840.00/406
The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 27.]
Sir: There are certain considerations, which I have the honor to set forth below, with respect to the general European outlook, particularly [Page 123] viewed from Paris, which have occurred to me in reading Ambassador Long’s32 Strictly Confidential Despatch No. 561 of June 1, 1934.33
Needless to state, circumstances have slightly changed since the writing of the despatch, due to the fact that the meeting of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, which reassembled in an atmosphere of fear and difficulty, succeeded in effecting a compromise which may ultimately permit the return of Germany to the Conference, and the continuation of efforts to reach an equitable agreement on disarmament. In particular, the efforts to heal the breach between France and England will have, I think, a stabilizing effect on European opinion, and members of the Government have gone out of their way to express appreciation for the rôle played by Mr. Norman Davis in making this possible.
There has been some war talk constantly in Paris and it reached its height last autumn about the time that Germany withdrew from the League of Nations. This talk has been chiefly inspired by military circles or by the Right press, the control of which has always been kept closely within the orbit of the Comité des Forges. However, the fact that no untoward incidents arose in the autumn considerably calmed the apprehensions here, and even the announcement of Germany’s large military appropriations did not raise the general excitement that might have been expected. It merely caused the Government to send the stiff note of April 17, 1934,34 on the arms question and to request greatly increased military expenditures. It has likewise made the French people face the probability of lengthening the term of military service, as indicated by the overwhelming vote of 420 to 171 which M. Doumergue35 received on the military budget on June 15, 1934.
With respect to the dangerous areas in Europe, the apprehensions of France have lessened since the Dollfuss régime was definitely set up in Austria, and for the moment they fear neither a Hapsburg restoration or a Nazi dictatorship. Moreover, the whole difficulty with respect to the Saar seems to have been appeased by the compromise arrangement reached by the Council of the League on the plebiscite. In fact, French public opinion has never been deeply stirred by the Saar question and the manifestations of feeling have been almost perfunctory, even on the part of the extreme Right press.
There is no question but that the cooling off of relations with Poland has thrown France definitely into Russia’s arms, and that her hope of friendship in the East now lies in Moscow. Moreover, the recent debates in Geneva ultimately demonstrated that France’s first interest [Page 124] lies in an accord with England, the only country which can, with or without guarantees, give France the backing necessary to make her secure, and it would seem that this fact was being borne in on the French Government.
Members of the Foreign Office in most conversations usually manage to touch upon the possibility of a conflict in the Far East between Japan and Russia, and the possibility that such an event might cause further wars, the implication being that the United States would be drawn in. They sometimes follow this up with the possibility that if such were the case, Germany and Poland might combine to attack Russia’s European borders in the hope of annexing the rich regions of the Ukraine. In fact, it is the very definite opinion that German policy is turning toward the East. They stress the similarity of ideas which dominate both in Germany and Japan, and the close relations Pilsudski36 has established with Tokyo through his brother who is a professor at the Imperial University there. In fact, about the middle of the winter it was definitely expected that a conflict would break out this spring. The fact that no hostilities have occurred is now being explained as due to the diplomacy of the Soviet Government: first in obtaining recognition from the United States, and second in bringing France into the orbit of Eastern European problems by proposals for treaties of mutual assistance or an Eastern Locarno.37
France is concentrating more vigorously than ever on rendering her territory impregnable to attack and the fortifications along the borders, the so-called Maginot Line, are being supplemented and strengthened in every way. Moreover, her naval program is being pushed so that when Germany shall have exceeded her naval allowances under the Versailles Treaty,38 France will be fully up to the limits which she accepted under the Washington and London treaties. The same consideration applies to the relations with Italy, concerning naval armaments. (See my despatch No. 972, June 12, 1934.)39
There can be no question but that the existence of so many states in Europe under dictatorships subjects the continuation of peace to a variety of uncontrollable personal whims and ambitions, although it is the widespread opinion here in government, parliamentary and press circles that the present régime in Germany is weakening and that some change may be anticipated by autumn. Against these tendencies, France, although somewhat torn by internal dissension, corruption and economic maladjustment, has opposed the strongest possible defensive attitude. In fact, I have heard from various members of the government [Page 125] that the French people could not be induced to move beyond their own borders. If, as seems likely, due to the growing realization in England of the menace which Germany’s increased armaments, especially in the air, will have for her, a good understanding can again be created, I think immediate prospects of war in this part of Europe will be considerably delayed. For example, M. Piétri, Minister of Marine, believes that Germany cannot be prepared for any war with France in less than from six to nine years, and this contention was only questioned with respect to the possibility of German air bombing raids, for which matériel, in addition to that existing, could be quickly got together. The difficulties of consolidating a position after even the most successfully destructive air raid, however, make this threat more psychological than strategic.
If the Soviet Union can succeed in the formation of an Eastern Locarno, and/or pacts of mutual assistance, to which France shall be a party, the prospects of war in Eastern Europe will diminish, leaving a strengthened Russia to face any troubles in the Far East, which, from all the information we are able to obtain, may arise next year.
No one can deny that a race in armaments is once more on: the great question is whether the goal is Peace or War. It is my belief that in France, as in other great democracies, that goal is peace.
Respectfully yours,
- Breckinridge Long, Ambassador in Italy.↩
- Ante, p. 88.↩
- Great Britain, Cmd. 4559, p. 20.↩
- Gaston Doumergue, French Prime Minister.↩
- Joseph Pilsudski, Polish Minister for Military Affairs.↩
- For correspondence concerning an “Eastern Locarno” Pact of Mutual Guarantee, see pp. 489 ff.↩
- Treaties, Conventions, etc., 1910–1923, vol. iii, p. 3329.↩
- Not printed.↩