837.00/3616: Telegram
The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 9—4:48 a.m.]
134. I had an interview with President Machado this morning. I told the President that in accordance with my conversation with him of last Sunday afternoon, I handed him as mediator a solution of the Cuban political problem which represented a compromise accepted by the sectors of the opposition, by the directors of the Popular and Conservative Parties and by seven leaders of the President’s own party, the Liberal Party, including the president of that party, and which compromise would permit the Cuban people to return immediately to a state of peace and tranquility, and be enabled as a result thereof to devote themselves to the restoration of Cuba’s economic prosperity. I told President Machado further that I was specifically authorized to state that the solution as proposed by me met with the full approbation of the President of the United States.
The President immediately stated that he would not accept this solution as proposed and that I could inform the President of the United States that he would prefer armed intervention to the acceptance of any such proposal. It was obvious that he was in a state of mental disturbance bordering on hysteria which, however, later changed into a more reasonable attitude. He stated that he was as much in favor of my mediation as he had ever been and that no one could have carried out their official duties in a more friendly spirit and in a manner less calculated to injure the susceptibilities, either of the Republic or of any individual, than I had. I pointed out to [Page 341] him, that notwithstanding his assertions in a radio address which he had broadcast last night, the solution as proposed, represented neither imposition nor interference by the Government of the United States, but was a solution which had been drafted as the result of conferences between the representatives of every part of Cuban public opinion. I stated that the solution in no wise impaired the sovereignty of the Republic and was furthermore entirely in accord with existing constitutional procedure in Cuba; that it must be obvious to him that rightly or wrongly the refusal to the Cuban people to return to a state of political tranquility was due to the fact that the existing Cuban Government was charged with all of the tragedies and economic disasters which had taken place during the past 3 years; that it had been my earnest hope that the President as a patriotic gesture would agree through the solution proposed to make it possible for a rapid return to normal conditions here and that it was my firm belief that unless the solution proposed or one similar to it was carried into effect, no such betterment could be possible.
The President informed me that he accepted the last three points of the solution proposed but would never accept the first two. I inquired whether this was intended to mean that he would refuse to consider any counterproposition and he told me that on the contrary he would consider the desirability of formulating a counterproposition. To this I replied that in view of the extreme gravity of the situation here I felt that I was entitled to receive a reply from him within a very brief period.
The Presidents of the Conservative and Popular Parties have been to see me today to assure me of their unfaltering support in view of their belief as stated in a formal resolution of the Conservative Party “That Mr. Welles be advised in his character as mediator, as likewise all those who compose the mediation commission of the fervent desire of the Conservative Party for a solution of the domestic political problems which now confront the Republic and of the hope which inspires the Conservative Party that with a high spirit of patriotic sacrifice there will be established shortly peace and relief to the Cubans”.
The President has appealed to the cupidity of many of the members of the Liberal Party in Congress in order to stir up opposition to the solution proposed, owing to the fact that necessarily the representatives who agree to shorten their terms will have to give up the lucrative privileges to which they are now entitled.
I trust that through the joint influence of the political leaders in Congress and of certain of the higher-minded members of the Cabinet such as General Herrera, the President will reconsider the attitude which he has taken. I am, however, by no means hopeful of the outcome.
[Page 342]I think the situation demands forceful and positive action by the Government of the United States in order that our prestige both here and in the rest of the continent may not be seriously prejudiced. If President Machado remains in power he can only continue through the exercise of the most brutal methods of repression, which will culminate time and again in such tragedies as that which took place in Habana yesterday. It will be impossible for him to govern without a continuance of martial law and the suspension of all constitutional guarantees, which condition makes it possible, of course, for the President and the military authorities to assassinate, to throw into prison, and to deprive of “life, property and individual liberty”, any citizen in the Republic.
The Government of the United States has clearly demonstrated its intention to use every possible means at its disposal to further and to support a peaceful and constitutional adjustment by the Cuban people of their problem. The realization of that end is made impossible solely by the unwillingness of one man, President Machado, to retire from the office which he holds through a reelection which in its genesis is unquestionably unconstitutional. Throughout the course of my mission here, I have exerted every possible effort to avoid the creation of a situation which might result in intervention by the United States. If the present condition is permitted to continue much longer, I am positive that a state of complete anarchy will result which might force the Government of the United States, against its will, to intervene in compliance with its obligations under the permanent treaty.
I should like further to emphasize the fact that in my own judgment the permanent treaty imposes upon us responsibilities as regards the Cuban people. I do not see how the Government of the United States can, in view of its treaty obligations, continue its formal support of a Cuban Government which has consistently deprived the Cuban people of their constitutional rights, which has been guilty of atrocities which have shocked the entire continent, and which refuses to consider the acceptance of a fair and Cuban solution of this disastrous situation. I believe that intervention should be avoided at any cost except that of failing to comply with our treaty responsibilities, but on the other hand I believe that should President Machado positively refuse to agree to the solution proposed, or to one similar in character, the Government of the United States should no longer accord its moral support to the Government of Cuba and should withdraw recognition.
I do not believe that the withdrawal of recognition would in all probability force us to intervene; I think that if the President himself was advised that we would withdraw recognition unless he [Page 343] accepted a fair solution of the problem, he would be obliged to accept such solution by most of the members of his Cabinet, by the Army and by the great majority of Congress. If, however, he persists in refusing to accept any compromise after notification that recognition would be withdrawn, in such event, I do not believe that his Government would be able to maintain itself for more than an exceedingly brief period and should steps be taken by me in advance in accordance with the leaders of the political parties and with the important leaders of the opposition to provide for the installation of a stable government immediately upon President Machado’s forced resignation, I have every reason to believe that the situation here would continue sufficiently within control to make it unnecessary for the United States Government to undertake even a brief armed intervention.
The Department will understand that I have for many weeks past been giving the possibilities which have now arisen the most serious consideration, and it is in view of the considerations set forth above that I make the following recommendations:
- 1.
- That if at the end of a reasonable period President Machado has given me no indication that he will either accept the solution proposed by me as mediator or adopt some other solution equally satisfactory, I be authorized to inform him that the United States Government will withdraw recognition of the Cuban Government within a stated time unless the President consents to a solution of the character proposed and that I be instructed to declare that the action would be based upon the unwillingness of my Government to continue to lend its moral support to a government in Cuba which is maintaining itself in power by martial law and through the exercise of brutal methods of repression, and which is unwilling to agree to a compromise acceptable to every element of public opinion in Cuba existing at the present moment.
- 2.
- That I finally be instructed, upon the expiration of the period indicated in the preceding paragraph, should President Machado still refuse, formally to withdraw recognition of the Cuban Government after having agreed with the political leaders and with the leaders of the opposition upon means of installation of a stable government, and to leave the Republic.
In order that I may be guided by a thorough knowledge of the instructions of the President and of the Department, I beg to request that this recommendation of policy by me be placed in the President’s hands at the earliest possible moment and in any event before he sees Cintas tomorrow and that I be advised of the course I am to pursue at the earliest moment that such instructions can be cabled to me.