033.4111MacDonald, Ramsay/95⅖

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

Memorandum of Papers Drawn Up During Prime Minister MacDonald’s Visit

When we came down from Rapidan we used as a basis the memoranda “A” and “B” attached to my memorandum of October 7. Mr. Cotton drafted a memorandum which is annexed hereto marked I.

From this memorandum the President, on Monday afternoon,14 drafted another memorandum, according to my recollection, while I was at work with Mr. Adams15 over the vagaries of the General Board. I went over the President’s memorandum on that afternoon with him while Mr. Cotton went down to see the General Board. The President’s original memorandum is not attached. Then the Prime Minister took the President’s memorandum and on the basis of it that night produced another memorandum which is attached, marked I–a.

After he produced I–a the Prime Minister got alarmed about making any reference to the President’s statement on food ships and there was produced II.

In the meantime I was at work on the President’s food ship idea and made a revision of it, marked II–a.

He16 accepted substantially as embodied in II–b.

[Page 15]

Tuesday night he was getting more troubled about public opinion and getting frightened about the naval station point, but at the British Ambassador’s dinner he told me what he thought he could do in respect to that. I got up at six o’clock Wednesday morning and drafted the penciled paper attached, marked III. At 7:20 I telephoned to Vansittart my version of what the Prime Minister was willing to do on the naval base point. I stopped at the British Embassy on my way downtown and found the Prime Minister had receded again from III and was at work on a carbon of draft II. He came in and brought me a draft of II with his amendments in his handwriting. I had a pretty thorough talk with the Prime Minister at that time and made up my mind he could not do any more than he proposed without danger of disrupting his government and destroying what we were hoping for.

I then went to the White House with II with the Prime Minister’s amendments on it. I went over it with the President, putting in the things which are in my handwriting, and then at 12:15 the Prime Minister, Vansittart and Craigie came in and the communique for the press was agreed on substantially upon the basis of II as amended.

The President afterwards sent me over a letter, dated October 9, with memoranda on the two subjects which had thus been omitted: military stations and food ships. This letter is attached with its enclosures as IV.

Later that afternoon the President sent for me and read me a memorandum which he had made of his conversations with the Prime Minister on the subject of the enforcement of prohibition, which, after my criticisms, was sent to Mr. MacDonald.17

The communique for the press is attached here as V in the form which Cotton and I went over with Craigie after the 12:15 White House conference. In this form it was given to Mr. Akerson18 to be multigraphed.

I also attach hereto a memorandum dated Sunday, October 6, 1929, containing the results of the President’s discussions with MacDonald and Craigie on the subject of the cruisers, at Rapidan. This is marked VI.

There is also attached the President’s note of October 1 containing some of his preliminary memoranda in regard to the various matters which were to be discussed at Rapidan. This is marked VII.

There is attached as VIII a memorandum, my first one, scratched up by the President, on the principle of trying to work out the Kellogg Pact amendment mentioned in my memorandum of October 7.

[Page 16]

Today, October 9, in our discussion at the Embassy, Craigie, who was very anxious to have added to our communique in some form, the Pact of Peace amendment, made the draft which I have marked IX and attached hereto.

In a telephone conversation this morning the President suggested that his statement on food supplies could be given out by Mr. MacDonald after he left Washington with the enclosed memorandum marked X. I proposed this to MacDonald at the Embassy this morning when I was there between 10 and 10:30 and he at first accepted it and was going to do it, but after consultation with Vansittart decided that it was too dangerous in view of his later telegrams from London.

I attach also miscellaneous copies of some of these papers which I have not had time to sort out and which I have marked “x”.19

[Annex I]

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Cotton)

By the Pact of Paris the nations of the world renounced war as an instrument of national policy. The United States and Great Britain completely accept that renunciation. As regards each other they have resolved that henceforth it is axiomatic that war between the two countries is unthinkable. That basic conclusion has been the chief point in the consultations which have been proceeding between the Prime Minister and the President. To emphasize that conclusion has been the main purpose of the Prime Minister’s visit to the United States. During the consultations they have reviewed the concrete measures which, in the light of that conclusion, may be wisely taken by the two countries to prevent friction and differences between them.

