500.A15A4/1620

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Rogers)

Disarmament

The Italian Ambassador, after expressing himself as pessimistic about the German-French situation, said he wanted to outline again the Mussolini plan which he had communicated in two interviews to the Secretary but may have stated without sufficient clarity or exactness. Mussolini’s suggestion was this:

  • First, that the German right to juridical equality should be recognized but in such a way that the employment of the right should be moderate, proportionate, and in pursuance only of a definite agreement. The right must be recognized because, first, the efforts so far at disarmament have yielded nothing; and, second, because the right has a foundation in the Treaty of Versailles and the French correspondence. The chief object should be to avoid Germany’s retiring from the concert of nations which would be disastrous and whatever sacrifice is necessary must be made to this end.
  • Second. The new convention should include some arrangements for security not only for France but for others, designed on some appropriate system. Afterwards, in answer to some questions by the Secretary, Mussolini added some further comments. The German-French parity should be brought about by a diminution of world armament through the process of conference and convention. If the conference fails to meet the question of bringing actual German armament nearer to parity by this means, then the formula for German armament which recognizes the right to equality must provide for an increase in her armament which is scaled over a period of time and definitely stated in a convention. Mussolini’s motive in suggesting this whole line of procedure was the danger arising if Germany should withdraw from collaboration with the other nations.

The Ambassador added personally that he was afraid the French people had an impression that we would back them against Germany if they would back us on the Manchurian situation. He thought this was very unfortunate. I said there was no bargain or agreement with France, express or implied; that our concern was world order and peace; that there were three lines of action on which we could proceed: First, to sacrifice everything to quiet the German-French conflict. This conflict was ancient, difficult, acute, and, while it might be quieted, could not be cured by merely local applications. Second, we could proceed to disarmament. This was going slowly, but we would not vary from it. Third, we could, as a contribution to world peace, develop further the general conviction of the necessity of preserving [Page 470] the sanctity of treaties. He said the stabilized world contemplated by the sanctity doctrine required some elastic means of readjustment. Italy herself might face a time when expanding populations required new territory abroad. He hoped this could be arrived at peaceably. I said I realized there must be some machinery of adjustment and indeed the League covenant contemplated it. He said the Italians looked on the League as a French organ which was not capable of producing the necessary accommodations easily. I said we were developing other means in addition to the League. I said our attitude on the German-French matter was that we were concerned with disarmament and not with either a modification or the maintenance of the Treaty of Versailles. He said the line was hard to draw.

Debts

The Italian Ambassador brought up the topic of debts82 and wanted to know whether all the newspaper talk really represented some negotiations. I said we had had no approaches by either Great Britain or France; that the matter was quiescent. He asked whether Herriot had said that they would pay the commercial debt and not the political debt on December 15. I said Herriot seems to deny that he said that and we are not satisfied that he did. He asked whether our position was still that we would handle the debt problem separately with various nations. I said it was still that and that we expected the December payment in the usual course; that there would be no opportunity to discuss any adjustments of that if of any.

The Ambassador said he was sailing November 12th definitely.

J[ames] G[rafton] R[ogers]
  1. See pp. 781 ff.