[Enclosure 1]
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Moore)
[Washington,] October 4,
1933.
Mr. Secretary: Impressions relative to
the recognition of the Russian Government derived from the data
furnished me by the Secretary and other data available at this
moment:
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(1) It seems clear that there should and must be recognition
eventually and without undue delay, provided there is assurance
that the Russian Government will not directly or indirectly make
any effort to affect the political institutions or integrity of
the United States and that certain other major matters can be
satisfactorily disposed of.
(2) According to the statements contained in Mr. Atherton’s
communication,15b as illustrated by the
experience of Great Britain, Russia is (a) inclined to a more reasonable attitude towards nations
that have not accorded the recognition she seeks than towards
those that have, and (b) after eagerly
seeking and obtaining recognition she becomes more indifferent
to her obligations than theretofore.
(3) If what is said in the last paragraph can be assumed as a
correct premise, it may be thought best in advance of actual
recognition to take the time necessary to explore the entire
situation and endeavor to reach a full agreement between the two
governments to be embodied in a treaty, pertaining to all or
most of the very large number of important questions that sooner
or later will call for consideration, e.g. as to the alleged
desire of Russia to undermine our system of government; as to
the personal, religious and property status and rights of our
nationals in Russia and the ports of that country; as to the
claims of Americans for the repayment of loans or for damages,
and the claims that may be asserted against our Government by
the Russian Government in its own behalf or in behalf of its
subjects; as to the basis and character in various aspects of
the commercial dealings between the two nations, etc., etc.
(4) An act of recognition is not revocable and it is certainly
retroactive unless otherwise limited.* Should the President
extend recognition without the situation being dealt with in
advance as suggested, then for the purpose of eliminating
disputable questions as far as possible it might be accompanied
by such conditions as may be agreed upon. The general effect of
conditions attached to recognition is stated as follows by a
leading authority, it being noticed, however, that in cases
where such conditions are violated there is really no practical
method of enforcing their observance:
“Recognition will, as a rule, be given without any
conditions whatever, provided the new State is safely
and permanently established. Since, however, the
granting of recognition is a matter of policy, and not
of law, nothing prevents an old State from making the
recognition of a new State dependent upon the latter
fulfilling certain conditions. Thus the Powers assembled
at the Berlin Congress in 1878 recognised Bulgaria,
Montenegro, Serbia, and Roumania under the condition
only that these States should not impose any religious
disabilities on any of their subjects.
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The meaning of such
conditional recognition is not that recognition can be
withdrawn in case the condition is not complied with.
The nature of the thing makes recognition, if once
given, incapable of withdrawal. But conditional
recognition, if accepted by the new State, imposes the
internationally legal duty upon such State of complying
with the condition; failing which a right of
intervention is given to the other party for the purpose
of making the recognised State comply with the imposed
condition.” (Oppenheim, International
Law, page 136, Volume I)
A restricted representation of each country, in the other until
otherwise mutually determined, might well be specified and in
such manner as to encourage the performance of the conditions
accompanying recognition.
(4) [(5)] It would seem that immediate and
unconditional recognition would not be of any special moral or
material advantage and on the other hand, might be attended by
very widespread adverse criticism
[Enclosure 2]
Memorandum by the Special
Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bullitt)15c
Dear Mr. Secretary: Pursuant to our
conversation of this afternoon:
Whatever method may be used to enter into negotiations with the
Soviet Government, it seems essential that formal recognition
should not be accorded except as the final act of an agreement
covering a number of questions in dispute. Before recognition
and before loans, we shall find the Soviet Government relatively
amenable. After recognition or loans, we should find the Soviet
Government adamant. Among the chief agreements which, in my
opinion, must be reached before recognition are the following:
- 1.
- Prohibition of communist propaganda in the United
States by the Soviet Government and by the
Comintern.
- 2.
- Protection of the civil and religious rights of
Americans in Russia which are inadequately protected
under current Russian practice (e.g. “economic
espionage”).
- 3.
- Agreement by the Soviet Government that the act of
recognition shall not be retroactive to the foundation
of that government (which is the usual practice), but
shall take effect only from the day on which it may be
accorded. This is essential to protect both our
Government and many citizens and corporations from suits
for damages.
By negotiation before recognition, we should also attempt to
obtain an agreement in regard to the repayment of the loans of
the Government of the United States to the Kerensky Government,
a waiver of
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Russian
counter claims based upon our Vladivostock, Archangel and
Murmansk expeditions;15d also some sort of provision for the
settlement of claims of American nationals and corporations for
property, goods and cash seized by the Soviet Government.
There are of course scores of other questions involved in
resuming normal relations with Russia. Our position would be
strongest, I believe, if all these questions, whether of a
legal, economic or financial nature, should be handled as a unit
in one global negotiation, the end of which would be signature
of the agreements and simultaneous recognition.
Yours very respectfully,
William C. Bullitt
[Washington,] October 4,
1933.