Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1933, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/5876

The Consul General at Tientsin (Lockhart) to the Minister in Chma (Johnson)⁹¹

No. 313

Tientsin, January 13, 1933.

Subject: Shanhaikuan Incident of January 1, 2 and 3

Sir: I have the honor to refer to my telegrams of January 2, 1 p.m., January 3, 3 p.m., January 3, 7 p.m., January 4, 11 a.m., January 4, 12 Noon, January 4, 2 p.m., January 5, 11 a.m., January 6, 1 p.m., January 7, 12 Noon, January 9, 2 p.m., January 10, 4 p.m., January 11, 3 p.m., January 12, 3 p.m., and January 13, 12 Noon, all of which were repeated to the Department,⁹² on the above-mentioned subject and to report more in detail as follows:

Events of January 1, 2, and 3.

Like other incidents which have occurred in recent months in which Chinese and Japanese soldiers have been involved, responsibility for the events at Shanhaikuan on January 1, 2, and 3, has been difficult to fix. Conflicting reports, many of which originated for the purpose of misleading the public, made a confused situation worse confused.

At about 9:30 p.m., on January 1, some unknown person hurled a hand grenade, or grenades, into a Japanese guard house at the railway station at Shanhaikuan. The Japanese claim that the grenade was thrown by a Chinese whereas the Chinese claim that it was thrown either by a Japanese or by the Manchukuo police and that instead of having been thrown against a Japanese guard house it was in fact thrown against a Chinese post. Whoever may have thrown the grenade, or grenades, the undisputed fact is that this act led later to a serious conflict between the Japanese and Chinese, the aftermath of which is still being felt and the end is not yet in sight. Following the explosion of the grenade, rifle shots in considerable volume were exchanged between the Chinese and Japanese and throughout the night of January 1 there was intermittent rifle firing, much of which came from Chinese soldiers stationed on the city wall. The gates to the walled city were shut and barricaded from the inside by the Chinese while the East and South gates were watched from the outside by hundreds of Japanese troops in full war equipage, and who undoubtedly did some shooting. At about 11:00 a.m. on January 2 two armored trains from outside the Great Wall arrived at Shan-haikuan as well as a train full of Japanese troops. There was considerable panic in the walled city of Shanhaikuan and in the area outside the city wall throughout the night of January 1 due to the intermittent firing and this panic increased on the arrival of the armored trains and Japanese troops from beyond the Great Wall. Japanese women and children fled to the Japanese Barracks while the Chinese populace outside the city wall moved towards the seafront. Shortly after the arrival of the armored trains and fresh Japanese troops a bombardment of the city began. This is believed to have been caused by a demand of the Japanese that the Chinese troops which were manning the South and East Gates should give up these positions in favor of the Japanese who claimed that they desired the gates to be opened so that the civilian population could seek a place of safety. On the refusal of the Chinese to surrender the two gates a Japanese junior officer, Lieutenant Kodama, with a squad of Japanese soldiers, mounted the wall and demanded peremptorily the surrender of the gates. Several of the Chinese soldiers then on guard surrendered their guns, but one young soldier, said to have been about seventeen years of age, on being approached by the Japanese officer and his men, threw a hand grenade at the officer killing him instantly and wounding two of the soldiers who accompanied him. One report has it that the two soldiers were killed. This incident is understood to have occurred shortly before the heavy bombardment of the city began late in the morning of January 2. At 2:30 p.m., January 2, two airplanes flew over Shanhaikuan dropping bombs here and there and causing considerable property damage and some casualties among the civilian population. At 3:30 p.m. on January 2 an extraordinarily heavy bombardment of the city began and this continued until 5:00 p.m. After 5:00 p.m. trains were made ready at the station and they were filled with Manchukuo and Japanese troops who, it was understood, were destined to Chinwangtao. The night of January 2 was comparatively quiet as only a few shots were heard. During the night, however, further Japanese reinforcements from outside the wall arrived. In the meantime the Commandant of the Garrison, Major Ochiai, is said to have heard that General Ho Chu-kuo, the Linyung Garrison Commander, had arrived in Chinwangtao from Peiping, and would be prepared to open negotiations Avith him for the settlement of the incident. Major Ochiai claims that General Ho promised to be in Shanhaikuan on the morning of January 3 at 6 a.m. to negotiate but failed to appear or even to send word explaining his absence. Incidentally, General Ho has denied having promised to go to Shanhaikuan as stated. The Japanese Commandant claims to have waited until 10:00 a.m. on the morning of January 3 for General Ho to appear and having learned that the Chinese were making preparations for a stubborn defense, the Japanese opened fire for the third time with renewed strength against the South and West gates and this time they were aided by guns from naval vessels in the harbor. At 12:15 p.m. the Japanese troops entered the city by the South Gate and drove the Chinese soldiers in the direction of Shih-menchai. The city was finally occupied by the Japanese between 2 and 4 p.m. on January 3. Chinese resistance may be measured by the fact that the Japanese, although supplied with heavy artillery and aided by bombing planes and the guns from two destroyers, were compelled to make three attempts before finally capturing the city from a small and poorly equipped Chinese force. The Japanese are understood to have lost five commissioned officers and ten noncommissioned officers and about one hundred soldiers killed or wounded. The Chinese losses among the military forces are not known but they were undoubtedly severe. It is estimated that the casualties among the civilian population were about thirty killed.

