793.94/2057: Telegram

The Change in Japan (Neville) to the Secretary of State

182. Department’s 191 [192], October 10, 2 p.m. I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read the message it contained. He asked me for a copy which I gave him. He told me that he had received a telegram from the President of the Council of the League which he read to me.36 It was similar to the message I was instructed to deliver. He stated that he was replying to it Monday or Tuesday at the latest and would give me a copy; the reply will also be given to the Ambassador in Washington I understand.

The Minister then said that the British and French Ambassadors had called on him and delivered messages similar to mine and to that of the President of the Council of the League. He spoke very frankly to me and said that in his judgment the affair would drag on as long as the Chinese could avoid direct conversation; that as far as he could see it was the record of the Shantung negotiations over again; after the ratification of the Versailles Treaty the Japanese had notified the Chinese that they were prepared to open negotiations for the rendition of Tsingtau and the railway to China; the Chinese [Page 22] refused to negotiate and the affair dragged on until the Washington Conference, when all points were settled with relatively little difficulty by direct conversations between the Japanese and Chinese representatives.37 He said that the present matter could be speedily settled between them if direct negotiations could be inaugurated; that so long as the Chinese have any encouragement to believe that some pressure can be brought to compel the Japanese to yield in the present situation they will evade any negotiations. He said the Japanese obligation to withdraw within the railway zone was contingent upon the Chinese ability and willingness to safeguard the lives and property of Japanese subjects lawfully in the country; that the Chinese have made no effort to respect the lives and property of the Japanese; that in some cases it might be difficult for the Nanking Government to fulfill their obligations, but that the lower Yangtze Valley was in their power and the Japanese residents fared worse than in many other places. In such circumstances he said that the Japanese could not withdraw their forces, and until an indication is given that the Chinese intend to safeguard Japanese lives and property in fact as well as in name, he did not see what could be done; all these matters would settle themselves if the Chinese were made to realize that they have no chance of settlement except by direct negotiations; once that is made clear to them, the irresponsible agitation by students and professional politicians will die down because the Kuomintang will have no chance to make domestic political capital out of baiting the Japanese. He said that in the meantime Japan would exercise extreme forbearance and not provoke any trouble. I said that the Chinchow incident had aroused much comment. He had nothing [more?] of importance on this point he said than he had told me before.

I am pretty well satisfied that the statement I made in my 16238 is still correct: direct conversation between the Chinese and Japanese is the only way out, because the Japanese for the present will not welcome interference by any third party.

Repeated to Peiping.

Neville
  1. League of Nations, Official Journal, December, 1931, p. 2484.
  2. For papers relating to this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1921, vol. i, pp. 613 ff.; ibid., 1922, vol. i, pp. 339 ff and 934 ff.
  3. Not printed.