033.4111 MacDonald, Ramsay/95⅕
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
[
Washington
,] October 7, 1929.
Memorandum of Trip to Rapidan,
October 5th to 7th
I left Washington about 2:30 with Sir Robert Vansittart and R. L.
Craigie.3 We arrived about six o’clock at
the camp. On the way we discussed:
I. The assistance required for
prohibition enforcement.
They said this would be very difficult as it required legislation. They
were willing to do everything that could be done without legislation. At
the camp the Prime Minister confirmed this and said they would do
everything possible and he included a treaty, which could be ratified
more easily than legislation, as something they would be willing to
do.
II. Free food supply.
When I put this to them the first time they took it rather, on the whole,
favorably. Vansittart suggested that free food ships would not be any
good to England unless accompanied by free ports. I answered with the
suggestion that this could be accomplished in the same way that we
protected Red Cross ships and hospitals; they could be given separate
ports or separate portions of ports and be exempted from bombing
parties. I repeated the conversations to the President that evening at
camp and he adopted the analogy of Red Cross supplies. I don’t think he
had heard it before.
The evening was spent in general conversation until ten o’clock when the
President and Mrs. Hoover retired. Afterwards we remained [Page 4] talking with the British Party but
without taking up anything special.
Sunday, at nine o’clock, immediately after breakfast, we began a full
discussion; the President, the Prime Minister, Craigie, Vansittart and
myself. It was an informal but interesting discussion, with the
President and I sitting on one side of the fire and the others on the
other side, taking up the subjects in the following order, the President
leading the conversation, of course.
I. Assistance in preventing shipments
of liquors and narcotics from Great Britain to America.
We proposed reciprocal action forbidding the clearance of ships loaded
with cargoes of goods forbidden to enter either country, liquor and
narcotics for us, and narcotics for Great Britain. (Note: On my talk with Craigie and Vansittart coming down they
had suggested that the existing machinery of liaison between the two
countries under which Great Britain notified us of any shipments of
narcotics to this country might be considerably improved by better
cooperation. This was brought up in this conference.) Informally it was
agreed that at some future date representatives of both countries would
meet to discuss the method of assisting in the enforcement of the
prohibition and narcotic laws. The Prime Minister confirmed his
associates’ statements that the punishment of false clearances would
require legislation. They all admitted the objections to legislation
would not apply to a treaty with the same strength.
II. Freedom of the seas.
This matter was carefully discussed with the reasons for it on our side
and the dangers on theirs. I made as strong a presentation as I could of
the importance of it to Great Britain and to the naval question. The
President said it must come as an offer from us to Great Britain. The
proposal finally boiled down to the recommendation that the matter
should be examined into by jurists and then the President should make a
statement, off his own bat, in favor of free food ships, with the Prime
Minister to follow by another public statement; the President’s
statement to be incorporated in our general announcement of the results
of the Prime Minister’s visit. The Prime Minister analyzed the political
situation in England as follows: Labor would support such a proposition;
the Liberals would support it; the young Conservatives would support it;
the old Conservatives would oppose it; the Naval people would oppose it;
unorganized public opinion, in general, would be suspicious of it.
Afterwards, Vansittart told me that the Prime Minister had been
overoptimistic in his opinion; that it would be much more generally
opposed than he thought. Craigie said that the Committee of Imperial
Defense had been discussing the general subject “in and out” for two
years. [Page 5] They felt pretty clearly
that there was great danger of the matter causing an unfavorable
reaction unless it was presented just right. If presented just right
they agreed with us that it would command British support. For this
reason they opposed the use in the first announcement of the expression
“freedom of the seas” as this was associated in the British mind with
attacks on their navy. Craigie suggested instead “rights and immunities
at sea during war”.
III. The Kellogg Pact.
Throughout the talk it was agreed by everybody, and in fact, kept coming
up for re-affirmation constantly, that the enactment of the Kellogg
Pact4 created a new starting point for international
negotiations for the preservation of peace.
IV. Amendment of the Kellogg
Pact.