On January 4 the city was again thrown into panic by rumors that Chinese soldiers were marching on Shanhaikuan with a view to its recapture. Many hundreds of the civilian population from outside the city wall and many others from inside the city who had escaped after the gates were opened, slept on the beaches in the vicinity of Shanhaikuan in bitterly cold weather. The suffering of these refugees was undoubtedly intense.

Although there were a score or more foreigners in Shanhaikuan at the time, there were no casualties among them.

The above account of happenings at Shanhaikuan was obtained from a foreigner who was in the city at the time of the trouble and is believed to be a fairly accurate statement of the happenings at Shanhaikuan from January 1 to January 4, inclusive. He is also an authority for the statement that the resistance of the Chinese troops was valiant considering the means of defense at their disposal.

Strategic Position of Shanhaikuan.

Ever since the occupation of Chinchow by the Japanese, Shanhaikuan has been looked upon as the seat of possible future trouble between the Chinese and Japanese because of its strategic position at the entrance to the territory beyond the wall. The presence of Chinese and Japanese troops in the city constituted a menace to the peace and order of the place and on several occasions serious trouble has been narrowly averted. It will be recalled that there was a clash between the Japanese and Chinese on December 8, 1932, an account of which may be found in my political report for the month of December.⁹³ The Chinese have felt that the Japanese have intended for months past to seize Shanhaikuan at the first opportunity for the twofold purpose of preventing a movement of troops into Manchukuo territory along the Shanhaikuan-Mukden railway and also to serve as a base for operations to seize Jehol. Whether the Japanese, as claimed by the Chinese, instigated the trouble at Shanhaikuan, under plans formulated some time ago and for the purpose above mentioned, will probably never be known, but the promptness with which the Japanese stated that they would endeavor to localize the incident and the announcement that they had no intention of extending their operations down the railway towards Peiping and Tientsin, unless some provocative act on the part of the Chinese compelled them to do so, might well lead to the conclusion that the movement was not designed as a part of an invasion of the Tientsin-Peiping area. To have embarked upon such an enterprise at this time, in the view of the writer, would have required much greater military strength than the Japanese now possess in the Shanhaikuan area and in the territory beyond the wall to a point as far as Chinchow. The despatch of two Japanese cruisers and three destroyers to Chinwangtao led many to believe that that place would be the next point of attack in the general direction of Tientsin and Peiping, but this naval display was undoubtedly nothing more than a measure to prevent the movement of any considerable number of Chinese troops into the area between Chinwangtao and Shanhaikuan.

The immediate results of the occupation of Shanhaikuan might well be summarized as follows:

Interruption to Railway Traffic.