Naval Disarmament

The most important concrete step to insure peace is to stop the race of competitive naval armament with its train of fear and friction and its economic burden on the peoples of the world. The negotiations which have taken place between the United States and Great Britain during the past summer have been based upon the desire of both countries to find solution for the problems peculiar to them which have hitherto stood in the way of world agreement on this question. The negotiations have resulted in such an approximation of views as warrants the issue of invitations to a conference of the leading naval powers in the belief that the way is now prepared [Page 17]for a general agreement on naval reduction. In the negotiations the two countries have agreed on the principle of parity between them in the belief that thus alone can they end competition between them in naval armament. They have also agreed, if the other signatories be in accord, to a reconsideration of the capital ship replacement program provided in the Washington Arms Treaty.

The exchange of information and views between the Prime Minister and the President in person during the last few days has resulted in a better understanding of the needs and the problems of the two Governments in regard to naval armament, and it is clear that such differences as still remain may be safely left to be disposed of in the conference. In preparation for the conference the two countries will continue to exchange views and information with each other and concurrently with the other naval powers who are invited to the conference.

Rights and Immunities at Sea

It is recognized that some of the most troublesome questions in international relations are those arising out of rights and immunities at sea during war. The controversies and disputes engendered by this subject have in the past been pregnant with the danger of aggravating or extending hostilities. The misunderstandings and fears arising from this source have been a frequent, but it is believed an avoidable, cause of friction between the two countries. It is resolved, therefore, that this question should be fully and frankly examined.

The President hopes that food-ships will be declared free from interference in time of war, thus removing starvation of women and children from the weapons of war and reducing the necessity for naval arms for the protection of avenues of food supplies. Such a proposal would protect all vessels laden solely with food supplies in the same way that hospital ships are now protected.

[Annex I–a]

Memorandum by the British Prime Minister (MacDonald)

During the last few days we have had an opportunity not only to review the conversations on a naval agreement which have been carried on during this summer between representatives of the United States and Great Britain, but also to discuss some of the more important means by which the moral force of our countries can be exerted for peace. We have been guided by the double hope of settling our own differences on naval matters and so establishing [Page 18]unclouded good-will, candour and confidence between us, and also of contributing something to the solution of the problem of peace in which all other nations are interested and which calls for their cooperation.

In signing the Paris Peace Pact we and 56 other nations have declared that war shall not be used as an instrument of national policy. We have agreed that all disputes shall be settled by pacific means. Both our Governments resolve to accept the Peace Pact not only as a declaration of good intentions but as a positive obligation to direct national policy in accordance with its pledge.

The part of each of our governments in the promotion of world peace will be different, as one will never consent to become entangled in European diplomacy and the other is resolved to pursue a policy of active cooperation with its European neighbours; but both of our governments will direct their thoughts and influence towards securing and maintaining the peace of the world.

Our conversations have been largely confined to the mutual relations of the two countries in the light of the situation created by the signing of the Peace Pact. Therefore, in a new and reinforced sense the two governments not only declare that war between them is unthinkable, but that distrusts and suspicions arising from doubts and fears which may have been justified before the Peace Pact must now cease to influence national policy. We approach old historical problems from a new angle and in a new atmosphere. On the assumption that war between us is banished, and that conflicts between our military or naval forces cannot take place, these problems have changed their meaning and character, and their solution, in ways satisfactory to both countries, has become possible.

The exchange of views on naval reduction has brought the two nations so close to agreement that failure seems now out of the question. We have kept the nations which took part in the Washington Naval Conference of 1922 informed of the progress of our conversations, and we have now proposed to them that we should all meet together and try to come to a common agreement which would justify each in making substantial naval reductions. An Anglo-American agreement on naval armaments cannot be completed without the cooperation of other naval powers, and both of us feel sure that, by the same free and candid discussion of needs which has characterized our conversations, such mutual understandings will be reached as will make a world agreement possible and pave the way for the long delayed larger world conference on disarmament.