The President brought up the memorandum which he had dictated embodying
his latest views on the proposition which Cotton5
and I had been urging on him of getting a new starting point by which
all nations could agree on stamping out the conflagration of war and
preventing it.6 I had brought up Philip Kerr’s article in Foreign Affairs for October and gave it to the
Prime Minister to read. He knew of Kerr’s view and told me he agreed
with him; I told him that I also agreed with him. He read the article
while he was there and said he agreed with it.
The President was opposed to our proposition that any outside nation had
a right to interfere in this subject of preventing a conflagration of
war because of the political opposition which it would excite against
having officious countries butt into our affairs. Ho stressed the point
of view that the essence of our proposal should be that the parties to
the controversy were entitled to have it investigated by a commission of
their own choosing and on which they were represented. The memorandum
which he presented embodied both our views. The question of whether it
should be presented as an amendment to the Kellogg Pact was also argued.
I had pointed out the danger of offending Mr. Briand7 by an
attempted amendment of his treaty and this difficulty was recognized in
the conference.
The President’s memorandum was talked over very fully during the morning
and again in the evening. In this discussion these points came out very
clearly: [Page 6]
- First. The two separate amendments which we were trying to
cover, both of which we agreed were important:
- (a)
- that either of the disputants should have the right to
present his case to world opinion through a Commission
on which he was represented;
- (b)
- in case neither disputant did so, that a neutral
nation was interested in stopping the conflagration of
war and should be allowed to do so.
- Second. The difficulties which gradually emerged were that
nearly all other nations are members of the League of Nations
where the Council has the right to impose a conciliation with
sanctions.
Again, there are many separate conciliation treaties between various
nations which cover point (a) above. If we should
propose a general multilateral treaty covering both (a) and (b) the nations who were members
of the League would not be interested in doing it for us. Yet there is
great need that it should be done in order to bring the great influence
of the United States effectively to bear upon the settlement of
controversies despite the fact that she is not a member and will not
join the League. Also the general trend of public opinion now is in
favor of the method of the Kellogg Pact of an appeal to world opinion
rather than the method of the League with an appeal to force, after an
investigation by a Superior Council.
After all these points had been discussed late in the evening we decided
that, owing to these objections, it was unsafe to use this subject as
one of the announcements of our meetings.
On the way home Monday morning driving with the President and MacDonald,
I asked MacDonald whether, in case I should succeed in avoiding these
difficulties and in negotiating successfully with Briand for a general
pact would he, MacDonald, support it. He replied: “With open arms”.
V. Naval Bases.
The President presented our proposition to divide the world into two
hemispheres in the western one of which the British will not maintain
naval or military stations which are a menace to us and in the eastern
one of which we shall not maintain such bases which are a menace to
them. They said that they were certain their existing bases in the
western hemisphere were not fortified enough to constitute such a
menace. It was agreed that only armament should be affected and not
supplies or repairs. They were willing that the armament should extend
only to the ability to stand off raids of privateers and to do ordinary
police work against internal troubles. Finally it was decided that the
best way was to have our General Board advise us as to the truth of the
British statement that their bases are thus innocuous and then to have
them agree not to increase them so that [Page 7] they would become a menace to us. In the eastern
hemisphere I pointed out the existence of the Pacific Treaty8 and the danger of making a new covenant within
the scope of that treaty, particularly in reference to regulation in
relation to Hawaii and Japan, and they agreed.
During the morning conference I suggested to the President that we send
for Cotton and he arrived after luncheon at about two thirty.
After the morning conference, at about eleven o’clock we went for a walk
and on our return at one o’clock the President and I retired and the
President, with my assistance, dictated a memorandum which was used as
the basis of the afternoon’s conference and which covered the subjects
discussed in the morning. This is attached and marked “A” with red
pencil. The interlineations are in the President’s handwriting.9 This was used as the basis
of the afternoon conference. In the afternoon we went over it and then
Cotton and I retired and dictated a new memorandum. A copy of this
memorandum is attached marked “B” with red pencil. The interlineations
on it are in my own handwriting.9 This was discussed all evening. Then we decided
that we would eliminate the point about the amendment of the Kellogg
Pact (marked I) in view of the difficulties above discussed, and modify
the whole thing so as to confine it to the relations of the United
States and Great Britain.
