Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1932, General, Volume I

500.A15A4 Steering Committee/152: Telegram

The American Delegate (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, November 16, 1932—7 p.m.
[Received 8:44 p.m.]

458. From Davis and Wilson. The delegation, including Army and Navy members, have been considered [considering?] the French plan and we offer certain general considerations, entering into a more detailed analysis in another message.

1. In considering the plan which Paul-Boncour called “the inner concentric circle” or the organization for Europe, we offer certain thoughts. We take it that the greatest good that could come out of the General Disarmament discussions would be the establishment of real peace in Europe. If such peace can be established and at the same time a substantial reduction of armament achieved, so much the better; but the essential thing is finding a thesis on which the European states can agree, within the framework of which they can live and under the jurisdiction of which most of the bitterness will have a chance to be forgotten. We believe that you will agree that the method to achieve these ends is secondary. We are inspired to these thoughts by the considerations which you have so often emphasized when discussing the Manchurian question and its effect on world affairs, especially on the “framework of peace”. We have particularly in mind the third paragraph of your message to Davis, No. 273, October 20, 8 p.m.²⁵ We, therefore, suppose that anything which is not fundamentally unacceptable to us and which at the same time may prove practical enough to contribute to the reinforcement or enlargement of this “framework of peace” should receive our good wishes. We cannot say now whether anything along the lines of the French Plan for Europe will prove generally acceptable and we are not the judges as to that. We see the profoundest difficulties in the [acceptance?] by the European states of such a plan for Europe, but if this scheme for Europe can only be accepted through the establishment of armed forces at the disposition of the League, then such establishment would be of benefit even though it contravenes our conception of how the machinery of peace should be organized.

2. While the French plan is essentially what the French have been consistently striving to attain it is disappointing in that emphasis is laid on complicated theses rather than on disarmament. A lot of brushwood must be swept away before you arrive at certain real advances in French thought. Their tactics are as ancient as French civilization, to emphasize their conditions and withhold their reality for the purpose of bargaining, and as long as we deal with them we must expect such procedure.

3. It appears to us that we should show in conversation with the French an attitude of disappointment, stating that we had been ready to give the most friendly consideration to their proposal but that it really is disappointing that everything France wants is set out with exceeding clarity, while everything that is simple disarmament is put in the vaguest form and fails to be in any case a definite offer. Therefore, how can we know whether it is worth our while to examine the political conditions in so far as applicable to us.

4. The plan will be still more unpalatable to the British Government than it will to us because of the more positive role ascribed to them under its terms, and its fate will probably turn on its reception by the British. In any case it can be said that it is more palatable to the British Government than was the protocol of 1924.²⁶

5. We trust that these rather pessimistic observations will not prove to be the last word on the plan and that something may yet be worked out on the basis of its positive features. It would appear that the plan, as approved by the Council on National Defense, does not carry out the spirit and purpose which Herriot revealed both in his conversations and his public declaration. Possibly when they come here next week we can persuade them to [revise?] some of their unworkable ideas, but the publication of the plan in all its details will prove an obstacle.

6. We will bear in mind in any case that the Lytton Report²⁷ comes up for discussion in the near future and walk especially warily regarding the French plan for the moment.

7. In the meantime we think it will be highly useful to consider with you how we should shape our views and it is in that sense that our 459, November 16, 9 p.m. is drafted.

Wilson

25. Post, p. 467.
26. Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, October 2, 1924; text printed as S. Doc. 180, 68th Cong., 2d sess.
27. For correspondence relating to discussion of the Lytton Report during the period October 1–November 30, see ch. 12, vol. iv, pp. 281 ff.