Between now and the meeting of the proposed conference in January, our governments will continue conversations with the other powers concerned, in order to remove as many difficulties as possible before the official and formal negotiations open.

[Page 19]

In view of the security afforded by the Peace Pact, we have been able to end, we trust for ever, all competitive building between ourselves with the risk of war and the waste of public money involved, by agreeing to a parity of fleets, category by category.

We have already initiated steps for the reduction of our own naval programmes. We propose that between ourselves and the other naval powers we shall, before the conference, consider how far the replacement battleship programmes set out in the Washington Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament can be deferred or dropped or modified; re-examine the cruiser category, which for the moment produces special difficulties, with a view to fixing the gross tonnage at its lowest possible level; and suggest a very considerable reduction of tonnage used for destroyers. Further, we agree that whilst ourselves prepared to abolish all submarines, we realise that we must meet the views of the other naval powers, but we shall negotiate with them so as to try and effect reductions by mutual agreement.

Success at the coming conference will result in a large decrease in the naval equipment of the world and, what is equally important, the reduction of prospective programmes of construction which would result in competitive building to an indefinite amount.

Two questions which cannot be dissociated from any satisfactory agreement between America and Great Britain have also been discussed and methods of dealing with them suggested.

The first relates to fortified stations which are apt to be made the subject of a propaganda of fear from which friction is likely to arise.

The General Board of the United States Navy have put their opinion on record that the existing military and naval stations of Great Britain in the Western Hemisphere are not in their present condition an appreciable menace to the United States.

Great Britain will not hereafter establish any military, naval or military aviation stations in her possessions in the Western Hemisphere nor alter any existing stations in such a way as to become a menace to the United States.

Reciprocally the United States makes the same agreement as to the Eastern Hemisphere.

It is understood, however, by both parties that the above declaration does not alter nor supersede the provisions of Article 19 of the Washington Treaty of 1922 for the Limitation of Naval Armament within the territory covered thereby.

The Western Hemisphere is to be defined as that portion of the globe lying West of the 30 meridian and East of the 170 meridian, and the Eastern Hemisphere as the remainder of the globe. This arrangement may be placed in treaty form if it seems desirable.

[Page 20]

As regards the second point, we recognise that some of the most troublesome questions in our relations are those which have arisen out of rights and immunities at sea during war. The controversies and disputes engendered by this have in the past been pregnant with the danger of aggravating and extending hostilities. Misunderstandings and fears springing from this source have been a frequent, but we believe avoidable, cause of friction between our two countries. We have resolved, therefore, that we shall examine the question fully and frankly together on all its bearings.

[The two paragraphs which follow infra were stricken from the draft, as the Secretary implies in his memorandum of October 9, printed on page 14.]

The President himself hopes that food ships will be declared free from interference in time of war, thus removing the starvation of women and children from the weapons of warfare and reducing the necessity for naval arms to protect avenues of food supplies. His proposal would place all vessels laden solely with food supplies on the same footing as hospital ships.

He takes the view that the accentuated growth of industrialisation during the past half century places countries with populations in excess of their domestic food supply in a peculiarly weak military position, and that protection for overseas supplies has been one of the impelling causes of increasing naval armament. Further, he contends that the economic stability of surplus food-producing countries is to a considerable degree dependent upon keeping the avenues of export open and they in turn consider they must maintain armament to protect such outlets. Moreover, in all naval wars of recent years a large element in strategy by all nations has been to cut off such supplies. He expressed the belief that the time had come for the world to consider the true meaning of such action and to agree that the starvation of civilian populations should not be included in the weapons of war, and that a definite organisation for the protection of food movements in time of war would constitute the most important contribution to the rights of parties whether neutrals or belligerents, as well as a lessening of the pressure for naval strength.

