862.00/2715

The Ambassador in Germany (Sackett) to the Secretary of State

No. 1627

Sir: With reference to despatch No. 1591 of March 23, 1932,11 relative to the Prussian police raids on the offices of the Nazi party and homes of the party leaders, I have the honor to report that the Prussian Minister of the Interior has now published a part of the material seized by the police on that occasion. Other incriminating documents which have been transmitted to the Attorney General, it was explained, proved that the Nazis had committed acts of treason, and therefore could not be published since the law prohibits even an intimation of their contents in public.

To representatives of the press the Prussian Minister of the Interior declared that since the Reichstag election of September, 1930, the Prussian Government had been besieged with information from private and official sources about illegal Nazi activities. He repudiated the charge that the police raids were an election maneuver. The Nazi leaders had been reproaching themselves for not having made use of the psychological moment on the day after their phenomenal rise in the Reichstag election on September 14, 1930, to seize power by force, and there was reason to believe that they might not let a similar opportunity go by on March 13. However, the [Page 289] Prussian Government felt that the police was fully prepared for any emergency and could promptly put down an attempted uprising by the Nazis. The police had therefore been instructed to hold itself ready for such an emergency but to combat all rumors of a planned Nazi uprising in order not to alarm the public.

After the election on March 13, which was unusually tranquil, local authorities in various parts of the State had reported that armed storm detachments were making the countryside insecure and that a shifting of regional units of the storm troops seemed to indicate preparations for a Nazi Putsch. To verify these reports the Prussian Government had ordered the police raids. In the opinion of the Prussian authorities, the raids showed that the contention of the Nazis that the storm detachments had been mobilized in their quarters on election day in order to avoid clashes with political opponents was incorrect. The confiscated documentary material, said Minister Severing, had proved that the Nazis systematically spied on the civil authorities, the police and the Reichswehr in connection with their plans to seize power by force.

The criminal side of the case is being investigated by the Attorney General at Leipzig. What the political consequences will be the next few days will tell. The indications are that, after the final presidential election on April 10, Prussia, in conjunction with other German States, will probably bring pressure to bear on the Reich Government to prohibit the Nazi semi-military organizations throughout the Reich. The Bavarian Government has only recently published disclosures of secret preparations for a Nazi Putsch on the night after the first presidential election, and similar disclosures are reported in several other German States.

The seized documents would seem to indicate that the Nazis were actually contemplating a Putsch on March 13 in the event Hitler received more votes than von Hindenburg but not enough for an absolute majority to be elected on the first ballot. The preparations for this step, according to the documentary material confiscated by the Prussian police, were carried out to the minutest detail.

These documents resemble in large measure similar disclosures in the past of Communist subversive activities. This is not surprising since many former members and leaders of the Red Front are known to have become members of the Nazi storm detachments following the suppression of the Communist organization.

In addition to an extensive system of espionage in all administrative and executive departments of the Government, the Nazis established a signal corps along military lines with pigeon carriers and secret radio stations. The storm detachments were instructed to make [Page 290] available for emergency service war veterans trained in the various branches of the army. A mobilization order was issued for election day and members of the storm detachments were ordered to provide themselves with iron rations for several days, a new uniform, and other equipment. Regional units were shifted to strategic points, and the members of the storm detachments were pledged to utmost secrecy.

The acts of treason attributed to the Nazis, it appears, consisted of a planned attempt to seize the arms of the Reichswehr, particularly in the eastern frontier sections of Germany, for their struggle against the republican section of the population, notably the Iron Front, from which they expected stiff resistance against a Nazi dictatorial regime. It is pointed out that by disarming the Reichswehr the Nazis would have impaired the national defense by exposing sections of the country to a Polish invasion, and severe punishment is demanded for the Nazi instigators of the plot.

The parties of the Right are endeavoring to disparage the Prussian Government’s action, making no effort to conceal their sympathy with Hitler’s movement and its aim to overthrow the present order. They argue that a prohibition of the Nazis’ semi-military organizations should be followed by a prohibition of the republican Reichsbanner.

Those familiar with the Nazi tactics know that they will not be at a loss to explain their activities even in the face of conclusive evidence. It is of interest that one of the most effective arguments was furnished the Nazis by their political opponents. The tactless threats by the leaders of the Iron Front and the Reichsbanner that they would prevent a Nazi regime in Germany even if that party should accede to power by constitutional means will doubtless make it easier for the Nazis to justify as a measure of self-defense the secret activities unearthed by the police.

Respectfully yours,

Frederic M. Sackett
  1. Not printed.