During our absence from the room two other memoranda were drafted by the
President and they are attached hereto marked with red pencil “C” and
“D”.
[Annex A]
Memorandum by President Hoover
We have engaged in an examination of the broad questions of
reinforcing the peace of the world. The situation in the world has
been importantly altered in consequence of the pact of Paris. The
declaration of that pact, “that the world has renounced war as an
instrument of national policy[”] and its undertaking that settlement
or solution of disputes and conflicts of whatever origin shall never
be sought except by pacific means re-orients all problems: of
peace.
One of the important consequences is to reduce the purpose and use of
military and naval power solely to that of national defense and to
emphasize the necessity for removal of international friction. It is
imperative to re-examine the international situation in these lights
and to seek further means for the pacific settlement of
international controversies, and measures in reduction of
international frictions.
[Page 8]
In the furtherance of practical application of these ideas, we have
examined the possibility of the extension of the pact of Paris to
strengthen measures against the outbreak of war and to reinforce the
machinery of pacific settlement of controversies.
I
We are united in the feeling that an advance step could be taken in
development of pacific means for the settlement of controversies if
an article, to be called “Article 3” could be added to the pact of
Paris to the effect that in event of any controversy in which
satisfactory settlement is not made by direct negotiation or agreed
reference to arbitration or judicial decision, such controversy
shall be investigated by a commission to be selected by the parties
to the controversy, upon which commission the parties shall be
represented together with impartial members; this commission to
examine all the facts concerning the controversy, to endeavor to
conciliate the difficulties and to publish the facts; that
suggestion of the desirability of such action by nations strangers
to the controversy would not be considered an unfriendly act.
In the field of reduction of international friction we have examined
the broad problems of naval reduction and limitation. We have
further examined the question of limitation upon construction of
military bases and we have examined the question usually referred to
under the heading of “freedom of the seas”.
(Rights and immunities at sea during war)
(Merchant trading during time of war)
The state of peace is recognized as normal by the Pact of Paris and
war is outlawed. All nations have a legitimate interest in the
preservation of peace, and all are injured by a breach of peace.
The United States, in numerous treaties of conciliation with the
leading powers of Europe, in treaties with the Pan American nations,
in its adhesion to the Hague treaties, has already accepted these
principles. The covenant of the League of Nations provides that the
counsel [Council?] of the League shall make
such inquiry among its members. The principles of this suggestion,
therefore, have been widely agreed to by the nations of the
world.
This proposal however differentiates itself from those hitherto in
that it would extend the number of nations adhering to these ideas;
it undertakes to secure action by initiative of the parties to the
controversy themselves; to secure to each nation the right to have
the facts determined and an appeal to public opinion, and to arouse
world opinion and world conscience that the facts shall be
determined.
[Page 9]
II
Naval Reduction and
Limitation
One of the primary necessities of the world for the maintenance of
peace is the elimination of the frictions which arise from
competitive armament and the further necessity to reduce armament in
economic relief to the peoples of the world. The negotiations which
have taken place between the United States and Great Britain have
been based upon a desire on both sides to find solution to their
peculiar problems which have hitherto stood in the way of world
agreement on this question.
The negotiations which have taken place during the past three months
have resulted in such an approximation of views as has warranted the
calling of a conference of the leading naval powers10 in the belief that
at such a conference all views can be reconciled. (Between ourselves
we have agreed upon parity, category by category as a great
instrument for removing the competition between us.) All the
reconsideration of capital ship replacement programs provided in the
Washington Arms Treaty,11 the limitation and reduction in the
categories of cruisers, destroyers and submarines, yield strong hope
of final agreement, and it has been agreed that we shall continue to
mutually examine these questions involved prior to the conference.
And we shall continue to exchange views upon questions and
concurrently discuss these views with the other naval powers.