We believe that this cooperation in peacemaking will be warmly welcomed by the peoples whom we represent and be a substantial contribution to the efforts now being universally made to gain security, not by military organisation which has always failed, but by peaceful means rooted in public opinion and enforced by the sense of justice of the civilised world.

[Annex II]

[This annex is not printed. It is the same as annex I-a, supra, except for slight verbal changes and the omission of the two last [Page 21]paragraphs preceding the final paragraph. For annex II as amended, see the joint statement of President Hoover and the British Prime Minister set forth in the statement issued to the press October 10, printed on page 33.]

[Annex II-a]

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

We recognize that some of the most troublesome questions in our relations are those of rights and immunities at sea in times of war. The controversies and disputes engendered by this have in the past been pregnant with danger of aggravating and extending hostilities. Misunderstandings and fears springing from this source have been a frequent, but we believe avoidable, cause of friction between our two countries. We have resolved that we will examine the question fully and frankly together in all its bearing.

The President hopes that it will be possible to suggest to the other powers that all ships laden solely with food shall be made free of any interference in times of war, in some such manner as is now provided for hospital ships, thus removing starvation of women and children from the weapons of warfare and reducing the necessity for naval arms for protection of the overseas lanes of food supplies.

He expressed the view that the rapid growth of an industrial civilization during the past half century has created in many countries populations far in excess of their domestic food supply. As a consequence protection for overseas supplies has been one of the impelling causes of increasing naval armaments. Again, in countries which produce surplus food their economic stability is also to a considerable degree dependent upon keeping open the avenues of their trade in the export of such surplus, and this stimulates armament on their part to protect such outlets. Thus the fear of an interruption in sea-borne food supplies has powerfully tended towards naval development in both importing and exporting nations and in all naval wars of recent years the cutting off or the protection of such supplies has formed a large element in their strategy. He expressed the belief that the time had come for the world to consider the true meaning of this situation and to establish that the starvation of civilian population should not be included among the weapons of warfare. He felt that a definite organization for protection of food movements in time of war would constitute a most important contribution to the rights of parties whether neutrals or belligerents and would greatly tend towards lessening the pressure for naval strength.

[Page 22]
[Annex II-b]

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

The President hopes that it will be possible as one of the results of such examination to suggest to the other powers that food ships shall be made free of any interference in times of war, thus removing starvation of women and children from the weapons of warfare and reducing the necessity for naval arms to protect the overseas lanes of food supplies. His proposal would place all vessels laden solely with food supplies on the same footing as hospital ships.

He expressed the view that the rapid growth of an industrial civilization during the past half century has created in many countries populations far in excess of their domestic food supply and thus peculiarly weakened their military position. As a consequence, protection for overseas supplies has been one of the impelling causes of increasing naval armaments and military alliances. Again, in countries which produce surplus food their economic stability is also to a considerable degree dependent upon keeping open the avenues of their trade in the export of such surplus, and this stimulates armament on their part to protect such outlets. Thus the fear of an interruption in sea-borne food supplies has powerfully tended towards naval development in both importing and exporting nations and in all important wars of recent years the cutting off or the protection of such supplies has formed a large element in the strategy of all combatants. He expressed the belief that the time had come for the world to realize this as one of the underlying causes of the situation and to establish that the starvation of civilian population should not be included among the weapons of warfare. He felt that a definite organization for protection of food movements in time of war would constitute a most important contribution to the rights of parties whether neutrals or belligerents and would greatly tend toward lessening the pressure for naval strength.

[Annex III]

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

To follow the statement about General Board in II.

The Govt of Great Britain stands ready to make this situation permanent, and after consultation with the dominions concerned to undertake by treaty that no military, naval nor military aviation stations shall be maintained in her possessions in the Western Hemisphere in such a way as to become a menace to the United States.

In those portions of the Eastern Hemisphere where our territories come into proximity the provisions of Article 19 of the Washington [Page 23]Treaty of 1922 for the Limitation of Naval Armament already apply.

