500.A15A4/1003½: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Acting Secretary of State

151. For Castle and the President from the Secretary.…

1.
On my arrival here it was evident that nothing could be accomplished pending the French elections and that the debate which was going on was productive of dangerous issues likely to be used in the [Page 107] campaign to provoke national feeling. The whole atmosphere of the Conference was very depressed and confused. I have directed my efforts towards stopping these controversies and towards getting on personal good terms with the delegates of the leading powers and to arrive at an amicable understanding on subjects which might hereafter provoke issues if not thrashed out now and finally toward getting the general discussion put over until after the French elections.
2.
On his arrival MacDonald has heartily joined in this program and we have worked together in perfect harmony. Tardieu has also cooled down on his earlier issue with the American aggressive weapon proposal and has agreed that all controversial matter should go over.
3.
The Conference today agreed to adjourn ostensibly to enable the technical committees to report but in reality until after the French elections leaving only the technical committees, and probably all the chief delegates will leave by Friday.
4.
Among the issues which I think was [have?] probably backfired so as to minimize further trouble are
(a)
Capital ships. When I arrived the French and others were seeking to attack capital ships as an aggressive weapon in their fight against our proposal to abolish heavy artillery and tanks. In this they would probably have had support from the Italians and British to a certain extent. After very frank discussions with all three on this subject centering around the stabilizing influence of our own capital ships in the Pacific today Tardieu, MacDonald and Grandi have all expressed their approval of my opinion. If any of them raises the issue hereafter I believe most of its sting will be gone for none of them really believes in it.
(b)
The old consultative pact issue. This was beginning to show itself again in journalistic circles, was somewhat taken up by the French in suggesting that we were really to blame for the British refusal to give more security to the French. I had a show-down with MacDonald in the presence of Simon, Gibson and Davis, in which the British explicitly and clearly stated:
(a),
that they had never suggested to the French that our opposition was an obstacle to their giving the French further security;
(b),
that present British conformity would not permit them to make any additional commitments of security to the French strength; no covenants on our part to consult would alter the situation in the slightest;
(c),
that as a matter of fact they regarded the precedent of our cooperation with the League during the Sino-Japanese controversy quite as good assurance as any formal covenant even if such covenant were made.
5.
I can make no prophecies as to the ultimate outcome of the Conference. The British but of course are strong for an agreement. I believe that Tardieu wishes to do something and would fear the effect of a futile ending of the Conference. He has admitted to me frankly that he expects to get no additional security from the British and under these circumstances he probably will concede little in reduction but with patient effort something useful may be eventually accomplished.
6.
The Germans are at least as difficult to deal with as the French at present and I am inclined to think the major fault at the moment rests on them. They are trying to drag the subject of reparations into the negotiations with Tardieu. MacDonald and I are trying to arrange for a conference between Bruening and Tardieu in our presence tomorrow or Wednesday. This may give additional light.
7.
On the Sino-American [Sino-Japanese?] situation the atmosphere has been cleared by a very full discussion with Simon and MacDonald the latter of whom was previously quite ignorant of what had happened during his illness. I feel that I have done substantially all that can be done in assuring future cooperation. Lord Hailsham, the British War Minister, is to dine with me tonight and I shall discuss the same subject with him. He is a strong conservative. Thus far there has been no indication of any dissent on the part of the British from the necessity of absolute cooperation with us on all steps with respect to the new Manchurian state.
8.
In view of the long adjournment of all important discussions for at least 2 weeks and the departure of the leaders I am planning to come home at once. I have been badly handicapped by illness since I arrived which has much reduced my efficiency and in an effort to recuperate I am planning to return by the southern route probably sailing on the Roma from Cannes Friday. [Stimson.]
Gibson
  1. Telegram in two sections.