500.A15A4/833
The British Ambassador (Lindsay) to the Secretary of State
Washington, 22 January,
1932.
My Dear Mr. Secretary of State: With
reference to the memorandum containing the views of His Majesty’s
Government in the United Kingdom on the subject of the procedure to
be followed with respect to naval disarmament at the forthcoming
conference at Geneva, which I left with Mr. Castle on December 5th,11 and to
that [Page 13] which Mr. Castle handed to Mr. Osborne on December 30th12
containing the views of the United States Government, I now enclose
a memorandum setting forth certain further important points.
Sir John Simon earnestly
hopes that our two governments will find that they are in general
agreement on these points before any of the Powers concerned finds
it necessary to define its attitude at the conference.
The Japanese Government are being similarly approached.
Believe me [etc.]
[Enclosure]
The British Embassy
to the Department of State
Memorandum
His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom are glad to note
that the United States Government agree to part 3 of the London
Naval Treaty being maintained until revised by the 1935
conference.
- 2.
- As regards the duration of any convention resulting from
the conference, it is possible that the United States
Government may have taken the observations contained in the
memorandum handed to Mr. Castle on December 5th as referring to the
disarmament convention as a whole, whereas in fact they were
intended to refer only to the Naval clauses of any such
convention. His Majesty’s Government fully agree as to the
desirability of the convention as a whole running for a
longer period than that for which the London Naval Treaty is
still valid.
- 3.
- His Majesty’s Government understand the effect of the
proposal which the United States Government now make in
regard to the Naval clauses of the convention to be as
follows:
- A.
- That so far as the parties to the Washington and
London naval treaties are concerned the provisions
of these treaties (supplemented, it is hoped, by an
agreement with France and Italy) should represent
their contribution to the reduction of Naval
armaments up to the end of 1936.
- B.
- That an agreement for a longer term should be
negotiated by the other naval powers and
incorporated in the naval clauses of the
convention.
- C.
- That representatives of the Washington and London
naval treaty powers should meet in conference in
1935 as already arranged in Article 23 of the latter
treaty.
- D.
- That if as a result of this conference any changes
in the naval strength of the Washington and London
naval treaty powers were contemplated, all the high
contracting parties which have entered [Page 14] in the proposed
convention naval figures for the categories limited
by the Washington and London treaties should meet to
advise as to any revision of their own figures that
might be necessary.
- 4.
- His Majesty’s Government for their part readily concur in
these proposals except that, in regard to proposal (D), they
consider that the proposed conference should not result
automatically from any changes in the naval strength of the
Washington and London naval treaties but should only be
summoned if any of the parties concerned should consider
their security to be affected as a result of such changes.
His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom also consider
that any one of the Washington and London treaty powers
should itself have the right to call a conference of all
naval powers should an agreement reached at the 1935
conference for any changes in Washington or London
limitations on the size or armament of types of ships render
this desirable.
- 5.
- As regards the form in which the contribution of the
parties to the Washington and London naval treaties should
be expressed, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom
are considering in consultation with the Dominions the
course which they will advocate but the following arguments
against the insertion in the naval clauses of the convention
of the figures appearing in Part 3 of the London Naval
Treaty appear to merit serious consideration.
- 6.
- In the first place, it is to be hoped that the smaller
naval powers will be prepared to enter in the convention
figures which they will not exceed for the whole term of the
convention (subject only to revision in 1935 as proposed
above) whereas the figures in Part 3 of the London Naval
Treaty are agreed only up to December 1936 and represent in
some cases tonnage levels which must be reached by that date
but may be exceeded in the interval. Secondly, the
negotiation of an agreement concerning construction by
France and Italy up to 1935 or 1936 would be greatly impeded
if figures had necessarily to be entered in the convention
by the Washington and London naval treaty powers.
- 7.
- If this view were adopted it would seem to follow that in
so far as those powers are concerned there would be in the
convention a simple reference to the fact that their naval
strength will be limited up to 1936 by those treaties and by
any supplementary agreement in the nature of the bases of
agreement of March 1, 1931,13
which may be reached with France and Italy. His Majesty’s
Government in the United Kingdom will communicate again with
the United States Government on this point as soon as
possible but they are anxious that the United States
Government should be informed at once that they have the
above considerations in mind.
- 8.
- The enquiry which was addressed to the United States
Government in the memorandum referred to in paragraph 2
above was simultaneously addressed to the Japanese
Government. The latter replied that since the demands to be
put forward by other countries such as France and Italy were
unknown, it would be a mistake to regard the strength laid
down at Washington and London as fixed. It was not desirable
that a new treaty should have provisions characteristic of
the London Treaty and therefore require the meeting of a
further conference in 1935. In these circumstances the
Japanese Government preferred to reserve their decision
regarding the proposal of His Majesty’s Government in the
United Kingdom until the conference met.
- 9.
- While it is possible that the Japanese Government’s view
may have been based on a misunderstanding of what His
Majesty’s Government had proposed, it is also possible to
interpret their communication as meaning that they are in
favour of an attempt being made at the forthcoming
conference to extend the term of validity of the London
Naval Treaty and so to dispense with a conference in 1935.
His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom would see
serious objections to any such proposal. The difficulties of
the disarmament conference will be enormous, especially as
it now appears that apart from the large number of smaller
powers whose conflicting claims will have to be reconciled,
there is no longer any prospect of a settlement of the
Franco-Italian difficulty before the conference meets. From
existing indications it is not clear by any means that His
Majesty’s Government will be able to avoid recourse to
Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty owing to the action of
European powers, and it is unnecessary to emphasize the
importance of doing nothing which might increase the
existing difficulties.
- 10.
- Furthermore, as the United States Government are aware,
His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom were only
able to accept the existing level of limitation as part of
the agreement as a whole, which was negotiated in London in
1930, including in particular a specific and limited
duration. It would mean precipitating difficulties which
need not arise until 1935 if an attempt had now to be made
to find an acceptable limitation level for a period
subsequent to 1936. It would also no doubt mean the renewal
by Japan of a claim to a higher ratio (probably 70%) of
United States and British naval strengths in all limitable
categories.
- 11.
- If the parties to part 3 of the London Naval Treaty14 enter the Disarmament
Conference in agreement amongst themselves, they will be in
a strong position to influence the other powers to reduce
[Page 16] their armaments
in turn. If, on the other hand, these powers reopen the
whole question between themselves they will be in no
position to do this: their influence will be greatly reduced
and with it the prospect of success in bringing about any
reduction on the part of other powers.
Washington,
22 January,
1932.
