500.A15A5/280a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis)
34. Referring to our today’s teletype conversation. It is still our opinion that the course, potentially most advantageous, would be that the Japanese, in view of their intention to denounce the Washington Treaty, be given no encouragement to expect any concessions or to expect the conclusion of a new treaty in substitution for the Washington Treaty; and that the Japanese, as a result of the British and ourselves showing no further solicitude in that connection, be forced to make the denunciation solely on their own responsibility and at a moment, between now and the end of December, of their own choosing.
Insofar as concerns the situation in Japan and in the Far East in general, as distinguished from considerations of internal British politics, we believe that the tactics of exploring possibilities regarding substitutes, et cetera, has already been and would continue to be, if pursued, of less advantage than disadvantage. The same is also true of the situation in the United States.
The end of the first phase would properly be brought about by a clean break through denunciation by the Japanese. To proceed at once with what would be in fact new conversations looking toward a new objective would mean that we had conceded the fundamental Japanese demand in the present conversations, that is, that the existing ratios be given up. Moreover, an immediate beginning of new conversations or negotiations would establish a bad precedent and have a very bad psychological effect. It would mean that the Japanese had been granted a substantial gain and there would be no opportunity for the development which is envisaged by us as likely within a reasonably short time, that is, an approach by the Japanese on their own initiative requesting further naval limitations discussion, resulting in the creation of a setting for such discussions favorable to the viewpoint that naval limitation is desirable. Should our expectation of such a development be disappointed, as time goes on, there is nevertheless, before the termination of existing treaty obligations, a period of two years during which it will be possible to revise plans and estimates.
[Page 263]Therefore, it is not our belief that further British exploration of the “middle course” would be of any practical value unless it is envisaged that it is to be carried out solely for the purpose of filling in the time until such moment as the Japanese, through denunciation of the Washington Treaty, assume the responsibility of breaking off the first phase. Even under those conditions we consider the policy hazardous in that it encourages Japan to believe that the British and perhaps the Americans are unduly perturbed in the face of her apparent determination and her strength. In addition, it would continue to offer opportunity and possible material for suspicion and propaganda.
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It is not possible for us to see how the present conversations could either be turned into or immediately followed by negotiations, without the British and American Governments, ipso facto, making concessions, both in principle and in fact, to the Japanese, resulting in the Japanese making definite gains both in appearance and in fact without having made any concessions.
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