500.A15A4 Steering Committee/153: Telegram
The American Delegate (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
459. From Davis and Wilson. Supplementing our 458, November 16, 7 p.m., herewith follows comment on “proposals of French plan” (see my 455, November 15, noon.)
Chapter I of the French plan provides that the powers shall establish in an effective manner certain principles “recognized to be a necessary consequence” of the Paris Pact. Presumably France has in mind that these principles should be set forth in the Disarmament Convention although the use of the phrase “in an effective manner” possibly leaves open the establishment of the principles in other ways such, for example, as a unilateral declaration of governmental policy.
The first question which arises is as to whether it would be possible and advisable to restate the principles outlined in your August 8th speech and in your Pittsburgh address in connection with a Disarmament Convention.
In case it is deemed advisable to contemplate some such action we add our analysis of the four principles set forth in chapter I dealing of course not with matters of phraseology but with the substance. Paragraph (a) appears to raise little difficulty. Paragraph (b) might be acceptable but would suggest that the phrase “shall concert together” be replaced by the phrase “shall advise together with respect to the maintenance of peace” and the elimination of the rest of the sentence. Paragraph (c) obviously goes very much farther than we could accept and we raise the question as to whether in lieu of this paragraph anything could be worked out on the principle that in the event of breach of the Pact of Paris the powers should be under no obligation to recognize that the violator had the rights of a belligerent or to observe the rules of neutrality with respect to [Page 391] such violator. The French will also certainly press us for an undertaking that we would not in this event insist on what are now known as neutral rights.
With respect to paragraph (d) with regard to nonrecognition of de facto situation brought about by violation of “an international undertaking” it would appear to us that in view of the multiplicity of international undertakings presumably any such commitment should be limited to multilateral undertakings of a special character as the Paris Pact or in the case of parties thereto the Covenant of the League.
Under both (c) and (d) it appears essential that any formula should be based upon the idea that it is for the United States alone to determine the aggressor as far as it concerns our action under the treaty.
We fully appreciate that this whole subject raises questions of the gravest import. In laying the matter before you we would point out that if we take a completely negative stand with regard to the whole subject matter of chapter I an effort might be made to place on our doorstep the responsibility for the failure to make further progress in the disarmament work. In view of the declarations which the President and you have made and the position taken in the party platforms regarding consultation there seems to be no reason to be driven into any such position. It is, however, of very great importance that we know how to proceed with respect to the general subject matter of chapter I when the French plan comes up for serious discussion. If the plan breaks down presumably it will be on chapter III. We must be careful therefore that chapter I is not blocked by us before we find out whether chapter III is going to present insurmountable obstacles. In any case we feel we should give no definite answer for or against some cooperation under chapter I until we have satisfied ourselves as to the results to be achieved.
Chapter II. No comment.
Chapter III. This chapter raises certain possibilities of giving satisfaction to Germany through the establishment of armies of common pattern. Conversations with French military officers have convinced us that the French proposals regarding effectives for the home-land are capable of being adapted to and indeed will facilitate the working out of President Hoover’s proposal relating to the subject.
The political considerations under section (a) of this chapter are not our immediate concern but it seems essential to us that point 5 at least of this section be modified since it would in its present form involve a change in the Covenant and as such causes an indefinite delay.
[Page 392]Section (b). There is no evidence in part 2 paragraph (b) of the French plan of a desire to scrap material of any category but there is a distinction of considerable importance made between mobile and fixed artillery. As for material, while France does not recede from its previous position concerning material in stock the proposals contained in chapter III section (b), part 3, would eventually after a period of years not only make material in stock uniform but its quantity and type would become known to other powers.
It is fair we think to state that reduction of material will, under the plan, be largely fictitious at present although some scrapping may be brought about under chapter III, section (b), part 2 (b).
Reference chapter III section (b), part 5, the conception of successive stages of reduction appears to us really useful in that while the balance of force and resulting feeling of security can be maintained real reductions can be envisaged which in themselves will gather momentum in favor of more radical means of reduction as each successive stage is reached.
Chapter IV. No commitment is taken regarding the reduction of colonial forces and indeed the fourth paragraph would seem to offer no application of the Hoover plan to overseas forces and is consistent with the maintenance of the status quo. As regard naval reduction, the proposal that this should be chiefly effected in categories of vessels “recognized as the most offensive” is, according to Massigli, directed against the battleship and the submarine. The basing of naval reductions on the aggregate tonnage declared in 1931 in reply to the League questionnaire will be considered by Italy as another attempt by France to profit by the retention of its obsolete capital ships and armored cruisers.
Concerning the last paragraph and the fifth paragraph of chapter IV, members of the French delegation have assured us that they were under no misapprehension as to the fact that we would never tolerate any such use of the American fleet and that this paragraph was written with the idea of England in mind and the obligation which rests upon England under the Covenant to make use of their fleet to give effect to decisions of the Council under article XVI. It is not intended to apply to us.
Chapter V. This chapter on air forces constitutes no advance over the final resolution of the General Commission of July 23 and indeed in its precisions may present still greater difficulties.
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