[Annex IV20]

President Hoover to the Secretary of State

My Dear Mr. Secretary: I send you herewith copies of my memoranda on the two subjects—Military Stations, and Freedom of the Seas—and in addition, a copy of the revised edition of the food statement which I gave to Mr. MacDonald this morning.

I transmit these to you in order that we may check up to see that we have the same record.

Yours faithfully,

Herbert Hoover
[Enclosure 1—Memorandum]

Army, Navy, and Military Aviation Stations

The General Board of the United States Navy have put their opinion on record that the existing military and naval stations of Great Britain in the Western Hemisphere are not in their present condition an appreciable menace to the United States.

Great Britain will not hereafter establish any military, naval or military aviation stations in her possessions in the Western Hemisphere nor alter any existing stations in such a way as to become a menace to the United States.

Reciprocally, the United States makes the same agreement as to the Eastern Hemisphere.

It is understood, however, by both parties that the above declaration does not alter nor supersede the provisions of Article 19 of the Washington Treaty of 1922 for the Limitation of Naval Armament within the territory covered therein.

The Western Hemisphere is to be defined as that portion of the globe lying West of the 30 meridian and East of the 170 meridian, and the Eastern Hemisphere as the remainder of the globe. This arrangement may be placed in treaty form if it seems desirable.

[Enclosure 2—Memorandum]

Rights and Immunities at Sea During War

As regards the second point, we recognize that some of the most troublesome questions in our relations are those which have arisen out of rights and immunities at sea during war. The controversies and [Page 24]disputes engendered by this have in the past been pregnant with the danger of aggravating and extending hostilities. Misunderstandings and fears springing from this source have been a frequent, but we believe avoidable, cause of friction between our two countries. We have resolved, therefore, that in the light of the new situation created by the Pact of Paris, we shall examine the question fully and frankly together on all its bearings.

[Enclosure 3]

Statement Regarding Food Ships

The President has made the informal suggestion that food ships should be made free of any interference in times of war, thus removing starvation of women and children from the weapons of warfare and decreasing the necessity for naval arms for protection of the overseas lanes of food supplies. His suggestion would place all vessels laden solely with food supplies on the same footing as hospital ships.

He expressed the view that the rapid growth of industrial civilization during the past half century has created in many countries populations far in excess of their domestic food supply and thus steadily weakened their natural defenses. As a consequence, protection for overseas supplies has been one of the impelling causes of increasing naval armaments and military alliances. Again, in countries which produce surplus food their economic stability is also to a considerable degree dependent upon keeping open the avenues of their trade in the export of such surplus, and this again stimulates armament on their part to protect such outlets. Thus the fear of an interruption in seaborne food supplies has powerfully tended towards naval development in both importing and exporting nations. And in all important wars of recent years to cut off or to protect such supplies has formed a large element in the strategy of all combatants. He expressed the belief that the world must sooner or later realize this as one of the underlying causes of its armed situation. And further, that steps should be taken that starvation should not be included among the weapons of warfare. He felt that definite organization under neutral auspices for protection of food movements in time of war would constitute a most important contribution to the rights of parties, whether neutrals or belligerents and would greatly tend toward lessening the pressure for naval strength.

The President recognizes that such a suggestion could become practicable only by world-wide revision of existing treaties and the international understandings among many nations, and only after further realignment of world thought which should flow from the Paris Peace Pact.

[Page 25]
[Annex V]

[This final draft of the joint statement by President Hoover and the British Prime Minister is set forth in the statement issued to the press October 10, printed on page 33.]

[Annex VI]

Memorandum by President Hoover

Mr. MacDonald explained to me that he thought he could devise a program which would maintain 50 cruisers for the British Navy and still result in a reduction of gross tonnage by some 14,000 tons He asked how this would affect our views.