III
With further view to reducing friction and to minimize the
possibility of conflicts, we believe that we should agree that Great
Britain should not establish new or maintain fortified military
bases in the Western Hemisphere, such area to be defined as that
portion of the globe lying west of say 25° meridian to the 180°
meridian, or thereabouts; and that the United States on the other
hand should not establish or maintain military bases in the Eastern
Hemisphere, except so far as that provided in the pacific treaties
of 1922—the Eastern Hemisphere for this purpose to be defined as
that area of the globe lying east of the 25° meridian to the 180°
meridian.
IV
We recognize that one of the most troublesome questions in
international relations is that of freedom of the seas. (Some other
expression [Page 10] to be
substituted). Not only does this subject arouse fear and stimulate
naval preparation, but it is one of the pregnant causes of expansion
of the area of war once it may have broken out, by dragging other
nations in as the result of controversies with belligerents.
Misunderstandings arising out of these questions have been the most
pregnant cause of controversies in the past between our two
countries. We have resolved therefore that we will examine this
question fully and frankly.
The President proposes, and he hopes the American people would
support the proposal, that food ships should be declared free from
interference during times of war, and thus to remove starvation of
women and children from the weapons of warfare. That would reduce
the necessity for naval arms in protection of avenues of food
supplies. Such a proposal goes wider than the rights of neutrals in
times of war and would protect from interference all vessels solely
laden with food supplies in the same fashion that we now immunize
hospital and medical supplies.
[Annex B]
Memorandum by the Secretary of State and the
Under Secretary of State (Cotton)
We have engaged in an examination of the broad question of what steps
are involved in re-enforcing the peace of the world. The situation
has been vitally altered in consequence of the pact of Paris.
The declaration of that pact, that the nations of the world have
renounced war as an instrument of national policy and have
undertaken to settle all disputes and conflicts of whatever origin,
by pacific means, furnishes a new starting point for all the
problems of peace.
[By agreement upon this pact, the underlying causes which have led to
competition in armaments, are ended and one of the great causes of
war is eliminated.]12 It
is therefore now imperative to re-examine the international
situation in this light in order that we may find measures to
strengthen pacific means to settle international controversies, to
reduce international friction and thus prevent other causes which
might still lead to war.
[Page 11]
I13
By the pact of Paris, it is recognized that in the public opinion of
the world today the condition of peace is normal and the condition
of war outlawed. Thus public opinion has become a new and vital
factor underlying every international controversy. It is important
to either party in every such controversy where the difficulty
cannot be settled by direct negotiation or by an agreed reference to
arbitration or judicial decision, that the dispute be impartially
investigated and the facts thus brought out laid before the public
opinion of the world, in order to secure for a righteous cause the
support of the world’s approval.
Even before the ratification of the Pact of Paris, the United States
had proposed and bound itself by this method in numerous treaties of
conciliation with the leading powers of Europe and in recent
treaties with other American nations. The Covenant of the League of
Nations also provides that the Council of the League may make such
inquiries and investigations among its members. The importance and
value of this method of resolving differences has thus been widely
accepted by the nations of the world.
It seems wise, therefore, that this right of a disputant nation to
appeal to the public opinion of the world should be made universal.
By a general treaty like the pact of peace, the disputant should
have the right to call for the creation of an impartial commission,
formed for this purpose, on which both sides should be represented,
to investigate and report upon the facts of the controversy.
Furthermore, as other nations have a legitimate interest in the
preservation of peace, and may be injured or endangered by a breach
thereof, they also, in cases where the usual means provided by
treaties for direct negotiations or arbitral or judicial settlements
are not invoked, should have the right to urge and require that such
an investigation be made and the public opinion of the world be
informed.
It may well be found that this end may be most appropriately
accomplished by a third article to the pact of peace.
