500.A15A4/1033½

Memorandum of Conversation Among Members of the American, British, and German Delegations

Mr. MacDonald, the British Prime Minister, having suggested to Secretary Stimson that it would be advisable to get Dr. Bruening and M. Tardieu together in a conference with a view of having a frank discussion of some of the problems having a bearing upon the Disarmament Conference it was decided to have such a meeting on the morning of April 26th, at which time M. Tardieu had planned [Page 109] to be back in Geneva. After having invited Chancellor Bruening it was learned that M. Tardieu could not be here but it was decided to go ahead and have the three cornered meeting, which took place at Bessinge97 at 10:30 A.M.

Besides Mr. MacDonald, Dr. Bruening and Secretary Stimson the others present were Lord Londonderry, Dr. von Buelow, Hugh Gibson and Norman Davis.

Mr. MacDonald began the conversation by stating in effect that he understood there were two chief questions which Germany considered of vital importance. One was an alteration in the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and the other the problem of regaining her position of equality as a nation. He continued to say that while he was sympathetic with Germany’s desire to be freed from certain conditions which had been imposed upon her he would greatly deplore and in fact would be opposed to having Germany start up again a competitive race in armaments which could only have a most disturbing influence.

Chancellor Bruening stated that Germany had no desire whatever to enter such a race or in fact to increase her armaments or military forces but that there should be a reduction in the military forces of her neighbors which were so vastly superior to hers and which had a disquieting effect on the German people and placed Germany at a considerable disadvantage. In substance he said that this was required not only as a matter of justice but in the interests of peace and goodwill in Europe.

Dr. von Buelow stressed the fact that what Germany was interested in was equality of treatment, which was a juridical matter, and that one of the great difficulties of getting on with the discussions was that every time a German bespoke equality of treatment the entire French press came out with the statement that what the Germans were demanding was equality of armaments, which was different thing.

Dr. Bruening said then that he did not expect France to be reduced to the basis of German arms or to establish equality but that he felt that substantial steps should be taken in that direction.

It was then suggested that perhaps the most logical and practical way of getting rid of the obligations of the Treaty of Versailles which is permanent would be in effect to lift out of that Treaty part five by incorporating in the Convention of the Arms Conference the limitations to be placed upon the German military forces, which would last for the life of the Convention, say ten years. In this way part five of the Treaty of Versailles would in effect be amended by a new [Page 110] enactment. Chancellor Bruening indicated his acquiescence in this. Mr. MacDonald said, however, that France would unquestionably raise the point as to whether or not at the termination of that Convention Germany would be free of any obligation and might refuse to enter a new treaty placing proper limitation upon her military force. There was some discussion as to the possibility of finding a formula that would obviate any inconsistencies with respect to this but the consensus of opinion was that it might be wiser to settle things for ten years in the hope that at the end of that period it would be easier to deal further with such a problem.

Dr. von Buelow then stated that Germany would be perfectly willing to limit her forces, in the Arms Convention, to what they are with a stipulation, however, in a footnote that she had freely agreed to this limitation, and that the forces entered in the treaty for Germany were disproportionately small for that country. He said that this might appear to be self-evident, but that they attached importance to having such a foot-note to the treaty to use as a leverage when the time came for revision at the end of the ten years, in the hope that it might help to bring the French down to still lower levels; that if the Versailles treaty figures were entered without any comment the French might later maintain that these had been recognized as equitable and that the question was not open to discussion. He went on to say that they would like certain adjustments, as the rigidity of the existing system was very irksome. He did, however, raise the point of removing some of the irritating conditions which have been imposed upon Germany. This would not in any way increase her armed strength. For instance, at present they are unable to have their munitions all manufactured in one place. One portion is made in one place and the rest in another which makes it very expensive. In substance he said that some of the conditions had been imposed with of making Germany realize her impotence and that relief such conditions would not in any way endanger France and would merely create better feeling in Germany.

The Chancellor said that another irksome condition which should be modified was that requiring twelve-year enlistments for all the Reichswehr. He said he quite recognized that this had been meant to be an onerous condition, but that it really worked undue hardship, for it made it almost impossible to get an adequate supply of men fitted by character for the work imposed on them. The period was so long as to appear something in the nature of a prison sentence, and one evidence of this lay in the fact that they had an average of 100 suicides a year among men in the later stages of their enlistment. He said that they would like some relief from this; that he quite [Page 111] realized that if he were to suggest that the period of enlistment be limited to two or three years, the French might reasonably reply that this was opening the door to rapid training of German effectives, but that he had no intention of asking any such sweeping change; that what he would like would be to have a certain portion of the existing forces exempted from the twelve-year period, and reduced to a six or eight year period. He said that eight years marked the beginning of the danger zone in demoralization, and that he felt something reasonable could be worked out on that basis. He said he did not ask that this reduction be applied to the entire force, because there was a type of volunteer who was quite capable of going through a twelve-year period without demoralization, and that he would not ask exemption for these.

The question was raised as to the use of the Green Police, and the French contention that they more than doubled Germany’s forces. The Chancellor replied that this was not strictly accurate, that they had 150,000 police, but that 50,000 of these were not trained in the use of arms, but detectives, secret service men, book-keepers, typists, door-keepers, clerks, etc. He said it was true that about 97,000 or 98,000 men had been trained to the use of arms, but that this had been imposed on Germany by circumstances, as she was forbidden by treaty to use the Reichswehr in the demilitarized zones and that she had to have a military force of some sort to deal with communists and other uprisings; this had been clearly shown by experience. He said that even with this additional force it had been touch and go whether the Government would be able to maintain order if there had been uprisings in widely separated parts of Germany simultaneously.

The Germans did not indicate any desire to dictate how much reduction there should be in the armed forces of France but seemed to be more interested in having the power of attack and invasion reduced by the abolition or the restriction upon the use of particularly aggressive weapons. Dr. von Buelow seemed to think they had been making some progress in their discussions with the French but that as yet they had not been able to understand in detail just how far the French wished to go with their so-called plan. They were not quite sure whether their so-called plan for an international force or for the lodging with the League of certain material was with a view of actually building up a permanent international force under the League or with a view of having a period of transformation with the ultimate object of abolishing the more aggressive weapons. He seemed to think that the French might possibly be interested in finding a way to reduce without too much strain upon the sensitiveness [Page 112] of French public opinion. He inferred that this might be a way of reconciling the divergent views of Germany and France.

It was remarked that perhaps France might be satisfied with creating an international air force under the League with a view of abolishing or greatly reducing national military aviation. Dr. von Buelow said that in that case he thought it would be necessary to remove the danger of civil aviation being developed for military purposes and that Germany would be willing to internationalize civil aviation.

There was then some discussion about further matters and it was agreed that if M. Tardieu could be in Geneva on Friday the 29th as had been indicated Messrs. MacDonald and Stimson might first have a talk with him and then bring Chancellor Bruening into a four-cornered conference.

  1. The villa which Mr. Stimson occupied during his visit at Geneva.