Transportation on the Peiping-Shanhaikuan section of the Peking-Mukden Railway was seriously disrupted and the despatch of trains to Shanhaikuan was immediately annulled. One express train a day, usually considerably delayed, is now being operated between Chinwangtao and Peiping. Other passenger trains are proceeding only as far as Peitaiho. When the heavy troop movement to the Lwan-chow-Chinwangtao area began traffic was further disrupted and trains between Tientsin and Peiping were in many cases delayed for several hours.

General Reactions to Incident.

A further development of importance was the reaction in other parts of China and in the western world to the incident. The fact that Shanhaikuan is inside the Great Wall was a preponderant factor. Military and civil officials in Nanking and in other parts of China displayed the utmost concern over the new turn of events. The newspapers were immediately filled with news items purporting to give plans of the Chinese for the recapture of Shanhaikuan, for the defense of Jehol and for the protection of Tientsin and Peiping. Chinese commercial bodies and civic associations also appeared to be aroused to the necessity of more effective measures of defense than have been heretofore employed. The belief appeared to be general among Chinese officialdom and among the Chinese business leaders in the Yangtze region and further south that the Japanese would at once invade not only Jehol but all of North China, including Peiping and Tientsin. In the meantime, Japanese officials in Tokyo, Shanhaikuan, Chinwangtao, Peiping, Tientsin, and elsewhere were announcing somewhat emphatically that the Japanese military desired to localize the Shanhaikuan affair and that they had no intention of extending the operation to the Peiping-Tientsin area. Contrary to these expectations, at this writing there is a complete absence of any evidence that any drive will be undertaken by the Japanese against the Tientsin-Peiping area in the immediate future, but this cannot be said of the Jehol territory nor can it be said that a continuance of the present heavy movement of troops towards the Lwanchow-Changli area might not ultimately provoke the Japanese to take some drastic step by a strategic move in back of these troops through Tangku, which would be accessible to Japanese naval vessels and Japanese transports, or by a strong frontal attack down the railway provided sufficient reinforcements can be brought down from outside the Great Wall.

Foreign and Local Views of Incident.

The unfavorable impression which the occupation of Shanhaikuan created in China appeared also to prevail in various capitals of the western world, if editorial comment reproduced in newspapers in Tientsin can be taken as a criterion. Many excerpts from editorials published in leading journals in Europe have been reproduced locally and almost without exception the Japanese have been condemned for their military move. As a piece of political strategy, if such it was, it would seem to have been a most inopportune time, from a Japanese point of view, to have undertaken any new military move involving an area inside the Great Wall while the League of Nations is considering a solution of the Sino-Japanese controversy. There are those who believe, on this account, that the occupation of Shanhaikuan at this time was not a planned adventure but was a natural sequence of the clash between the military following the throwing of the bomb.

Concerning newspaper comment, some surprise has been expressed in local circles over what appears to be a reversal of French attitude towards the Japanese. Criticism of the Japanese by local foreign residents is now being more freely expressed than was the case previous to the Shanhaikuan incident. In general, it can be said that the occupation of Shanhaikuan is especially deplored at Tientsin not only by Chinese but by foreigners as well because it is believed that the presence of any considerable number of Japanese troops there constitutes a potential source of trouble between the Chinese and Japanese which might ultimately spread to this area.

Military Preparations.

The feeling among the Chinese against the Japanese because of the Shanhaikuan affair was so spontaneous that the Chinese military officials in North China, either on their own volition or at the behest of civil and military leaders in the Government at Nanking, made plans at once to despatch large bodies of troops to the general vicinity of Lwanchow. This movement has been in progress for more than a week now with an average of from eight to fifteen train loads of troops being despatched in that direction every twenty-four hours. It is impossible to obtain an accurate estimate of the number of troops that have been moved to the East of Tientsin, the estimates varying from 4,000 to 8,000 per day. Equipment and food supplies in large quantities are also being moved simultaneously with the troops. Considerable artillery has likewise been moved. The units involved are difficult to identify, but from American military sources it is learned that among the units that have moved through Tientsin are the following:

[Here follows list.]

American Army Officers Visit Shanhaikuan.

