Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1932, General, Volume I

500.A15A4/833

The British Ambassador (Lindsay) to the Secretary of State

Washington, 22 January, 1932.

My Dear Mr. Secretary of State: With reference to the memorandum containing the views of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom on the subject of the procedure to be followed with respect to naval disarmament at the forthcoming conference at Geneva, which I left with Mr. Castle on December 5th,¹¹ and to that which Mr. Castle handed to Mr. Osborne on December 30th¹² containing the views of the United States Government, I now enclose a memorandum setting forth certain further important points. Sir John Simon earnestly hopes that our two governments will find that they are in general agreement on these points before any of the Powers concerned finds it necessary to define its attitude at the conference.

The Japanese Government are being similarly approached.

Believe me [etc.]

R. C. Lindsay

[Enclosure]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Memorandum

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom are glad to note that the United States Government agree to part 3 of the London Naval Treaty being maintained until revised by the 1935 conference.

2. As regards the duration of any convention resulting from the conference, it is possible that the United States Government may have taken the observations contained in the memorandum handed to Mr. Castle on December 5th as referring to the disarmament convention as a whole, whereas in fact they were intended to refer only to the Naval clauses of any such convention. His Majesty’s Government fully agree as to the desirability of the convention as a whole running for a longer period than that for which the London Naval Treaty is still valid.

3. His Majesty’s Government understand the effect of the proposal which the United States Government now make in regard to the Naval clauses of the convention to be as follows:

A. That so far as the parties to the Washington and London naval treaties are concerned the provisions of these treaties (supplemented, it is hoped, by an agreement with France and Italy) should represent their contribution to the reduction of Naval armaments up to the end of 1936.

B. That an agreement for a longer term should be negotiated by the other naval powers and incorporated in the naval clauses of the convention.

C. That representatives of the Washington and London naval treaty powers should meet in conference in 1935 as already arranged in Article 23 of the latter treaty.

D. That if as a result of this conference any changes in the naval strength of the Washington and London naval treaty powers were contemplated, all the high contracting parties which have entered in the proposed convention naval figures for the categories limited by the Washington and London treaties should meet to advise as to any revision of their own figures that might be necessary.

4. His Majesty’s Government for their part readily concur in these proposals except that, in regard to proposal (D), they consider that the proposed conference should not result automatically from any changes in the naval strength of the Washington and London naval treaties but should only be summoned if any of the parties concerned should consider their security to be affected as a result of such changes. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom also consider that any one of the Washington and London treaty powers should itself have the right to call a conference of all naval powers should an agreement reached at the 1935 conference for any changes in Washington or London limitations on the size or armament of types of ships render this desirable.

5. As regards the form in which the contribution of the parties to the Washington and London naval treaties should be expressed, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom are considering in consultation with the Dominions the course which they will advocate but the following arguments against the insertion in the naval clauses of the convention of the figures appearing in Part 3 of the London Naval Treaty appear to merit serious consideration.

6. In the first place, it is to be hoped that the smaller naval powers will be prepared to enter in the convention figures which they will not exceed for the whole term of the convention (subject only to revision in 1935 as proposed above) whereas the figures in Part 3 of the London Naval Treaty are agreed only up to December 1936 and represent in some cases tonnage levels which must be reached by that date but may be exceeded in the interval. Secondly, the negotiation of an agreement concerning construction by France and Italy up to 1935 or 1936 would be greatly impeded if figures had necessarily to be entered in the convention by the Washington and London naval treaty powers.

7. If this view were adopted it would seem to follow that in so far as those powers are concerned there would be in the convention a simple reference to the fact that their naval strength will be limited up to 1936 by those treaties and by any supplementary agreement in the nature of the bases of agreement of March 1, 1931,¹³ which may be reached with France and Italy. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will communicate again with the United States Government on this point as soon as possible but they are anxious that the United States Government should be informed at once that they have the above considerations in mind.

8. The enquiry which was addressed to the United States Government in the memorandum referred to in paragraph 2 above was simultaneously addressed to the Japanese Government. The latter replied that since the demands to be put forward by other countries such as France and Italy were unknown, it would be a mistake to regard the strength laid down at Washington and London as fixed. It was not desirable that a new treaty should have provisions characteristic of the London Treaty and therefore require the meeting of a further conference in 1935. In these circumstances the Japanese Government preferred to reserve their decision regarding the proposal of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom until the conference met.

9. While it is possible that the Japanese Government’s view may have been based on a misunderstanding of what His Majesty’s Government had proposed, it is also possible to interpret their communication as meaning that they are in favour of an attempt being made at the forthcoming conference to extend the term of validity of the London Naval Treaty and so to dispense with a conference in 1935. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom would see serious objections to any such proposal. The difficulties of the disarmament conference will be enormous, especially as it now appears that apart from the large number of smaller powers whose conflicting claims will have to be reconciled, there is no longer any prospect of a settlement of the Franco-Italian difficulty before the conference meets. From existing indications it is not clear by any means that His Majesty’s Government will be able to avoid recourse to Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty owing to the action of European powers, and it is unnecessary to emphasize the importance of doing nothing which might increase the existing difficulties.

10. Furthermore, as the United States Government are aware, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom were only able to accept the existing level of limitation as part of the agreement as a whole, which was negotiated in London in 1930, including in particular a specific and limited duration. It would mean precipitating difficulties which need not arise until 1935 if an attempt had now to be made to find an acceptable limitation level for a period subsequent to 1936. It would also no doubt mean the renewal by Japan of a claim to a higher ratio (probably 70%) of United States and British naval strengths in all limitable categories.

11. If the parties to part 3 of the London Naval Treaty¹⁴ enter the Disarmament Conference in agreement amongst themselves, they will be in a strong position to influence the other powers to reduce their armaments in turn. If, on the other hand, these powers reopen the whole question between themselves they will be in no position to do this: their influence will be greatly reduced and with it the prospect of success in bringing about any reduction on the part of other powers.

Washington, 22 January, 1932.

11. Foreign Relations, 1931, vol. i, p. 532.
12. Ibid., p. 535.
13. Foreign Relations, 1931, vol. i, p. 380.
14. i. e., the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. France and Italy did not agree to part III of the Treaty.