited convention are those which many States will find more interesting and desirable than the other, or what might be termed substantive provisions of a proposed treaty relating to manufacture of and traffic in arms. This we believe is especially the case with France and Russia. Therefore it is felt that the successful conclusion of a limited convention regarding the manufacture of and traffic in arms depends measurably upon the extent to which supervisory provisions are included and the importance and extent assigned to this aspect of the treaty. This clearly does not obviate the necessity for a precise definition of the rights, duties and limitation of powers of these special committees. We have endeavored to comply in the fullest possible measure with the Department’s desire for precision in the relations and duties of the investigating committees. It is difficult at present to write with further precision what those duties will be. Presumably the discussion which will center around these articles will give us clarification as to those points on which precision is necessary. I should be grateful if the Department could point out shortcomings in the draft on which further precision could be formulated. The thing that gives me concern is the difficulty of defining the rights of an investigating committee after it arrives on the territory of the State to be investigated. The only precisions which we have written lie in the general limitation that the investigation shall apply to matters covered by the convention, and the specific restrictions contained in paragraph “O”. I am satisfied that this is not all that is necessary. But, as I stated above, at present writing I do not feel competent to go further.
The enclosed articles have reproduced, in so far as they are applicable, the sections of the British Draft Convention relating to the establishment of the Permanent Disarmament Commission and the amendments introduced into these articles as a result of the deliberations of the Committee of the Bureau on General Provisions. (See Conf. Doc. Bur./C. D. G. 3/Dec. 7, 1933.) In many instances these original articles will not fit in a convention dealing only with the manufacture of and traffic in arms and have been either modified to meet the changed circumstances or omitted where they no longer [Page 157] applied. New provisions for publicity of manufacture and trade have been inserted in this section.
Please refer to Article “K”. You will note that in the first paragraph we have provided “… the Commission shall be entitled annually, or more often if it so desires, to examine …” We have adopted this phraseology rather than using a more mandatory form in order not to create too cumbersome a machine for the purpose desired. If the Convention should make it obligatory that every State should be inspected every year, the machine would not only be cumbersome and expensive, but would accomplish innumerable investigations of States whose neighbors had no apprehension regarding their activities and in which the investigation was patently useless. We therefore thought it better to establish the principle of annual inspection but to leave it to the Commission itself to determine the frequency thereof. On the other hand, cases might arise where the Commission might feel that an inspection should be immediately followed by another inspection for the purpose of deciding specific questions, and to cover this contingency we inserted the words “… more often if it so desires …”
I should be happy to learn whether this meets your conception of automatic control or whether you would prefer to have the article drafted in a more mandatory form.
In relation to the first paragraph of Article “K” I give below the draft of another article to be inserted in Chapter I of the Draft Articles enclosed with my despatch No. 103, October 3, 1934, providing for a report to the Permanent Disarmament Commission of the national control set up by each contracting party.
“The High Contracting Parties shall inform the Commission of the provisions of the national control exercised over the manufacture of and trade in arms and implements of war within the territory under their respective jurisdiction.”
I invite attention to the fact that different types of committees are set up under Articles “K” and “M”. Article “M” deals with complaints, and a complaint immediately creates a more serious situation than a normal investigation and therefore, it seems to us, should be handled with special precaution. Hence the final paragraph providing that the two Parties to the complaint shall not be members of the special investigating committee, but shall be represented by assessors only; and the further provision for a majority of States on the committee not directly interested in the complaint. The precaution has also been taken in Article “M” of providing for a two-thirds majority of the Commission to acquiesce in the special investigation based on complaint.
[Page 158]Article “N” raises a question of considerable importance. The final sentence reads as follows:
“The High Contracting Parties shall promptly advise as to the conclusions of the report.
