711.51/78: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Edge) to the Secretary of State
451. Accompanied by Armour I called on M. Herriot at the Foreign Office last evening. The stated object was to pay my respects following 6 weeks absence, added to the fact that Herriot had assumed office after my departure. I found the Prime Minister receptive to the discussion of outstanding questions and I decided to take advantage of the opportunity to capitalize to our advantage as far as possible his clearly defined desire to be friendly and reach understandings.
At the outset I told him very frankly that I was not empowered officially to discuss the war debt question;43 that he, of course, was entirely familiar with the sentiment in the United States against cancellation or even revision; and that at the moment it would be useless to go into that question. The Prime Minister responded without hesitation that he was thoroughly cognizant of this fact and that he agreed with me that the subject should officially be left absolutely taboo, anyhow for the next 4 months. At the close of the conversation in summing up the subjects discussed, the Prime Minister made the further statement that he much preferred that debts be left in abeyance as he had many pressing domestic problems to occupy his constant attention and he realized there must be much paving of the way for a fair consideration of this subject later.
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I then brought up commercial problems, drawing his attention to the recent Franco-British accord of confidence44 which in point 4 proposes the negotiation and conclusion of a commercial treaty and [Page 240] mutual agreement to avoid discrimination in the meantime; that representatives of the Embassy had for some time been endeavoring to reach common ground with French representatives but that nothing positive had been accomplished. He asked me if we would like to have a similar understanding on this question to that contained in the Franco-British accord. I said that we felt that we were considerably beyond that point but wanted to get back of the negotiations already under way and help hurry the conclusion as to final terms so that discriminations would be impossible. He assured me that he would take this up at once and asked me to give him a comprehensive memorandum as early as possible [as] to the progress made and the existing difficulties so that he could personally give the matter his personal cooperation.
I referred to various quota irritations; that notwithstanding a temporary agreement I had made with his predecessor only 2 months before that I was informed upon my return that a quota on fruits very disadvantageous to the United States had been promulgated; that one on films was threatened; all of which contributed to ill feeling in the United States. He asked me if I would not give him a memorandum of any or all of these points so that he could personally see if they were not possible of adjustment. This memorandum will be speedily furnished.
I took advantage of the opportunity to draw his attention to the new Franco-Belgian Commerical Treaty which, under the guise of a turnover tax, gave Belgium a 2 percent advantage on all imports, referring to the losses threatened to United States shippers in copper alone.
I feel confident that the Prime Minister was considerably impressed with our grievances and realized that there was much to be accomplished before it would be helpful to seriously talk debt revision. At least this was the objective that I sought.
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- Telegram in five sections.↩
- For correspondence on this subject, see vol. i, pp. 584 ff.↩
- Great Britain, Cmd. 4131: Declaration issued by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government on July 13, 1932, as to Methods for Promoting Future European Co-operation, which other European Governments are invited to adopt.↩