793.94/2074
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
The Japanese Ambassador said he came to bring me Baron Shidehara’s reply to my message to him of Saturday, October 10th. (See aide mémoire that date.39) It was as follows: [Page 23]
- First: Baron Shidehara was strongly of the opinion that the General Officer, commanding in Manchuria, was not in a position to take charge of diplomatic negotiations; and that such a question as the recognition of Marshal Chang’s authority in Manchuria was a question for the Imperial Japanese Government.
- Second: It was very far from Baron Shidehara’s real thought to minimize the bombing at Chinchow; that all he wished to express was that the bombing was an isolated military action which did not reflect the real attitude of the Japanese Government.
- Third: Baron Shidehara wished Ambassador Debuchi to assure me that the fixed policy of Japan towards China will not be influenced by a few incidents caused by Japanese military officers in Manchuria, which incidents might be merely the result of temporary states of mind on their part.
- Fourth: Baron Shidehara has entirely approved Ambassador Debuchi’s explanation of the Japanese memorandum to China (a copy of which was left by Debuchi at Mr. Castle’s home the other evening40), which was to the effect that this memorandum was merely a precautionary measure and could not be construed as an ultimatum or as evidence of aggressive action on Japan’s part.
After conveying these messages, the Ambassador made some personal observations. One was to the effect that the position of the Japanese Cabinet is very difficult; that Shidehara is responsible to the Cabinet and to Parliament and for that reason it was very difficult for Shidehara to say whether he approved or disapproved the action of the Japanese military in Manchuria or of the act of Japanese airplanes in bombing Chinchow.
I replied that I understood Mr. Shidehara’s position. I said that my attitude towards him personally was not modified by the fact that he did not seem to be able to control his general officers, but that on his part he must remember that I faced the fact that these actions by the general officers may affect the safety of the world and must govern my action accordingly. As the Ambassador left I told him that the one important thing I wished him to convey to Baron Shidehara was that the situation in Manchuria was regarded here as most serious, both by our government and the American people, and there should be no mistake about that. I then told Debuchi that I was going to authorize Gilbert to sit with the Council of the League of Nations, if invited, in their discussion on any matters that related to treaties to which we were a party. I told him my reason was that both for the sake of the effect on the world at large and the relations of this country with Japan I wanted it to be clear that we stood not alone vis-à-vis Japan but with the other nations of the world.