500.A15a3/747: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson)
207. Your telegram No. 128, March 12, 6 p.m.
(1) In regard to situation which has developed at the Conference, we agree, of course, that a two-power pact is better than nothing, but that a three-power pact would be very much stronger in all its implications. A serious question arises as to whether at the right moment, no doubt later on, we would not make some intermediate concession to the Japanese to bring them into the pact.
(2) We should also like to have your view as to whether the moment has not arrived when the President should issue a public notice in the nature both of an appeal and a definition of the American position. The reasons for the disavowal of a political pact under the setting staged by the French have appeared in the press here, but it would be desirable to have them formally and extensively rammed home to the American public. The pronouncement might be in the nature of an appeal for reduction and limitation, stating that these negotiations were undertaken in consequence of the Kellogg Pact, which is already a security pact of the first order; also a strong statement might be added on necessities of the world in the matter of naval arms. Then possibly a statement might be included to the effect that upon some entirely separate occasion when there could be no connection with question of French naval armament, the Government of the United States would be prepared to take part, as occasions arise, in investigatory processes, which would be for the general purpose of establishing public opinion but for no purpose of sanctions.
If it is your belief that such a statement as sketched would be advantageous, it is highly desirable that you formulate broad lines of it and send it to us.
(3) We assume that you still expect to draft a five-power treaty on humanization of use of submarines; in that regard, it does not seem to us to be important whether or not departure from the form of the Washington Treaty be made, nor do we believe that articles III and IV of that treaty are of real importance.