I told him it would of course affect our views to the extent of this tonnage. I requested the details of the ships and these were furnished to me by Mr. Craigie. I then calculated the valuation of Mr. MacDonald’s new proposal by the General Board’s formula with the following results:

Mr. MacDonald’s New Proposal

Units Gross General Board Valuation
15 8-inch 146,800 135,565
21 old 6-inch 101,480 64,961
2 old 6-inch 9,000 6,000
7 new 6-inch (6500) 45,500 (6500) 43,680
5 new 6-inch (4500) 22,500 (4500) 21,000
325,280 271,206
Mr. MacDonald’s former proposal 339,280 287,886
Reduction 14,000 16,680

General Board American Navy

Units Gross Valuation
21 8-inch 210,000 204,460
10 6-inch 70,500 53,413
5 6-inch 35,250 33,840
315,750 291,213
Gen. Board American Navy 291,213
MacDonald new proposal 271,206

American Navy in excess by 20,000 valuation tons, or equal to two new 8-inch cruisers.

It is interesting to note the results of the application of Admiral Jones’ formula to Mr. MacDonald’s new proposal.

[Page 26]

Admiral Jones’ Valuation

United Kingdom United States
15 8-inch 137,543 21 8-inch 205,760
21 old 6-inch 61,461 10 6-inch 50,865
2 old 6-inch 5,500 5 6-inch (new) 30,888
7 new 6-inch (6500) 39,244
5 new 6-inch (4500) 19,350
262,098 287,513

There is thus a difference of 25,500 valuation tons or 2 new 8-inch cruisers and one 6″ cruiser.

On Maximum Formula—

(G. B. Age—Admiral J. guns)

United Kingdom United States
15 8-inch 135,565 21 8-inch 204,360
21 6-inch (old) 55,898 10 6-inch (old) 48,754
2 6-inch (old) 5,000 5 6-inch (new) 30,888
7 6-inch (new) 39,100
5 6-inch (new) 19,350
254,913 284,002

Or American Navy in excess by 29,000 valuation tons (equal to 3 8-inch cruisers)

Subsequently Mr. Craigie presented me the memorandum21 upon which the above plan was formulated, in which I discover that their proposed U. S. Fleet is

Gross Navy Board Valuation
18 large 8″ 180,000 174,460
10 Omahas 70,500 53,413
7 New 6″ (7000) 49,000 47,250
299,500 275,123

It will be seen that this fleet is 4000 valuation tons above Mr. MacDonald’s new fleet and could be reduced by one new 6″ and still fall within the Navy Board valuation formula.

Using the Navy Board formula for age and Admiral Jones’ formula for guns the valuation of these two fleets would be as follows:

Gross Tons Valuation Tons
U. K. 325,280 254,913
U. S. 299,500 266,000
–26,780 +12,900

[Page 27]

This indicates that we are two of the new ships in excess.

I informed Mr. MacDonald that I could not obviously agree to the reduction of two cruisers from 21 to 19 without the approval of my colleagues. My impression was that it offered an avenue for solution at the conference, that it was my belief that it was undesirable to submit these figures in such places as they would be likely to become public as that would only again start speculation and that we should hold them confidential within our administrations until we arrived at the conference, more especially if the British went into the conference with an initial claim for 339,000 tons of cruiser fleet. It would offer opportunity for adjustment.

It was decided to leave it in this position.

[Enclosure]

