500.A15a3/749: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received March 13—1:05 p.m.]
133. To be repeated to Tokyo.78
The following is the present situation: We have stood firm against allotting more than 108,400 tons of 8-inch-gun cruisers to Japan but our offer has been to defer until 1933, 1934, and 1935, respectively, the laying down of our last three cruisers. The offer of the Japanese has been to limit their 8-inch-gun cruisers to twelve in number, but they requested the privilege before 1936 of replacing the Furutaka class with 10,000-ton ships. Reed was told by Matsudaira that this had been suggested by you in Tokyo and in Washington. Reed’s reply was that there must have been a misunderstanding.
We have stood fast at the present Japanese tonnage of 98,415 tons of 6-inch cruisers except when we agreed, in a talk between Stimson and Wakatsuki on Wednesday, to ascertain what view regarding a possible increase of Japanese 6-inch cruisers to 108,000 tons would be held by our Navy. Having discovered the bitter opposition of the Navy and the majority of our delegates to this increase, we are informing the Japanese delegates of its impossibilities today.
The Japanese appear satisfied with 97,500 tons of destroyers and the allotment of this much is agreeable to us.
Reed has held out in talks with Matsudaira for 60,000 tons of American submarines against 52,700 tons of Japanese, but yesterday in the Stimson-Wakatsuki talk it was intimated that parity at 52,700 might be acceptable. The Japanese would be satisfied with this we believe.
Particularly with regard to the French is the Conference situation at this moment critical. If Japan cannot agree with us within a few days, MacDonald has agreed with Stimson that we will prepare a two-power treaty establishing parity with Great Britain and America in auxiliary categories of fleets by which competitive building in them would be ended. The battleship program of the Washington Treaty will not be modified by this treaty since we will not do that unless by a treaty covering all categories in which Japan joins. You can readily see how favorable, in view of French difficulties, will be the public reaction in America and Great Britain if a three-power treaty covering all categories including battleships can be joined by Japan. An unfortunate effect correspondingly would [Page 61] be caused by a Japanese refusal to join. It is essential to have an early decision.
That we have gone to the limit to accommodate Japan should be impressed upon Shidehara. The increase in speed limit of exempt vessels from 18 to 20 knots has been reluctantly agreed to by us. Maximum submarine displacement has been raised from 1,800 to 2,000 tons. Japan has been conceded the right to build two 5,000-ton minelayers in the special class, and we have agreed to allow her to retain in the special class for use as training ships five old cruisers of 43,690 tons. Parity in submarines and particularly 70 percent in 6-inch-gun cruisers has been agreed to by us. An agreement is impossible on the 70 percent ratio 8-inch-gun cruisers, as it would not be acceptable to Great Britain and our Senate. We can go no further.
- Transmitted to the Embassy in Japan as Department’s telegram No. 46, March 13, 2 p.m.↩