500.A15A5/284b: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)
191. Summary of developments at London since my telegram No. 186, October 31, 9 p.m., follows:
On October 31, at a meeting of the American and the Japanese delegations, the discussion centered mainly around (1) whether or not technical naval improvements had altered relative security as it was fixed by the naval treaties; and (2) whether or not the Japanese Government would continue to pursue policy of cooperation to adjust problems of international concern or whether it would revert to a course of independent action. Davis put forward the point that it was difficult for us to appreciate Japan’s contention that national prestige was affected by a smaller navy; by analogy, he compared our Army with the Japanese Army.
On November 1, Sir John Simon6a and Davis met to review the recent British-Japanese meeting. Sir John said that he had taken a more positive attitude vis-à-vis Matsudaira than he had heretofore in order that he might learn the true motives for Japan’s demands for parity. He had indicated that if Japan would be content with a face-saving formula, it might be possible to find a way out; but that if the question were one, of changing the present status of the naval treaties, the British would have to refuse. Davis was assured by Simon that the British would not essay the role of mediator; that it was the British policy to make no agreement with Japan or with any other power that would adversely affect Anglo-American relations.
On November 6, there was another meeting between Davis and Simon, at which time Simon said that he was going to ask the Japanese if they would be satisfied with a treaty which acknowledged in its preamble the inherent equality of sovereign rights but which would establish respective maximum programs worked out at the existing levels.
[Page 261]On November 8, Davis was informed by Craigie7 that the formula referred to by Simon had been proposed to the Japanese.
On November 13, Simon told Davis that in addition to the face-saving device which the British had proposed, they had made inquiry of the Japanese with regard to a nonaggression pact about which Hirota7a has thrown out suggestions from time to time. Sir John had told the Japanese that Japan could not expect Great Britain to enter into an Anglo-Japanese nonaggression pact without the United States, nor could the British enter into such a pact without knowing whether the policies of the participants in it were such as not to provoke aggression. Great Britain was interested in Chinese independence and in the open door, and the British wished to know whether Japan contemplated complete assurance with regard to these points in a proposed pact.
On November 14, the Department advised Davis that he should assume a receptive attitude only in any further discussion on a nonaggression pact and give evidence of no particular interest; that any proposal for a pact of this type should include at least the five powers, among them China, who were most concerned and also a definition of aggression and prescriptions of limitation upon the use of force by any power against another or in the territory of another.
On November 15, there was a further meeting between the British and the Americans. The former pointed out that in the face of Japan’s impending denunciation of the Washington Naval Treaty, there were three courses that might be taken: (a) Discussion of a new treaty containing a face-saving device and embodying all the principles of the Washington Treaty; (b) recognition of the situation presented and inaction as to any commitments at present; (c) attempt to come to an agreement which would salvage as much as possible of the Washington and London naval treaties.
On November 17, the Department informed Davis that it was our feeling that the scope of the present conversations did not include the negotiation of a new agreement, based on new principles. It was suggested (our No. 22, November 158) that, if the discussions should turn in the direction of termination of the conversations now taking place, the Department felt that while on the one hand it was important to preserve at least the form of a mere suspension of conversations, on the other it was equally important not to bind ourselves to resume them at a definite date irrespective of developments in the future.
[Page 262]Davis reports that although reports are carried in the press that the Japanese have rejected the British “middle course” feelers, he has not yet been officially informed of their rejection.