761.94/587

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 256

Sir: During the month of December, 1932, several events occurred to disturb Japan-Soviet relations, which had previously been becoming increasingly cordial. Before December, it appeared that the Japanese military objections to a Japan-Soviet pact of non-aggression were being gradually overcome and that a pact of this nature would be concluded before the end of the year. These expectations have been dissipated by subsequent events and the relations between Japan and Soviet Russia may now be considered as somewhat strained, due to the following causes.

1.
The success of the Japanese military drive against General Su Ping-wen at Manchuli early in December resulted in placing Japanese and Soviet troops for the first time in close juxtaposition along the Soviet-Manchurian border. It is rumored that the Soviets were inclined to approve of the independent stand of General Su Ping-wen, as he served to create a buffer between the Japanese Army in Manchuria and the Soviet border guards, but with his defeat the buffer has been removed and the two bodies of troops, traditionally hostile to each other, are placed face to face. Minor clashes, which may or may not result in major operations, are now possible, although the Japanese may avoid this possibility by placing “Manchukuo” (i.e. Chinese troops with Japanese officers) on guard duty along the border.
2.
The refusal of the Soviet authorities to hand over to the Japanese Army General Su Ping-wen and his men who had been interned in Soviet territory aroused a great deal of criticism in Japan. Considered as refugee troops interned in a neutral country, they could not of course be released to the Japanese by the Soviets, and consequently the Japanese requested their extradition on the grounds that they were common criminals. The Soviets refused to consider this proposition and the refugees are still interned in Siberia. Various newspaper articles criticizing this decision of the Soviets appeared in Japan and on the night of December 21–22, 1932, posters in Russian and Japanese were put Up in Tokyo by the “Association for Settlement of the Russian Problem” denouncing the Soviets and calling for severance of relations between Japan and Soviet Russia. A translation of one of these posters is enclosed.89
3.
The resumption of diplomatic relations between China and the U.S.S.R. cannot, of course, be criticized by Japan but nevertheless, in [Page 69] all official and press communications on the subject, there is an undertone of feeling that the resumption of relations means that the Soviets have definitely taken a stand inimical to Japan. Officially the Japanese authorities cannot regard the Sino-Soviet rapprochement in this light, and consequently they are using the Communist bogey, asserting that the rapprochement will mean the Bolshevization of China. This is evidently done with an eye to enlisting the sympathies of Europe and the United States. Certain newspapers, however, have recently been asserting that the rapprochement was brought about at the suggestion of “a certain country” (meaning the United States) in an endeavor to strengthen China against Japanese aggression.

The strained relations between Japan and the Soviets and the improbability that a Japan-Soviet non-aggression pact will be concluded in the near future are made evident by a statement of a Japanese Government “spokesman”, who stated on January 11th, in commenting on the speech of Mr. Joseph Stalin before the Committee of the Communist Party, that the non-aggression pact proposal “is as good as dead”. He stated that Mr. Stalin’s admission that the production of armaments in Russia had been speeded up showed that, while suggesting an agreement outlawing war, the Soviets were really preparing for war. He added that the demand of the Japanese military leaders for increased armaments can be attributed to the Five Year Plan of the Soviets, which will increase the military strength of that country.

As a further indication of the disturbed relations between the Soviets and Japan, I can refer to my telegram to the Department (No. 8, of January 6, 4 p.m.),90 in which I stated that a report had reached me that the Soviets had requested the approval of the Japanese Foreign Office to the publication of the correspondence between Japan and the Soviets on the subject of the proposed non-aggression pact. The approval of the Foreign Office was refused, whereupon the Soviet Ambassador informed the Foreign Office that the Soviets might feel obliged to publish the correspondence without the consent of the Japanese Government. It appears probable from this that the Soviets, in the expectation that trouble may possibly arise in the future, desire in advance to absolve themselves from all blame for the break in peaceful relations.

In addition to the above-mentioned events which have disturbed the relations between Japan and Soviet Russia, the long-expected Japanese drive into Jehol Province, if it takes place and if it is successful, will tend further to cause friction between the two nations, as it will bring the Japanese Army to the eastern and southern borders of Outer Mongolia, in which the Soviet influence is predominant. It [Page 70] is believed by some observers in Tokyo that the Jehol drive will take place before the spring of 1933. By the summer of 1933, therefore, the relations between Japan and the Soviets may be seriously strained.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew
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