American army authorities who visited the Chinwangtao-Shanhaikuan area on January 6 reported that the Chinese line between these two points extended on the right of the railway to the sea and on the left to the mountains and that the right flank was held by the 41st Regiment, 3rd Cavalry Brigade; that the center was held by the 627th Regiment of the 9th Brigade and the left flank by a cavalry regiment of the 3rd Brigade, with the 20th Brigade as a support in the rear. The right flank was without the protection of entrenchments.

Chinese Commanders.

The Commander-in-Chief at the front is General Shang Chen, former Governor of Shansi and Hopei and until a year ago a right-hand man of Marshal Yen Hsi-shan⁹⁴ who now has better connections with both General Chiang Kai-shek and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. General Yu Hsueh-chung, Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government, directs the right flank, General Wan Fu-lin, Governor of Heilungkiang before the Japanese occupation, the left, and General Wang Shu-ch’ang, former Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government and now Garrison Commandant for Peiping and Tientsin, has been charged to look after the rear defense. Practically all the “mixed troops,” formerly Kuominchun or Chihli troops, have been despatched or are on their way to the front. There are said to be eight brigades of troops in the vicinity of Peiping to guard the former capital.

Chinese Business Marts Statement.

A Chinese business man, who is well informed and who has many friends among Chinese officials, in the course of a confidential conversation with a person closely associated with the affairs of this Consulate General, stated that the orders for the mobilization which is now taking place were actually issued about one week before the Shanhaikuan incident. This may have been one of the results of the military conference at Peiping in late December. It appears that about three brigades of Chinese troops had actually entered into the Province of Jehol under this mobilization order previous to the outbreak of trouble at Shanhaikuan. This is said to have aroused the suspicion of the Japanese and the incident at Shanhaikuan was, it is alleged, a result of this disquieting movement. The Chinese claim that the attack on Shanhaikuan was launched when only a single brigade under General Ho Chu-kuo was in that immediate area and that only a small number of troops was stationed along the Peiping-Liaoning Railway line this side of Shanhaikuan as the other brigades which had been in that area had been despatched to Jehol. The Chinese business man above-mentioned holds the view that the Japanese, had they so desired and had they acted quickly, could have pushed forward from Shanhaikuan to Lwanchow, Tientsin and possibly Peiping without any serious difficulty after the defense at Shanhaikuan was broken down. The Shanhaikuan clash had the effect, however, of speeding up the order for the despatch of troops to the Lwanchow area, and it was soon found that obstacles might be in the way of a drive to Tientsin and Peiping especially since it became known that an understanding had been arrived at between the Central Government and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang that the troops of General Han Fu-chu and General Liu Chih would be brought to Hopei to take up defense lines evacuated by Chang Hsueh-liang’s troops which were being sent to Lwanchow.

To sum up opinion on the military situation, it is generally believed by responsible Chinese officials and business leaders that the Japanese have no intention of making a drive upon Tientsin or Peiping at this time but that ultimately, if such an enterprise is undertaken, it will only be after the occupation of Jehol and a consolidation of forces in that province.

Anxiety among Chinese.

The heavy movement of troops which has been proceeding for the past week has given rise to much concern in Chinese circles lest a major engagement may shortly be started in the Chinwangtao-Shan-haikuan area, although Chinese officialdom continues to announce that the despatch of these troops is for defensive purposes only. Notwithstanding these announcements, close followers of political and military affairs entertain the feeling that the movement is of such a large volume that it might ultimately be intended to attempt to invade Manchukuo territory. Personally, I believe the movement is designed for the defense of Jehol and possibly for use in case of a threat to the Tientsin-Peiping area. The chief danger lies in the possibility that the Japanese may regard the movement as provocative and may take measures to drive the troops back to their former stations, in which case at least the Tientsin area would become decisively involved. The fact that many empty trains are now returning westward to Fengtai would seem to indicate that the Chinese have moved their troops to the Lwanchow region in the belief that they will be able to maintain their position if attacked. Their only means of retreat would be down the railway or overland in a westernly direction.