Mr. Craigie’s Memorandum of October 6, 1929

Cruiser Problem

1.
The Japanese make a strong claim for 70% of 8″ tonnage of strongest Power. Total tonnage of 12 Japanese 8″ ships built and building is 10′, 400 [108,400]. This figure is 70% of 154,800, which would only give the United States between 15 and 16 8″ ships.
2.
The above shows that even if the United States come down to 18 8″ ships (180,000 tons) we cannot satisfy the Japanese claim to 70% of America’s 8″ tonnage. On the contrary, 108,400 tons is only 60% of 180,000 tons. On numbers we should however be offering the Japanese a 67% ratio and it is probable that they would accept this ratio under pressure. We could not however be a party to endeavoring to depress the Japanese ratio still further.
3.
Either therefore the United States must come down to 18 8″ ships or Great Britain and Japan must build further 8″ cruisers. The latter alternative would be disastrous from every point of view, so we are inexorably brought back to the former.
4.
How can this excess of 30,000 tons of American 8″ cruiser tonnage be disposed of? It is suggested that the line of least resistance would be to follow three methods simultaneously, i. e. (1) transfer of American 8″ tonnage to 6″ tonnage; (2) increase in yardstick in our favor; (3) reduction of total British cruiser tonnage each side making an equal contribution to bridge the gap.
5.
The precise allocation to each of the above categories of the tonnage to be reduced is a matter for negotiation, but the following plan is suggested as a fair compromise.
(a)
U. S. to transfer 14,000 tons of 8″ tonnage to her 6″ allowance thus permitting the construction of 2 more 7,000 ton 6″ cruisers (i. e. 7 in all instead of 5 as she now proposes.)
(b)
The present American yardstick works out at what the Americans call a discount in our favor of 24,280 tons on a total American tonnage of 315,000. Expressed differently, it means that 1 ton of 8″ tonnage equals 1.38 tons of 6″ tonnage. That is, one 10,000 ton 8″ cruiser would be regarded as the equivalent of two 6,900 ton 6″ gun cruisers. This is manifestly absurd even on calibre alone, since the bursting power of the 8″ shell is something like six times the bursting power of the 6″ shell. The transfer of tonnage suggested under (a) above would bring the yardstick ratio up from 1:1.38 to 1:1.49. Even this is entirely insufficient and it is suggested that nothing less than a ratio of 1:1.′ [1:1.8] would bring us within reach of real parity in combatant strength, which is the avowed purpose of the yardstick. This latter ratio works out at one 10,000 ton 8″ ship to three 6,000 ton 6″ ships which, though inadequate of this ratio would enable the Americans to reduce by a further 8,600 tons.
(c)
This would leave 7,600 tons of the 30,000 ton gap to be bridged. Working on a yardstick ratio 1:1.8 we should have to reduce one 6″ cruiser tonnage by 13,680 to enable the United States to reduce its 8″ cruiser tonnage by 7,600. It is believed that the Admiralty might be brought to agree to this if we could secure an agreement amongst the Naval Powers (with the possible exception of the United States) that 50% of the numbers of cruisers in each Navy shall be 4,500–5,000 ton ships. (This would be the proportion in our Navy if the suggested reduction of 13,680 in our 6″ tonnage were to be realized, i. e. 25 out of 50 ships would be of an average tonnage of 4,500 tons). As Japan and Italy already have well over 50% of the cruisers in the 5,000 ton type or smaller and France has about 33% in the smaller type, such an agreement should not be impossible.

To sum up:

The 30,000 ton American 8″ excess might, it is suggested, be disposed of as follows:

(a) By transfer of 14,000 tons to 6″ gun category 14,000
(b) By raising yardstick ratio from 1:1.38C to 1:1.8 8,400
(c) By reducing British light cruiser tonnage by 13,680 7,600
30,000 tons

Under this scheme the British and American cruiser strengths would be as follows:

British Empire

15 8″ gun cruisers 146,800
35 6″ gun cruisers 178,800
325,600 tons

United States

18 8″ gun cruisers 180,000
10 Omahas 70,000
7 new 6″ gun cruisers 49,000
299,000 tons
[Page 29]

Discount in our favour 26,600 tons, i. e. 13% on 199,000 tons.

Ratio of 8″ tonnage to 6″ tonnage equals 1 ton of 8″ to 1.8 tons of 6″.

Ratio of ships: 1 10,000 tons 8″ cruiser equals 3 6,000 ton 6″ cruisers.

[Annex VII22]

The Secretary to the President (Richey) to the Secretary of State

My Dear Mr. Secretary: The President has asked me to transmit to you the enclosed notes which he drafted today in connection with naval parity.

Yours sincerely,

Lawrence Richey
[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by President Hoover

The contracting nations agree that in case of any dispute between them that they are unable to refer to arbitration or judicial decision, they shall continue discussions looking to settlement for at least one year after the origin of such dispute, or alternatively they will each request through another nation the creation of a committee of inquiry upon which the disputants shall be represented and no military action shall take place during the twelve months.

