762.00/66
The Ambassador in Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 6.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that certain foreign political developments in Europe which followed the formation of the Hitler Cabinet are viewed in Germany with manifest uneasiness. Those political groups which condemned the policy of conciliation with France, initiated by Stresemann and continued by Curtius and Bruening, are beginning to realize that in the field of foreign politics Germany must proceed cautiously in order to avert the danger of political isolation.
As an opposition party, the Nazis asserted that the German policy of striving for conciliation with France tended to strengthen the latter’s hegemony in Europe without bringing appreciable alleviation to Germany. They repeatedly proclaimed that after their ascendency to power Germany would form an alliance with Italy and Hungary and seek closer cooperation with England in order to isolate France, “Germany’s hereditary enemy.”
[Page 192]In view of Mussolini’s policy against the German-speaking population of South Tyrol, and the fact that Italy had broken faith with Germany during the war, a new alliance with that country was open to strong criticism. However, to most of their adherents the Nazis’ argument that Italy’s difference with France made that country a natural ally for Germany was convincing enough to overcome this criticism.
It was widely expected, therefore, that the formation of the Hitler Cabinet would be followed by a change of German foreign policy along this line. The Hitler Government’s manifesto, however, carefully abstained from any statement which might be interpreted as a deviation from the foreign political course pursued by preceding German cabinets. Nevertheless, the enthusiastic supporters of the new régime inclined to view this as a tactical move rather than as an indication that the foreign policy is to be continued along the same lines. The manifest rebuff which Ambassador de Jouvenel met in Italy was hailed as an encouraging sign that, with Mussolini’s cooperation, Hitler would succeed in checking France’s influence in Europe.
Within the brief space of a few days, however, foreign political developments in Europe took a turn unforeseen by German chauvinists, who had condemned the policy of conciliation with France and had urged a shorter and more promising course to a revision of the Versailles Treaty.6 The rumors of a secret alliance between Germany, Italy, and Hungary evoked distrust of Germany in the smaller countries of Europe. The situation was further aggravated by the French ultimatum to Austria in connection with the Hirtenberg munitions affair, and the announcement of a consolidation of the Little Entente (see despatch No. 2200 of February 18, 19337).
The German plans of an alliance with Italy and Hungary envisaged Austria as the connecting link between Germany and Italy on the one hand, and Hungary and Italy on the other. The ultimatum to Austria in connection with the munitions affair is therefore regarded here as a challenge to Italy, as well as a tactical move to force Austria into the Little Entente, in order thus to make that country a barrier to such an alliance rather than a connecting link. The fact that the French ultimatum to Austria is reported to have been transmitted with the approval of England has evoked unconcealed disappointment and even bitterness among leading Nazis, who have been striving to gain England’s support for their plans of an alliance with Italy and Hungary.
Perhaps even more serious misgivings were aroused in Germany by the reports of Herriot’s activities looking to a revival of the pre-war alliance between France and Russia. As pointed out in despatch No. 2147 of January 20, 1933,7 the foreign policy pursued by Stresemann, [Page 193] and continued by his successors up to now, was based on the idea that, by virtue of her geographical position as well as her economic and cultural structure, Germany was the natural “bridge between East and West,” the connecting link between Soviet Russia and the capitalistic countries of the West.
While the Nazis would like to isolate France through an alliance with Italy and Hungary, they have no desire to alienate Russia. The Hitler Government doubtless realizes the inherent dangers to Germany of a Franco-Russian alliance, and that repressive measures against German Communists may make Russia more inclined to conclude such an alliance with France. This consideration—even more than the fear of the withdrawal of Soviet trade orders from Germany—doubtless explains why the measures against the German Communists have not been as drastic as was generally expected from a Nazi regime.
In this connection, a statement made by Dr. Frick, the Nazi Minister of the Interior, at an election meeting in Dresden yesterday, is especially significant. Dr. Frick said that, contrary to current rumors, the Government would not suppress the Communist Party, but would seek to overcome the Communist menace in Germany by convincing its followers of the error of their ways. This sounds more like the preaching of a missionary rather than the songs of hate against the Marxists that one is accustomed to hear from Nazi leaders.
Dr. Frick’s statement shows without doubt that the Hitler Cabinet realizes that in order to avert the danger of political isolation, Germany must not only continue a pacific and conciliatory policy abroad, but must also abstain from too drastic measures against the Communists. Russia has even now ceased to be a trump card in the hands of German diplomacy, and the German Government cannot well afford to carry out its threat to exterminate the Communists by brutal force, as a serious attempt in this direction may throw Russia into the open arms of France.
Respectfully yours,
First Secretary of Embassy