The heavy military movement has caused a considerable exodus of Chinese both from Tientsin and Peiping. So far as is known no foreigners have thus far left this area because of possible trouble hereabouts. From Peiping Chinese have sought safety by moving to points on the Peiping-Hankow Railway and to places on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and from Tientsin there has been a movement of Chinese to the south. For some days after the Shanhaikuan clash trains from the east were crowded with refugees.

Absence of Local Disturbances.

The troop movements gave rise in Tientsin to widespread reports that local disturbances would be certain to break out. Up to this writing, however, except for a limited movement of Chinese from the Native City to points south and into the foreign concessions, there have been no signs of any likelihood of disturbances in Tientsin. Up to the date of this despatch, no sandbag barricades or barbed wire entanglements have been erected at or near the borders of the Japanese Concession and there are no signs of any preparations for any emergency. Likewise, along the border of the Japanese Concession, practically all the Chinese police in the Chinese City are still unarmed. No defensive works are noticeable in the Native City. The alarm, if it can be so described, appeared to be confined largely to an element in the Chinese population which usually seeks safety on the mere rumor of impending trouble. While these outward signs of peace and order at Tientsin prevail, there is no escape from the fact that some local incident, such as the throwing of a bomb at police or military posts, or some other trifling incident, might well lead to disturbances of a major proportion.

Observance of Boxer Protocol.

Certain reliable quarters are authority for the statement that General Yu Hsueh-chung, Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government and Commander of the Hopei troops, is quite reluctant to order a large number of troops within a radius of 20 li of Tientsin. He is anxious to avoid any pretext for the Protocol Powers to protest against a violation of the agreement by the Chinese. The defense of the city of Tientsin, therefore, rests entirely in the hands of the Pao An Tui (Peace Preservation Corps) and the Governor’s bodyguard. In view of the resistance which the Pao An Tui offered to the Japanese during the trouble in November, 1930 [1931?] it would seem that this organization could probably hold its ground until Chinese troops in considerable numbers, which are understood to be stationed at a distance of about ten miles from Tientsin, could arrive in the city as reinforcements.

Some significance has been attached by the Chinese authorities to the seeming desire of the Japanese military to invoke the terms of the Boxer Protocol in justification for the Shanhaikuan occupation. Chinese officials profess to believe that if the Japanese are hard-pressed for the evacuation of Shanhaikuan they will, as a last resort perhaps, assert a right to remain there under the terms of the Protocol and thus perhaps avoid some criticism in western capitals for invading the territory inside the Wall.

Settlement by Negotiation.

There has been a welter of misinformation circulated concerning the report first given out on January 7 that the Japanese and Chinese military authorities, through the intervention of British naval authorities at Chinwangtao, had agreed to enter into negotiations for the settlement of the Shanhaikuan incident. An American army officer at Chinwangtao reported this information on the above date and stated that General Ho had agreed in writing (presumably to the British naval officer) to meet the Japanese for the purpose of negotiating. Subsequent information received from the army officer in question at Chinwangtao indicated that some preliminary negotiations were actually taking place. On January 13 he reported that General Ho Chu-kuo had sent a member of his staff for the purpose of negotiating, but that the staff officer appeared at Chinwangtao without any specific instructions although the Japanese were in possession of definite instructions. At the time of this meeting it was understood that General Ho was awaiting specific instructions from Nanking. A telegram under a Chinchow date line of January 3, published in the Osaka Mainichi, stated that the following would be the terms offered by the Japanese in settlement of the Shanhaikuan affair:

• “1. Chinese troops shall not be stationed at Shanhaikuan.
• 2. The Shanhaikuan region shall be made a buffer zone between China and Manchukuo.
• 3. Shanhaikuan shall be made the terminus of the Mukden-Shanhaikuan railway, and this line shall be separate from the Peiping-Shanhaikuan railway.
• 4. Pending the acceptance of these conditions by the Chinese side, the Japanese forces will not retire from Shanhaikuan.

The Japanese authorities also demand an apology by General Ho Chu-kuo for the present affair and a pledge against the recurrence of similar cases.

