500.A15A5/281: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State

52. My conversation this morning with the Prime Minister and Simon was satisfactory.

Simon gave an outline of the recent Anglo-Japanese conversations, in the course of which Matsudaira, in substance, had stated that: (1) Japan would be unable to accept a contractual limitation of her building program below the common upper limit, although she did not intend to build entirely up to that limit; (2) Japan would find difficulty in agreeing to qualitative limitation without quantitative limitation; (3) Japan would probably be prepared to “negotiate” a continuance of the nonfortification provision, although Matsudaira admitted that he had no definite decision of his Government on this point; and (4) Japan was prepared to agree not to denounce the Four-Power Treaty9 for the period of a new naval agreement.

Simon added that Matsudaira had very confidentially referred to Japan’s isolated position with reference to denunciation of the Washington Treaty, and had inquired whether it was really necessary that [Page 264] Japan should denounce it single-handed, from which Simon inferred that he had been instructed to find out whether Britain would join in denunciation. Simon replied that Japan had voluntarily announced her arbitrary decision to denounce the treaty before the end of 1934 and that Great Britain could not consider joining in it.

I then summarized to the British the pertinent portions of my recent cables to you setting forth my understanding of the British position and my conviction that they would not enter into any agreement with Japan without the United States, in order that there should be no doubt as to whether I had correctly understood and reported their views. Both MacDonald and Simon declared that my summary and analysis of the British views was accurate in every respect. I presented in substance your views, particularly as set forth in your No. 34 of November 22, and emphasized the inadvisability of negotiating a substitute treaty with the hammer of denunciation of the Washington Treaty hanging over our heads, and that the best hope of an ultimate agreement lay not so much in the search for some formula to satisfy Japan as in Anglo-American cooperation.

The Prime Minister and Simon categorically and, I am convinced, sincerely agreed that it was vital to continue and strengthen Anglo-American cooperation, but without giving grounds for extremists in Japan or sympathizers in England to raise the cry of a common front hostile to Japan. They felt they must avoid the charge that the possibilities of an agreement had been destroyed, not so much through Japanese intransigence, as through lack of patience on the part of the United States and Great Britain. They said they were now satisfied there was no essential difference between the two Governments as to the fundamental issues and that it was simply a question of immediate method. In substance they favored stalling along “to give Japan enough rope”. They did not feel it would be wise to break off negotiations immediately, for apart from the English political and public opinion they had to satisfy, there were the further questions, already posed to Japan, for instance, as to the nonfortifications provision, and as to Japan’s policy toward China, and they would obviously have to await an answer. MacDonald said that he did not agree with my estimate as to the effect in Japan of sending them home empty handed, that there were some who felt that the Japanese militarists would like to tear up the treaty and not be bound in any respect whatever, and that it would be helpful to the moderate element as opposed to the military element for us to try to find some form of agreement. Simon suggested that this point might be discussed confidentially with Matsudaira. MacDonald continued that the Cabinet were completely preoccupied at the moment with the debate on the India report, which would reach its most critical stage next week, and which was of vital importance [Page 265] to the national Government. In addition, preparations for the royal wedding were also taking a great deal of their time. Finally, they argued that even if the present conversations were to end now, the United States delegation must remain here to consider with them our respective naval policies and attitude in the future, with particular reference to any new conference arising under the Washington Treaty. MacDonald said definitely he hoped that if the Washington Treaty system were scrapped, and the two nations were faced with a dangerous situation in the Far East, we would be more generous to England in the matter of tonnage.

I stated that we had no wish to break off the negotiations hastily, but that instead of trying to reach an agreement now it would be advisable to impress the Japanese with the seriousness of the situation they were creating, and to point out to them that it was not merely a question of naval limitation, but that by denouncing the Washington Treaty they were placing in jeopardy the entire collective system which had been set up by the Washington Conference for the promotion of peace and stability in the Far East. MacDonald said that he had taken this position for some time, and Simon pointed to his statement in the House yesterday, particularly where he had said that Great Britain “would regard the breakdown of the system of naval limitation as a great disaster for everybody.” I suggested that we might even consider bringing about a termination of the conversations with a statement of such a friendly and pacific nature that it would appeal to the moral sense of the entire world and at the same time could not possibly be taken amiss by the military party in Japan, while greatly assisting the moderate element.

[Paraphrase.] The British have not stressed so strongly at any time in the earlier conversations their seemingly most genuine reasons for pursuing the talks with the Japanese, but they were willing to give more weight and consideration to our arguments and were much less insistent upon endeavoring to arrive at an agreement with the Japanese now. They said in fact that we should be able to reach a complete meeting of minds on this matter within a few days.

They have not expressed so forcibly at any other meeting the regret which they would feel regarding a withdrawal on our part during the life of the conversations, beyond the limited holiday period at Christmas time which might be agreed upon. [End paraphrase.]

At the conclusion of our conversation, Simon mentioned the possibility of my making a statement to the press, expressing my appreciation and support of his remarks on the naval conversations in the House yesterday, and it was agreed that I should make an appreciative reference along these lines in the course of my press conference this evening.

Davis
  1. Signed at Washington, December 13, 1921, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 33.