500.A15a3/747: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received March 12—5:25 p.m.]
128. Your No. 198, March 11, 4 p.m. I had already had a conference with the press yesterday afternoon at which time I explained our position to them as to political pacts. I pointed out that America is already a party to many pacts which make consultations obligatory and that our objection to a consultative pact was not because of [Page 58] its nature; that it was because the French would naturally feel, under the circumstances in which the proposed pact is presented, that it is an equivalent for their abandoned naval strength and they may claim reimbursement in kind in an emergency. All our best American reporters were present and they expressed themselves as understanding our position and as much gratified at having it explained to them.
MacDonald will not resign, though he lost an important vote in the House of Commons last night. His position has caused us some apprehension for some time for fear of a possible slip-up. It is quite possible that the Conservative leaders, though they are anxious to permit him to finish the Conference, might, by accident, lose control of their own followers.
I have come to the conclusion that both for the reason of the possible eventuality just mentioned and as a tactical maneuver against the delays which we are suffering from Japanese and French sources, we should proceed, therefore, with the drafting of a two-power treaty with Great Britain. I discussed the matter with MacDonald this morning, and he agreed with me. He also told me that he had specific information that the delays we have encountered during the past week with the Japanese were instigated by the French. Consequently, I had a conference with Wakatsuki this morning; after some further futile negotiations over figures, I told him that the adverse vote in the House of Commons last night had troubled me greatly, and that I was proceeding to close up with MacDonald. Although my statement was made under the usual pledge of secrecy, what I said will probably leak out and I advise you of it so that you may be prepared to back us up at home.
The proposed two-power treaty might cover all categories but carry a provision that the sections which relate to reductions under the Washington Treaty would not become effective unless and until a treaty with Japan is made by both Great Britain and the United States to cover all categories of fleets. An immediate treaty for a battleship equivalent or reduction between the British and ourselves would be just what the Japanese would most like, of course, as it would permit them to economize on battleship replacements and yet leave them free to proceed with their auxiliary construction.
Negotiations between Alexander for the British and Dumesnil77 for the French with reference to the respective fleet figures are continuing, with Morrow sitting in. Alexander has been patient in handling the situation and has spoken very plainly to the French, but the latter are unyielding. Last evening he made them the offer [Page 59] of 66,000 tons in submarines, that figure being the amount remaining in 1936 if they ceased all new construction. Dumesnil stated in reply that such figures were not even inside the zone of possible negotiation.
Tardieu is coming to London for the week end.
- Jacques-Louis Dumesnil, Minister of Marine in the French Ministry formed by Tardieu on March 2, 1930.↩