500.A15 a 1/474: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
114. Your No. 55, July 19, 4 p.m., in regard to adherence to the 5–3 ratio with Japan, as set forth in my telegram 106 of July 18.
In a recent informal conversation with some of the members of the Japanese delegation they expressed their regret that we had not taken up the question of ratio with them in detail and they indicated their fear that other questions would be settled, leaving unsettled only the question of ratio with Japan, and that if the Conference should then fail on account of American-Japanese disagreement on ratio this would bring about bad feeling between the two countries which they were most’ desirous of avoiding.
Hitherto we have refrained on purpose from discussing the ratio question with the Japanese in detail since our disagreements with British delegates seemed of such a fundamental nature that it would be bad policy to raise difficulties with the Japanese as well, particularly as we hoped for their support in reducing the exaggerated British tonnage demands and the maintenance of our freedom to arm with 8-inch guns. However, in view of the possibility that the British delegation will be in a position to negotiate on these points upon their return it may be necessary for us to discuss ratios and tonnage with the Japanese at a very early date.
As you know, even before the Conference the Japanese were emphatic in their demands that they could not take home a treaty based on the minority ratio with any hope of obtaining ratification. Nevertheless, I have every reason for hoping that even the encouragement which British have given them to ask for a substantial modification of the ratio will not lead them to forget the fact that we for our part cannot expect ratification of any treaty which might substantially impair the principle of the ratio. This much has already been made very clear to the Japanese.
In all our discussions the Japanese have indicated that they hope to take home a treaty which will not require that they indulge in new construction other than that already planned. It is obviously to our interest that they maintain this position, particularly as it is their feeling that if the treaty gave them latitude in building, popular opinion would very likely compel them to do so.
[Page 131]It is my opinion that a careful balance should be struck between the unfavorable results of a small change in the 5–3 ratio and the tangible gains arising from an agreement. Changes of a minor nature which would enable the Japanese Government to overcome their domestic political criticism while not invalidating the ratio principle should, I believe, receive careful study.
Would you object to expanding the instructions you originally gave us in such a way as to allow Jones and me to discuss with the Japanese, and refer to you for your decision, our ideas as to methods which might be adopted for reaching a compromise which would satisfy our justifiable demand for the maintenance of the 5–3 ratio as well as satisfying the Japanese necessity for meeting their domestic political objections?
You are, of course, aware of the Japanese dislike for the term “ratio” and we have therefore endeavored to discuss the matter in terms of tonnages while at the same time remaining hopeful of maintaining the actual ratio figure. You might consider coming to some reasonable adjustment on tonnage basis.
- Telegram in two sections.↩