500.A15A5/281: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis )

[Paraphrase]

37. With reference to your telegram of November 23, 9 p.m., No. 52. The conversation which you had with Simon and MacDonald definitely shows that the American and the British positions more nearly approach each other than for some time and I am encouraged correspondingly. The tone of press comment regarding Anglo-American cooperation is favorable also. As is shown by the attitude of Matsudaira, the Japanese are showing signs, at the thought of their isolated position, of being worried and nervous. The more they are uneasy, the sooner they may become willing to approach in the spirit of cooperation the problems involved. For the last three years, with conspicuous lack of success, the idea has been tried that the moderate Japanese element, now silent and in eclipse, would, through concessions made to Japan, be encouraged to oppose the Japanese military elements. According to our belief and information, furthermore, military psychology and military elements are stronger today in Japan than has been the case for a long time.

It is not possible to say that lack of patience has been shown by us. Every opportunity to present the Japanese case has been given them.

The British point of view that conversations should not be broken off right away has been accepted by us, even though public opinion has been somewhat confused as a result, and the fact that it is Japan which desires to do away with the treaties and the principles of limitation on which they are based has been obscured. Until the Japanese denounce the Washington Treaty we are prepared to continue the London conversations. The “life of the conversations” to which Mac-Donald has referred will thus have been terminated, and thereby the conversations will have been broken off by Japan’s own act. Immediately after or at the time of Japanese denunciation, which should place clearly upon the Japanese the blame for a breakdown of the present negotiations, a statement of the type which you suggest in the sixth paragraph of your telegram No. 52 might well be made. You might find some occasion, at the same time or even earlier perhaps, publicly to emphasize the fundamental difference between equality of security and equality of armament, indicating that during these conversations our efforts have in a most friendly way been directed toward the maintenance of the standard of equality of security. Should you have any concrete suggestions regarding the way to block out such a statement so as best to convey the impressions you had in mind I should be glad to receive them. It would seem that a joint statement by the American [Page 267] and British delegations would be called for, if a tripartite statement cannot be agreed to.

In all events, it is our feeling that you should refrain from doing anything which would diminish the embarrassment of the Japanese, as the time of denunciation approaches, or which would associate the British and ourselves with the act of and responsibility for denunciation.

Hull