These conservative demands have been made in the hope of avoiding the aggravation of the situation. In case, however, General Ho Chu-kuo and General Chang Hsueh-liang refuse to accept the demands, the Japanese military authorities are determined to realize them by armed force.”

On January 11 the Japanese Admiral at Chinwangtao reported to the senior British Naval Officer that negotiations for settlement of the Shanhaikuan affair had passed from him to a higher authority and it was later reported, but not confirmed, that this “higher authority” was Lieutenant General Nakamura at Tientsin who is in command of Japanese Troops in North China. General Yu Hsueh-chung, Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government, is said to have denied that any negotiations are pending at Tientsin. All indications since a few days after the Shanhaikuan outbreak have pointed to the fact that the Japanese have been willing, and even anxious, to localize the incident and to settle it by negotiation. It is believed that the Chinese have rather resolutely held aloof from any settlement on this basis. This conclusion has been all the more apparent because of the severe criticism heaped upon General Ho Chu-kuo for the settlement of the Shanhaikuan incident of December 8. While there may have been a disposition on the part of the northern militarists to settle the affair by negotiation, dominating influences in Nanking, far removed from the seat of trouble, have apparently opposed a settlement by this means. It may be, however, that a settlement on this basis may be undertaken after the Chinese have concentrated enormous numbers of troops in the Lwanchow region, tactics which might have the effect of inducing the Japanese to settle on more favorable terms than would have been the case in the early stages of the trouble.

American Mission at Changli.

Fortunately, no American citizens were at Shanhaikuan during the trouble so far as can be learned. A detachment of 15 or 20 men belonging to the 15th United States Infantry, in command of Lieutenant Moore, is stationed at Chinwangtao to guard the summer military camp. At Changli, a railway station midway between Lwanchow and Peitaiho, there is a mission station belonging to the American Methodist Mission at which are normally located some 15 or 20 missionaries including women and children. A written warning was communicated by this Consulate General to this mission and some of its members withdrew to Peiping and Tientsin while others remained pending further developments. The Chinese authorities were informed and were requested to afford adequate protection. In connection with American missionaries and mission property in the area affected, an enquiry was received from the Japanese Consulate General at Tientsin a few days ago which was somewhat puzzling. An officer of the Consulate General telephoned this office and said that the foreign office in Tokyo had received a request from the American Ambassador at that place to afford all protection to American missionaries and American mission property at Shanhaikuan. The Japanese consular officer inquired the name of the mission and of the missionaries at Shanhaikuan and was informed that no American mission was maintained there but that an American mission was maintained at Changli where there were some 15 or 20 American missionaries ordinarily stationed. No request was made of the Japanese to afford the mission protection at Changli inasmuch as it might have been misconstrued as an intimation that it was believed Japanese operations would be extended to include that area. It is very probable that the enquiry at Tokyo was based on the misapprehension that the Changli mission was located at Shanhaikuan rather than at Changli.

Public Statements on Incident.

In conclusion, and as of possible interest, and to have of record certain statements bearing on the Shanhaikuan incident, there are enclosed herewith⁹⁵ a statement issued at Nanking on January 6 by “an official spokesman”, a statement issued by the Japanese Information Bureau on January 5, a Rengo news item dated January 10, concerning the intervention of the British naval authorities at Chinwangtao with a view to the settlement of the controversy by negotiation, an account of an interview with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang by 60 press representatives on January 8 (Reuter), a speech delivered by General Suzuki⁹⁶ at Shanhaikuan on January 7, describing the Shanhaikuan incident, and a memorandum prepared by Vice Consul Mosher summarizing a lecture delivered by Captains D. D. Barrett and T. C. Rote of the 15th United States Infantry, who visited Chinwangtao and Shanhaikuan a few days after the incident.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart

91. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General at Tientsin in his despatch No. 237, January 14; received February 13.
92. None printed.
93. Not printed.
94. State councilor of the National Government.
95. Enclosures not printed.
96. Maj. Gen. Yoshimitsu (Yoshiyuke) Suzuki, Japanese commander, 4th Brigade, 8th Division, at Shanhaikwan.