837.00/3622: Telegram
The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State
[Received 2:05 p.m.]
135. In summarizing the views expressed in my telegram 134, August 8, 9 p.m., I feel it desirable to emphasize the following points as the result of the intensive study I have made here during the past 3 months:
- 1.
- There is absolutely no hope of a return to normal conditions in Cuba as long as President Machado remains in office. No one other than the exceedingly small clique of officeholders surrounding him has any trust or confidence in him and he represents in his person to every other Cuban the cause of economic distress and personal suffering which has existed during the past 3 years.
- 2.
- So long as this condition continues there is no possible chance of improving economic conditions in Cuba, and there will be immense loss to the Cuban people themselves and as a natural corollary to all of the American interests doing business in or with Cuba.
- 3.
- The solution proposed by me as mediator represents a compromise framed by the representatives of all Cuban factions both of the opposition and of those which have in the past been cooperating with the Government and if such solution could be carried into effect I have the utmost confidence that peace and tranquility would be restored to Cuba within a week.
- 4.
- If my recommendations are adopted and recognition is withdrawn from the Machado Government I believe that the President would be forced to resign his office within a very limited period and that a stable government could be installed in strict accordance with the provisions of the existing constitution within a period of hours thereafter provided arrangements to that end are made by me before recognition is withdrawn.
- 5.
- If recognition is withdrawn there will in all likelihood be for a brief period disturbances in the city of Habana. If my recommendations are adopted and this eventuality takes place I feel that two American warships should be in Habana harbor with instructions not to land a man except in the gravest emergency the terms of which should be precisely defined beforehand.
The ultimate objective, in addition to the immediate objectives above-mentioned, of the recommendations which I formulated, is to permit the Cuban people to hold free and constitutional elections for a new government in accordance with the existing constitution in November 1934. If President Machado remains in power even until February of next year no political parties can reorganize and none of the opposition parties will organize, with the consequence that the elections due to be held in November 1934 would once more result in the election of a government which did not come into power with the free consent of all of the Cuban people.
[Page 345]You will understand, I am sure, that the recommendations I have made have been offered with reluctance and only after the most careful consideration. I can frankly state, however, that I see no other solution.