862.00/2822: Telegram
The Ambassador in Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State
161. Department’s 95, August 15, 4 p.m. The political situation has been clarified to the extent of losing its immediate acuteness by the Hitler interviews with the President, Chancellor and Schleicher, [Page 310] in the course of which the President refused Hitler’s demand to be appointed Chancellor with full power to form a Nazi government. The fortnight until the Reichstag convenes on August 30th will be chiefly occupied by the political tactical maneuvering and bargaining of the usual Cabinet crisis nature to secure if possible some combination of the Reichstag which would enable the present Cabinet to survive.
The leading possible developments would seem to be:
- First, a definite working agreement between the Nazis and the Center Party on which a coalition Cabinet headed by Hitler could be based (see despatch No. 1841 of July 25, and 1859 of August 6, 1932).34 Although Hitler refused to enter a Cabinet under Von Papen it is yet possible (though certainly not probable) that he might agree to head a Cabinet containing Centrist ministers. Such a coalition might even be extended to include Hugenberg Nationalists but as they would not be necessary to the formation of a comfortable majority they would not have much to offer in exchange for their inclusion (see despatch No. 1855 of August 2nd).35
- Second, short of such a working agreement, these two parties might so vote or abstain from voting in the Reichstag as to give the Papen Cabinet a breathing spell. However, this again cannot be termed a probability, for as the Papen Cabinet must submit its emergency decrees to the Reichstag for approval, it is difficult—to take only two striking instances—to envisage the Center Party sanctioning the appointment of a Reich Commissary for Prussia, or the Nazis confirming the taxation decree to which they professed to take such exception.
- Third, the Nazi movement having for the time being at least, pretty clearly reached its peak at the elections of July 31 (see telegram 153 of August 1st and despatch number 1855) and Hitler having suffered some loss of prestige as a result of last week’s developments, there is a distinct possibility that the Nazi movement may split into two or more factions; the radical elements of the party may well take the line that they have not been waging as stout a fight as they have merely to see it end in a tame parliamentary opposition, and urge upon Hitler and the more moderate leaders who still wish to remain within the law actions which they have suspended. Thus the demagogue Goebbels and the militants whom he is constantly inciting to violence may get beyond all control and force Hitler to disavow them.
- Fourth, when the Reichstag convenes the Government is likely to have a Presidential dissolution decree up its sleeve, and, if it becomes obvious that votes sanctioning the various emergency decrees cannot be obtained or a vote of lack of confidence avoided, this dissolution decree will be read.
The Department will note that all of the foregoing is conjecture and therefore I have hesitated to telegraph it though most of it will be [Page 311] found in the Embassy’s despatches. It must perforce be such and future developments cannot be reported as probabilities on account of the attitude of the Nazis who are stable only in their complete intransigence. The exaggerated demands made by Hitler on the President and the Chancellor at their meetings last Saturday made it easy for the President to refuse to turn the Government over to him and confirmed the belief that Hitler personally does not yet feel really capable of assuming the responsibilities of governing.
At the present writing I regard the fourth possibility above-mentioned as the most likely. In the latter contingency dissolution would constitutionally have to be followed by another election within 60 days and convocation of the Reichstag within a further 30 days (incidentally the possibility of an election for a Constituent Assembly rather than a Reichstag with a view to changing the Constitution is beginning to be mooted, a step for which there would seem to be no constitutional authority) but in the meantime the Government might by decree raise the voting age—Minister of the Interior Gayl definitely advocated this in his Constitution Day speech last week—in the hope of bringing about sensibly different results from the last election. This in itself would obviously be a questionable and risky procedure but the one thing I do feel certain of in this maze of uncertainties is that the President and his advisers will not hesitate to stretch the Constitution to the uttermost limit.
As the Department is aware the Government of Dr. Bruening was a veiled dictatorship under what seemed about as broad an interpretation as possible of Article 48 of the Constitution, but if there is any way of straining it still further I think there is no doubt but that it will be resorted to.
If this strain should prove too great for a large part of the German people to accept the ultimate question becomes one of the demobilization of the Reichswehr. A year ago I should have unhesitatingly affirmed its loyalty. In the interim, however, there is certainly a possibility that the Reichswehr and particularly those units thereof stationed in parts of the country where the Nazis predominate has been impregnated to a certain extent with Nazi doctrines. Nevertheless, I am inclined to think that the Reichswehr would loyally execute the orders of a government enjoying the confidence of the President. I do not think that Hitler is any more ready for a march on Berlin than he is to take over the parliamentary responsibility of the Government. If as indicated above there should be a split in the Nazi Party I think the Reichswehr could positively be counted on to deal in short order with the radical minority if it tried to make trouble.
[Page 312]In conclusion it is my belief that the Von Papen Government will remain in office for at least 3 months more. If the Nazi Party should carry its violent attitude to its logical conclusion it is difficult to see how serious trouble could be avoided. However, it is my opinion that there will be no such consistency on the part of the Nazis, that they will find it expedient to back down and that disorders on a large scale will not be forthcoming.
I have seen the Paris Embassy’s telegram 477, August 13, 12 a. m37 to the Department. The information received by the French Government tallies with the state of mind which I found to exist in members of the British and French Embassies here in Berlin on Constitution Day, August 11. While I realized that the situation at that moment was distinctly delicate with various threatening possibilities I did feel that both of these Embassies were in an unduly nervous way and I preferred not to send a telegram of an alarmist character until the situation had a chance to crystallize somewhat further and therefore did not enlarge upon my telegram No. 159, August 10, 5 p.m.37 In the immediately following days the situation in fact changed to the extent mentioned in the opening sentence of this telegram.
Copy by pouch to Paris.