500.A15A4/1613
The Chargé in Czechoslovakia (Tuck) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 11.]
Sir: I have the honor to report as follows: On October 25th I had occasion to interview Dr. Beneš, who had just returned to Prague from Geneva and Paris, and I asked him to give me his impressions on recent developments in matters relating to disarmament. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is rather fond of referring to himself as a professional optimist in the disarmament field, impressed me as being in a distinctly gloomy frame of mind. He had come [Page 471] away from Geneva, he said, with the conviction that the problem of disarmament was in a particularly bad way. From his conversations in September with German representatives, with Zaleski, and from “other sources” he had been forced to the unwilling conclusion that the German Government had decided to take no further part in the Disarmament Conference. According to Dr. Beneš, a very definite reason had led to this decision which was that the present Government of the Reich had every intention, within the next two years, of bringing before the League of Nations the question of the Polish Corridor.83 Consequently it would serve no useful purpose for Germany to collaborate in the framing of a Convention which, if signed, would definitely limit the extent of her future armaments over a number of years and, in the event of the adoption of the Hoover proposal relating to effectives, would leave France, owing to her colonies, in a position of numerical superiority.
Dr. Beneš believed that the rest of Europe was again face to face with the German spirit which dominated in 1914, and he was forced to the regretful conclusion that Hindenburg, Schleicher and Papen would do everything possible, as long as they remained in power, to frustrate any useful collaboration in the limitation of armaments.
This unfavorable impression was in no way altered as the result of his subsequent visit to Paris where he encountered an equally stubborn attitude, particularly in higher military circles. He had had occasion to talk with Pétain and Weygand. The Marshal had remarked to him in substance “This Hoover proposal may be all very well but in view of Germany’s present attitude you cannot expect us, militarily speaking, to ‘undress’ France (déshabiller la France militairement). The French Government is willing to agree to substantial reduction in armaments and effectives, and even to discuss equality of rights on a juridical basis, but only on condition that Germany ceases to advance claims for an increase in armaments on the ground of her security.”
I then asked him, in view of the unhappy situation which he had depicted, whether he saw any hopeful prospects for the continuation of disarmament work in Geneva. He replied that the best possible tactics to adopt under present circumstances, was for the United States, France and Great Britain to continue their active participation in the work of the Disarmament Conference, whether Germany collaborated or not. If these three great Powers were able to frame, and to sign, a Convention acceptable to themselves and to the majority of the smaller European nations, he believed that Germany would then find herself in an extremely awkward position; a position [Page 472] in fact so embarrassing that it might conceivably result in the overthrow of the Government and a return to a more normal and less militaristic attitude toward disarmament. Should it prove impossible for the United States, France and Great Britain to see eye to eye, then the cause of disarmament would indeed be in a sorry plight.
Czechoslovakia, he concluded, unlike Poland, was fortunately in a position to view the present situation from a detached and objective point of view (this I do not believe for a moment) and his Government would contribute its weight towards the framing of any convention which would definitely tend toward the limitation of armaments and it would continue to oppose any attempt to introduce projects which could only be interpreted as proposals for rearmament.
It may be of interest to add that when I compared notes with the Italian Minister, who was received immediately following me, Signor Rocco informed me that Dr. Beneš had referred to his Geneva and Paris impressions in almost exactly the same pessimistic vein.
Respectfully yours,