II
The most important concrete step to insure peace is to stop the race
of competitive armament with its train of fear and friction and its
economic burden on the people of the world. The negotiations which
have taken place between the United States and Great Britain during
[Page 12] the past summer have
been based upon the desire of both sides to find a solution for the
problems peculiar to them, which have hitherto stood in the way of
world agreement on this question. These negotiations have resulted
in such an approximation of views as to warrant the issue of
invitations to a conference of the leading naval powers in the
belief that the way is now prepared for a general agreement on naval
reduction.
We have agreed upon the principle of parity between our two navies,
category by category, believing that such an agreement alone will
prevent competition in naval armaments between our two
countries.
We have also agreed, if the other signatories are in accord, to a
reconsideration of the capital ship replacement program provided in
the Washington Arms Treaty; to limitation of cruisers and reduction
in the categories of destroyers and submarines, and that we shall
continue to mutually examine these questions prior to the
conference, in the hope of achieving further reduction.
We shall continue to exchange views upon these questions and to
concurrently discuss these views with the other naval powers.
III
With the further view to reducing fear and the friction that comes
from fear, we have obtained the opinion of our General Board of the
Navy, that the existing military and naval stations of Great Britain
in the Western Hemisphere are not in a condition to be a menace to
the U. S.
Great Britain will not hereafter establish any military or naval
stations in her possessions in the Western Hemisphere nor alter any
such existing stations in such a way as in either case to become a
menace to the United States.
Reciprocally, the United States makes the same agreement as to the
Eastern Hemisphere.
It is understood however by both of us that the above declaration
does not supersede or alter the provisions of Article XIX of the
Washington Treaty of 1922 for the Limitation of Naval Armament.
Such Western Hemisphere is to be defined as that portion of the globe
lying west of the 25th meridian and east of the 180th meridian. The
Eastern Hemisphere is the remainder of the globe.
IV
We recognize that one of the most vexed questions in international
relations is that of rights and immunities at sea during war.
The controversies and disputes engendered by this subject have in the
past been pregnant with the danger of aggravating or extending [Page 13] hostilities.
Misunderstandings and fears arising from this source have been a
frequent but we believe avoidable cause of friction between our two
countries.
We have resolved, therefore, that we will examine this question fully
and frankly.
The President hopes that food ships shall be declared free from
interference in times of war, thus removing the starvation of women
and children from the weapons of warfare, and reducing the necessity
for naval arms for the protection of avenues of food supplies. Such
a proposal would protect all vessels laden solely with food supplies
in the same fashion that hospital ships are now protected.
[Annex C]
Memorandum by President Hoover
Preparatory to the January conference it is agreed that we shall
further examine the following questions:
Capital ships
The British to formulate suggestions for replacement by ships
limited to 12-inch guns, 25,000 tons.
The United States to formulate proposals for the deferment of
replacements for a period of 5 years and for the dropping
out of certain replacements altogether.
Cruisers
The United States to formulate a suggestion for creation of a
class of police cruisers to be comprised of cruisers not in
excess [omission?].
Destroyers
It is suggested that the maximum destroyer strength of each
nation should be approximately . . . . . . . tons.
Submarines
While our action must be governed entirely by the attitude of
the other powers, we suggest a maximum of . . . . . . . tons
for submarines. We would, of course, be glad to abolish them
altogether.
[Annex D]
Memorandum by President Hoover
We have reviewed the questions particularly affecting the United
States and Great Britain in naval reduction and limitation. The
following is the position of negotiations:
Battle Ships
We have agreed to continue the examination of how far we can
defer or drop or modify the replacements required by the
Washington Arms Treaty.
[Page 14]
Cruisers
We have agreed to continue the examination of the cruiser
category with view to reducing the gross tonnage previously
stated for this category.
Destroyers
We have agreed that the maximum tonnage for destroyers should
be 190,000 tons but we shall further examine this with the
intention of reduction at the conference.
Submarines
We are prepared to abolish all submarines. We shall, however,
need to establish a tonnage at the conference based upon
that required by other powers.
These accomplishments promise definite reduction in existing tonnage
and prospective programs of the two countries.
As soon as the conference has been fixed we propose to exchange views
with the other naval powers upon similar questions in a desire to
advance problems as far as possible prior to the conference.