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by President Hoover

The parity basis of the two nations shall be 250,000 tons measured in new Washington Treaty cruisers, that is, 10,000 ton cruisers with 8–inch guns, but for ships not exceeding 7,000 tons equipped with 6″ guns an additional gross tonnage shall be allowed not exceeding 20% of the displacement of the latter type of cruisers.

Either nation may elect what type of cruisers it will construct within these ratios. These standards being fixed upon new cruisers (not exceeding three years of age) an additional tonnage may be maintained from time to time compensating for the depreciation due to age within the following formula of progressive obsolescence: (General Board Formula)

[Page 30]

Upon this formula the following fleets could be maintained—

American Fleet No. 1

21 large cruisers 210,000 less age factor 204,000
10 Omaha (less age & 20% gun factor) 41,000
Displacement: 280,000
245,000

American Fleet No. 2

18 large cruisers 180,000 — age factor 184,000
10 Omaha (less age & 20% gun factor) 41,000
5 new 35,000 ton less 20% gun factor 27,500
Displacement 285,000
252,500

British Fleet No. 1

15 large cruisers less age factor 135,565
21 old cruisers 6″ type, less age and 20% gun factor 44,900
8 old 6″ cruisers, less age and 20% gun factor 72,800
Total displacement 339, 000 253,200
[Annex VIII23]

Memorandum by the Secretary of State24

Stimson No. 1

Hoover No. 3

proposed article iii for kellogg–briand pact

The High Contracting Parties further agree that if there should develop between any of them a controversy which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy in event of any controversy which satisfactory settlement is not made by direct negotiation or by reference to arbitration or judicial decision it shall be investigated by an impartial commission of conciliation, to be selected by the parties to the controversy and upon which commission said parties may be represented, which shall have full power to examine all the facts concerning such controversy. and to render to both parties and to make public their conclusions. To this end any of the High Contracting Parties not parties to such a controversy may suggest to them the propriety of the creation of such a commission of conciliation and such suggestion shall not be deemed an unfriendly act.

[Page 31]
[Annex IX25]

Statement Drafted by Mr. R. L. Craigie for Inclusion in the Joint Statement to the Press

As a part of the general policy of our two governments to promote the cause of conciliation and arbitration, we believe that the provisions of the Pact of Peace renouncing war as an instrument of national policy would be further strengthened if the interested Powers were to undertake to consult together with a view to agreement as to the best method of preventing a threatened outbreak of hostilities.

A26

We are determined to seek for methods to crystallize the support of the public opinion of the world to those nations which rely upon pacific means for settlement of any controversy.

[Annex X25]

Draft of a Proposed Joint Statement by President Hoover and the British Prime Minister (MacDonald)

Both the President and Prime Minister recognize that such a suggestion is impracticable except by worldwide revision of existing treaties and of international law among nations and only after a further development of pacific thought. The Prime Minister however considers that the suggestion is so pregnant with hope not only because of its transcendent humane character but also as a contribution to thought upon rights and immunities at sea that it should be made public.

  1. October 7.
  2. Charles Francis Adams, Secretary of the Navy.
  3. i.e., Prime Minister MacDonald.
  4. See letter from President Hoover, October 10, p. 31.
  5. George Akerson, Secretary to the President.
  6. Not printed.
  7. Filed under 033.4111 MacDonald, Ramsay/95⅗.
  8. Infra.
  9. Filed under 033.4111 MacDonald, Ramsay/95⅘.
  10. Filed under 033.4111 MacDonald, Ramsay/.
  11. Canceled type indicates words apparently crossed out by President Hoover and italics those words written in by him.
  12. Filed under 033.4111 MacDonald, Ramsay/.
  13. Added paragraph in the handwriting of the Secretary of State.
  14. Filed under 033.4111 MacDonald, Ramsay/.