837.00/3778: Telegram

The Ambassador in Cuba ( Welles ) to the Secretary of State

206. Late last night Dr. Horacio Ferrer, Secretary of War in the Céspedes Cabinet, called to see me. He told me that he had spent the preceding 24 hours in continuous conferences with political leaders of all the groups which had supported the Céspedes Government and that the plan which he would outline to me met with the approval and support of all of them. He told me that he had been in touch with the sergeants in control of the Fortress Cabana; that they realized that they had been deceived in participating in the mutiny and that they were prepared to make any reparation for their action. They had prepared a written communication in this sense addressed to President Céspedes. Dr. Ferrer stated that he had arranged with them that they should request of the revolutionary group, which is now attempting to persuade the officers to resume their positions, the reappointment of Major Cardenas the former Commander of Cabana and all the former subordinate officers in whom Dr. Ferrer states he has implicit confidence; that as soon as these preliminary measures had been taken Dr. Ferrer accompanied by a group of some 80 loyal officers would proceed tomorrow, Friday, night to Cabana Fortress with President Céspedes and several other members of his Cabinet and that early Saturday morning he would proclaim the support of Cabana Fortress to the legitimate Government of President Céspedes. He informed me that the Fortress was impregnable and that there was both food and water and sufficient ammunition for them to hold out if necessary for a period of at least 2 months. Doctor Ferrer assured me that all of the soldiers and non-commissioned officers in La Cabana would be loyal to him but that should there be any few disloyal individuals they would be immediately ejected. He stated that he had already been in touch with the officers of the military forces of Matanzas and Pillar del Río as well as in other portions of the Republic and that as soon as the proclamation from Cabana has been issued the loyal troops and officers throughout the country would make a simultaneous proclamation. He was confident that within a very brief period the present regime would be overthrown.

He inquired whether, should this action be taken, and should the Céspedes Government make such request the Government of the United States would be willing to land troops from the battleships now due to arrive at Cojimar, immediately to the east of Cabana Fortress, in order to assist the Céspedes Government in maintaining order. He stated of his own initiative that he fully understood my position and that of my [Page 397] Government and that he wished merely to inform me of the plans which he had made without expecting or desiring any assurances of any character from me, and that he would follow through the plan he had in mind no matter what action the United States Government might take.

I told him I deeply appreciated his advising me of his intentions; that of course, as he stated, it was impossible for me to participate even tacitly in the elaboration of his plans; and that I could make no commitments to him at this time with regard to the landing of American troops.

Dr. Ferrer stated that the Céspedes Government was still the constitutional and recognized Government of Cuba; that President Céspedes had left the Palace through force majeure and had accepted the declaration of the revolutionary group that he had been “deposed” since he had no armed forces to keep him in power but that he had not resigned either orally or in writing.

If the plan formulated by Dr. Ferrer were carried out successfully I desire to lay the following considerations before the President and yourself. The Céspedes Government came into power through constitutional procedure and was immediately recognized by all of the nations having diplomatic relations with Cuba including the Latin American Republics as the legitimate Government of Cuba. The President and his Cabinet have not voluntarily resigned but have had to give in in the face of a mutiny in the Army. If the legitimate and recognized Government of Cuba can make an effective demonstration of its intention to reestablish itself, it would most decidedly appear to me to be in the best interest of the United States Government to afford them immediate support. Any solution of this character is more advantageous to our interests and to our policy than full intervention and the possible necessity of an American Military Government. What I purpose would be a strictly limited intervention of the following nature:

The Céspedes Government should be permitted to function freely in exactly the same manner as it did until the time of its overthrow, having full control of every branch of the Government. It is obvious, of course, that with a great portion of the Army in mutiny it could not maintain itself in power in any satisfactory manner unless the United States Government were willing, should it so request, to lend its assistance in the maintenance of public order until the Cuban Government had been afforded the time sufficient, through utilizing the services of the loyal officers of the Cuban Army, to form a new Army for which it would possess a nucleus in the troops which are still loyal and detachments of the rural guard, most of whom have not come out in support of the present regime. Such policy on our part would presumably entail the landing of a considerable force at Habana and lesser forces in certain of the more important ports of the Republic.

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If through the lending of a police force to the legitimate Government of Cuba for a comparative brief period we can assist the Céspedes Government to function, in all probability the Constitutional Assembly and the national elections which the Cuban people unanimously desire, could be held within less than a year’s time with the result that a new constitutional Government in Cuba would come into power and by that time there will be functioning a Cuban Army capable of maintaining that Government in power and guaranteeing life and property and public order.

The disadvantages of this policy as I see them lie solely in the fact that we will incur the violent animosity of the extreme radical and communist groups in Cuba who will be vociferous in stating that we have supported the Céspedes Government because that Government was prepared to give protection to American interests in Cuba and that our policy is solely due to mercenary motives. It is worth emphasizing, however, that we always have had and always will have the animosity of this group and that the adoption of the measures above-indicated will merely offer them an excellent opportunity for attack. Consequently, since I sincerely believe that the necessity of full intervention on our part is to be avoided at all hazards, the limited and restricted form of intervention above outlined would be infinitely preferable. When the recognized and legitimate government of a neighboring republic, with which republic we have special contractual obligations, is confronted by mutiny in the army and can only maintain order and carry through its program of holding elections for a permanent constitutional government through the assistance of an armed force lent by the United States as a policing power, it would seem to me to be in our best interests to lend such assistance, and it would further seem to me that since the full facts of the situation here have been fully explained to the representatives of the Latin American countries, the landing of such assistance would most decidedly be construed as well within the limits of the policy of the “good neighbor” which we have done our utmost to demonstrate in our relations with the Cuban people during the past 5 months.

If Dr. Ferrer’s plan is carried through immediate action by us will undoubtedly be required if such action is to be of any effective assistance. I consequently request instructions from the President and yourself at the earliest possible moment in order that I may be fully prepared to carry out such instructions whom [when?] the appropriate moment arrives.

Welles