As you will remember, practically this phraseology was originally adopted by the Preparatory Commission in its Article 50 of the Draft Convention78 and was designed to make consultation possible between all States signatories in the event of a grave situation arising. In the case of a limited convention it is, of course, unlikely that an infraction of the convention would bring about a threat of war. On the other hand, it seems essential that some form of consultation should be provided. For instance, consultation might be the best means of obtaining relief from the obligations of the treaty for the neighbors of a State which had persistently and with premeditation violated its provisions.
Presumably investigations under the limited convention would not be of immediate or vital importance, yet some consultation regarding them would seem necessary. It would appear advisable, therefore, to make some provision for this eventuality, but to make it in a way which would cause the least publicity and the least apprehension on the part of the public. The Contracting Parties might consult diplomatically, though this, of course, is a clumsy procedure. They might consult through the Council of the League, but this raises certain difficulties for us and is inevitably a matter of wide public comment. It has occurred to me that you might think it wise to phrase the final paragraph of Article “N” somewhat as follows:
“At the instance of one of the members of the Commission, the High Contracting Parties shall promptly advise as to the conclusions of the report, in the first instance, through their representatives on the Permanent Disarmament Commission.”
Such advice through the ordinary machinery of the Commission would seem to be sufficient to liquidate minor questions which might arise as to infraction. If more serious questions arise either the States could name special members to the Permanent Disarmament Commission for the purposes of consultation, or another form of consultation would readily be devised.
Obviously any clause in a treaty that deals with consultation has to be scrutinized with the utmost care on our part, since the setting up of [Page 159] any form of consultation might and very probably would invite attempts on the part of certain States to urge the use of collective measures in the case of violation. The limited nature of this treaty should nevertheless be the guarantee that at any time the American Delegate would be free to refuse to follow in any such action, I fully realize what a difficult matter is this question of advice and the general as well as specific objections to our making any undertaking in this connection. I do feel strongly, however, that even if we left out of any draft treaty any mention of advice it would be brought up from another source in a more objectionable form. Furthermore, our willingness to “advise” in this relation would be an important if not, perhaps, decisive factor in bringing about agreement on such a convention.
With reference to Article “O”, this text is adapted from the Draft Articles Relating to the Manufacture of and Trade in Arms approved July 2, 1934,79 by the committee dealing with this subject. I ask your consideration of the phraseology adopted. I feel that it is indispensable that knowledge which could lead to unfair competition should not be made available to the trade rivals of the concern inspected. On the other hand, monies expended on certain types of materials may be an important index as to quantities produced or contemplated for production. I confess that I am not entirely satisfied as to the phraseology and would appreciate your observations on this article.
Articles “R”, “S” and “T” deal with functions of the Permanent Disarmament Commission which are entirely separate from the functions as specifically applying to the treaty on manufacture of and traffic in arms and implements of war. I am not sure what form exactly the wishes of the members of the Disarmament Conference will take as to the continuation of the Conference itself. It may be that they will decide to continue the Conference for active work, when conditions are ripe, on a general disarmament convention. It may be they will decide to continue the Conference purely as a façade while delegating the Conference work to the Permanent Disarmament Commission set up under this treaty. Or, it may be—a third alternative—that they will prefer to terminate the Conference and turn over its mandate to the Permanent Disarmament Commission. Whichever one of these alternatives meets general approval, there will probably be some attempt made to have the Permanent Disarmament Commission carry on the general disarmament work. We have therefore considered it wise to meet what we believe to be the general view by drafting Article “S” in such form that it could be [Page 160] readily adapted to any of the alternatives. In this connection please see my telegram No. 936, October 4, 10 p.m.
We have not attempted to draft articles of ratification since ratification inevitably differs in accordance with the document drawn up and can only be written effectively in the light of the text adopted.
Respectfully submitted,
- Not printed.↩
- League of Nations, Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference Entrusted With the Preparation for the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Series X: Minutes of the Sixth Session (Second Part) of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference (Ser. L. o. N. IX. Disarmament 1931. IX. 1), p. 618; Department of State, Conference Series No. 7: Report of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference and Draft Convention (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1931), p. 99.↩
- Conference Documents, vol. iii, p. 894.↩